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[1] 
Introduction 
 
 
In the archives of the former Danish telephone company Jydsk Telefon A/S 
(JTAS), one finds a drawing illustrating the effects of a 30-kiloton atomic bomb 
exploding at a height of 600 metres. The drawing depicts how, within a radius 
of 700 meters from the attack target, complete obliteration is to be expected. 
Less damage is expected when moving further away from the centre: Within a 
radius of 1400 meters from the attack target, electronic material is expected to 
be completely destructed, while moderate damage on brick buildings is 
expected within a radius of 2900 meters.1 
The drawing, dated January 11 1956, was sent to the telephone company 
from a colonel in the Danish Defence. The occasion for this rather dramatic 
letter was a discussion that had taken place in the autumn of 1955 regarding 
the automation of the public telephone exchange in the town of Slagelse on the 
Danish island of Zealand. Slagelse was actually located outside of JTAS’ 
operating area, but the telephone company operating in that region, 
Kjøbenhavns Telefon A/S (KTAS), had reported on its plans for a new 
building for the exchange at a meeting with representatives from the Danish 
telecom sector. The colonel, who participated in the meeting as an observer, 
objected that in relation to similar projects in the future, the telephone 
companies would have to pay more attention to national security. The drawing, 
sent to all three Danish telephone companies and the Postal and Telegraph 
Services (P&T) as a follow-up on this discussion, was complemented with the 
message that the colonel was now ready to discuss this “most important issue” 
with them.2 
 
 
While the drawing does not seem to have caused a reaction in neither JTAS 
nor the other addressees, it did usher in a new era. The drawing reflected a 
new challenge caused by the geopolitical circumstances of the Cold War: What 
would happen to the public telephone network in Denmark if it came to 
nuclear war? How could the network be protected against this threat? And who 
were responsible hereof?  
Indeed, by 1956 the ‘atomic age’ had arrived, also in the area of 
telecommunications. In the years and decades that followed, the Danish 
                                               
1 Illustration sent from FTF, January 11 1956. JTAS, Journalsager 1896-1988, 209. RA. 
2 Minutes of SU meetings, October 27 1955 and January 26 1956. TM, TTS, Bilag til 
samarbejdsudvalgets møder. RA. 
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telephone companies and the P&T took part in a wide range of initiatives with 
the purpose of preparing the telecommunications infrastructure for a nuclear 
war. This played out within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) of which Denmark had been a member since its 
establishment in 1949.3 As a defence alliance, NATO was worth little if its 
member states, commands, and agencies were not able to communicate 
securely and reliably with each other – on an everyday basis as well as in critical 
situations. As a 1971 NATO report underlined, “[w]ithout continuing reliable 
communications, a government could not govern, the military effort could not 
be sustained, and national participation in the defence effort at NATO level 
would be inhibited.” Moreover, the report stressed that “[t]elecommunications 
is not a field in which, in a time of crisis, improvisation could make up 
deficiencies in peacetime planning and provision.”4 Accordingly, through the 
decades of the Cold War, a wide range of steps were taken within NATO to 
connect and to protect national and transnational telecommunications 
infrastructure. 
 
*** 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate how the Cold War brought about 
a new security framework in the area of telecommunications. I do this by 
studying different efforts to protect communications infrastructures in NATO 
and in Denmark from the late 1940s through to the years around 1990. I 
examine how telecommunications were governed in terms of security, and 
more specifically how the different efforts to provide secure 
telecommunications were shaped by both technological and political agendas.  
Today, we label such efforts to secure communication facilities as ‘critical 
infrastructure protection’ and the protection of information and 
communication systems as ‘cyber security’. Although both terms are products 
of the post-Cold War era, the perception and governance of communication 
infrastructures as crucial and vulnerable have a long history.5 In fact, as the 
American historian of technology Daniel Headrick has called attention to, the 
quests for reliability and security have been important factors in the 
                                               
3 The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on April 4 1949 by the United 
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Portugal, and Italy. From 1950, the cooperation on the 
treaty was referred to as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 
4 Schedule on maintenance of government, April 8 1971. Annex A to C-M(71)18. NA. 
5 For the critical infrastructure agenda of the 1990s, see van der Vleuten et al., “Europe's 
Critical Infrastructure and Its Vulnerabilities”, p. 3; Collier and Lakoff, “The 
Vulnerability of Vital Systems”, p. 17. For emergence of the concept of cyber security, 
see Hansen and Nissenbaum, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen 
School”. 
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development of communication networks since the mid-nineteenth century, 
when the development of the electric telegraph marked the beginning of 
modern telecommunications.6 Since then, with a view to security, governments 
and private operators have taken a number of measures to protect 
communication facilities and the information transmitted through them: 
Landline cables have been dug deeply into the ground; submarine cables laid 
along the least exposed routes; communication nodes relocated to secret out-
of-the-way places; messages encrypted; and plans for maintaining 
communications in case of emergency prepared. Today, as the cyber threat 
ranks as one of the main security threats against modern, digitised societies, 
governments and other security actors put major efforts into safeguarding 
information and communication technologies.7 
In historical research on telecommunications security and politics, 
communication networks have often been studied as an element of power in 
diplomatic relations or an instrument of state control.8 For the Cold War 
period, the role of telecommunications in the geopolitical conflict has for 
example been explored in studies of the development of satellites as part of the 
superpower space race, of radio broadcasting as an arena for propaganda, or 
of the application of high-tech interception systems for the gathering of signal 
intelligence.9 This dissertation, by contrast, suggests another lens through which 
to study telecommunications during the Cold War: In the atomic age, as the 
JTAS drawing indicates, the threat of nuclear war caused governments and 
actors in the telecommunication sectors to think differently about the 
vulnerability and ‘criticality’ of transnational and national communication 
networks. The preparations for a total war that took place in NATO and the 
alliance’s member states illuminated the crucial role that telecommunications 
played for all parts of modern societies – governments, defences, businesses, 
and individuals in times of peace as well as war. In this light, telecommunication 
infrastructures emerged as a backbone of modern society. 
This topic has only been touched upon very briefly in previous research. 
We know today that NATO invested heavily in constructing communication 
facilities for defence purposes in the member states and that national 
                                               
6 Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, p. 5. 
7 See for instance the latest cyber treat assessment from Denmark: CFCS, 
Trusselsvurdering: Cybertruslen mod Danmark. In response to the cyber threat, the 
NATO allies proclaimed cyber defence a part of the alliance’s core task of collective 
defence in 2014 and recognised cyberspace as an operational domain in 2016. See: 
Nato, “NATO Cyber Defence”. 
8 See for instance Headrick, The Tools of Empire; Headrick, The Invisible Weapon; 
Winseck and Pike, Communication and Empire; Hills, The Struggle for Control of 
Global Communication; Hills, Telecommunications and Empire. 
9 See for instance Slotten, “Satellite Communications, Globalization, and the Cold War”; 
Aid and Wiebes, “Introduction on The Importance of Signals Intelligence in the Cold 
War”; Risso, “Radio Wars”. 
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governments and telecom authorities prepared secret and secure systems for 
the vital communications that needed to be prioritised in wartime. However, 
besides knowing that such facilities and systems existed, we still lack an 
understanding of the underlying visions and wider significance hereof. It is my 
hypothesis that the attempts to secure telecommunication systems in the Cold 
War were also attempts to promote specific technological and political agendas 
in communications. Therefore, in this dissertation I examine developments in 
the area of telecommunications through the lens of Cold War security politics. 
I do this in three different ways. 
First, my examinations deal with interactions of politics and technologies. 
The Cold War was a state of conflict which emerged in the aftermath of the 
Second World War between a Western and an Eastern bloc, representing the 
two different political systems of capitalism and socialism.10 In recent years, 
historians have explored how this political conflict also manifested in 
technologies – not only in the development of nuclear weapons and space 
technologies as part of the race between the two superpowers, the United States 
and the Soviet Union, but also in other technological areas.11 Building on this, 
I take my point of departure in the assumption that Cold War politics – and 
more specifically regional alliance politics in NATO and national security 
politics in Denmark – translated into technological and organisational practices 
in the area of telecommunications. 
Second, in continuation hereof, I examine what I refer to as the ‘Cold 
War preparedness agenda’. In a Western European perspective, the Cold War 
years can be characterised as an ‘era of preparedness’, as the military build-up 
of Western Europe beginning in the late 1940s with the aim of deterring a 
Soviet attack went hand in hand with an increased awareness to civil defence 
and emergency planning. Moreover, since both superpowers possessed large 
arsenals of nuclear weapons, the Cold War conflict was in its essence defined 
by the threat of nuclear war. In response to the Soviet Union’s test of the atomic 
bomb in 1949, the hydrogen bomb in 1953, and the later development of inter-
continental ballistic missiles capable of reaching long-distance targets on enemy 
territory, preparing for war in the Western block essentially meant planning for 
survival in a nuclear war. Under the umbrella of a ‘total defence’ – in response 
to the prospect of a total war – all parts of the society including public 
authorities, private businesses, and the civilian population were somehow 
involved in the preparedness planning, including actors in the telecom sector. 
                                               
10 On the characterization of the Cold War, see Westad, The Cold War, p. 1f.; Lane, 
“Introduction: The Cold War as History”, p. 1; Olesen, “Den Kolde Krigs Historie”, p. 
11; Immerman and Goedde, “Introduction”. 
11 See for instance Hecht and Edwards, “The Technopolitics of the Cold War”; 
Reynolds, “Science, technology, and the Cold War”. 
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In this way, the very notions of defence and security were broadened and the 
boundaries between military and civilian spheres were blurred.  
Third, I explore the junction between national, international, and 
transnational telecommunications. Historically, communication infrastructures 
have primarily been a responsibility of the nation state and have been 
constructed and protected within the confines hereof. However, modern 
telecommunications – as indeed many other modern infrastructures – are 
transnational nearly by definition, facilitating cross-border flows of 
communication and information. Cooperation between nation states on 
telecommunication matters therefore has a long history, both on a bilateral 
basis and within an international framework, not least marked by the 1865 
establishment of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).12 In the 
Cold War period, more international arenas for collaboration on 
communications between states appeared, one of them being NATO, within 
which the construction, interconnection, and protection of both national and 
transnational telecommunications infrastructures evolved to be an important 
task. While the responsibility for doing so remained at the member state level, 
national communications were taken into a new international context, since the 
commitment of the North Atlantic Treaty that each member state should 
“maintain and develop [its] individual and collective capacity to resist armed 
attack” could also be regarded as applying to national communications.13 
Thus, by examining how the Cold War preparedness agenda became a 
motive force for technological and organisational developments in the area of 
telecommunications and how this manifested in technopolitical practices 
shaped in a national, transnational, and international setting, this dissertation 
offers new perspectives to both the history of telecommunications and Cold 
War history. This introductory chapter provides a framework for my analysis. 
In what follows, I will first elaborate on my research question and situate my 
work in the existing historiography related to these issues. Next, I present my 
methodology and the empirical basis for my examinations. 
 
1.1 Research questions and arguments 
The overarching research questions for the dissertation are as follows: Which 
technopolitical agendas lay behind the efforts to connect and protect 
                                               
12 ITU was established in 1865 when representatives from twenty European states 
gathered in Paris for an international telegraph conference, leading to the signing of the 
International Telegraph Convention of May 17 1865. Prior to this, bilateral and regional 
cooperation had taken place in Central and Western Europe since the late 1840s. For 
more, see Jacobsen, “Small Nation, International Submarine Telegraphy, and 
International Politics”, p. 117; Codding, The International Telecommunication Union, 
p. 13f. 
13 “The North Atlantic Treaty”, April 4 1949, article 3. NA-E. 
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telecommunications in NATO and Denmark during the Cold War, and how 
were telecommunications governed in terms of security? 
As for the ‘technopolitical agendas’ that I aim to explore, I take 
inspiration from the concept of technopolitics. Technopolitics refer to the 
recognition that the design and development of technical systems can be used 
to enact political goals. This builds on the perception that technologies are 
shaped by political and social choices, resulting from a process in which 
technical capabilities and political possibilities define the scope of action.14 In 
accordance with this approach, technologies and infrastructures like 
telecommunications can have political visions or agendas embedded in them 
in different ways, and it is my assumption that the same applies to the technical 
measures and systems introduced to secure communicate on networks. In 
asking how telecommunications were governed in terms of security, I refer to 
the process of ‘governance’ undertaken by both governments, institutions, and 
other actors exerting influence on a specific area. Studying governance implies 
that I do not limit my focus to political decisions, but also take into 
consideration the making and implementation hereof. I understand this as a 
process in which different actors interact, in this case military and civilian 
agencies in NATO, different national delegations, and – within Denmark – the 
Danish government, Danish ministries, the Danish Defence, and the telecom 
sector. In Denmark, this sector was structured as a hybrid between public 
monopoly and private service composed by the Postal and Telegraph Services 
(P&T) – a department under the Ministry of Public Works – and three ‘private’ 
telephone companies (of which the state however owned the majority).15 The 
security governance of telecommunications, in other words, involved both 
politicians, military personnel, civil servants, business operators, and 
technicians.  
By making technopolitics and security governance my main objects of 
study, I am able to reach an understanding of the security framework that 
surrounded telecommunications in NATO and Denmark during the Cold 
War. The choice of the two different settings, NATO and Denmark, allows 
me to explore how this process played out in both an international and a 
national context. NATO was a main organisational actor in Cold War Western 
European security in the period under study, while Denmark is an interesting 
case as a NATO allied, being – with the words of the Danish historian Nikolaj 
Petersen – “an exposed frontline state with severely constrained policy 
                                               
14 I base my understanding of ‘technopolitics’ on an analytical framework presented by 
the American historians Gabrielle Hecht and Paul Edwards. I shall get back to this in 
section 1.3. 
15 Through the dissertation, I will refer to the telephone companies as private companies, 
since they are typically labelled as such in the contemporary material. I shall elaborate on 
the status of the companies in chapter three and six. 
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options”.16 However, the national context will take up more pages in the 
dissertation. This is, on the one hand, caused by the circumstance that the 
securing of communications eventually happened in the member state. On the 
other hand, as I shall get back to later in this introductory chapter, it is also a 
consequence of the character of the available archive material, which allows me 
to explore the national context more thoroughly than the international context. 
The dissertation overall shows how new aspects of the history of 
telecommunications come to the foreground when approaching the topic from 
the point of view of Cold War technopolitics and security governance. It is my 
main argument that political and technological developments in the Cold War 
period necessitated a new kind of security governance of the area of 
telecommunications. This was, on the one hand, a reply to the international 
defence cooperation among the NATO allies and the alliance’s strategic 
developments, for which communications played a vital role. On the other 
hand, the Cold War preparedness agenda overall involved a broadening of the 
scope of telecommunications security, in terms of both objects, methods, and 
actors.  
 
1.2 Telecommunications and the Cold War: Research overview 
The topic of telecommunications and security governance in the Cold War has 
not yet received much attention in historical research. My examinations will 
primarily be based on empirical studies of archive material, of which a 
substantial part has not yet been used in historical research. Yet, I build upon 
a number of existing and expanding research fields rooted in both political 
history, the history of technology, and business history. In this section, I outline 
the insights from these historiographies that are important for my study and 
suggest how my work expands upon them. 
My project falls within a pluralistic turn in Cold War research that has 
taken place in the decades following the end of the Cold War. Traditionally, 
the historiography on the Cold War has been divided into the three schools of 
traditionalism, revisionism, and post-revisionism; schools that have all arisen 
out of American research environments and analysed the Cold War primarily 
from a Western, in particular American, perspective.17 However, in what could 
                                               
16 Petersen, “The Dilemmas of Alliance”, p. 275. 
17 The traditional (or orthodox) school dominating the research agenda in the 1950s and 
1960s understood the Soviet Union as an aggressive and the US as a defensive and 
reactive part in the conflict, whereas the revisionist school gained ground in the mid-
1960s with a radically different critical view on American foreign policy. Since the 1970s, 
the release of new archive material has paved the way for a post-revisionism, which has 
drawn upon insights from both of the previous schools when conducting more thorough 
empirical studies. Although the schools have dominated different periods, main 
viewpoints from all of them remain present in Cold War research today. See Mariager, 
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be labelled as ‘new Cold War history’, these perspectives are being challenged, 
and, as the historian Federico Romero has observed, Cold War research today 
studies multiple actors in a “complex fabric of disparate interactions” – local, 
national, transnational, and global.18 Furthermore, in this pluralistic turn, 
political and diplomatic history has profited from bringing in perspectives from 
other historical disciplines, and other areas than the customary ones of 
diplomacy, security, and ideology have gained attention. One of these is 
technology. Technology has long been recognised as an important factor in the 
geopolitical conflict, but the focus in research has primarily been limited to the 
‘flashy flagships’ of nuclear weapons and space technologies.19 In recent years, 
however, historians have paid increased attention to the role played by other 
technologies and to how Cold War tensions were manifest not only in global 
political disputes but also in technologies and technological practices.20 Since 
my study is concerned with a technology that was already present when the 
Cold War began, but saw a rapid development through the following decades, 
it offers the opportunity to explore how a technology-in-use interplayed with 
the new geopolitical realities.21 
With the broadened focus and the conceptualisation of a growing 
number of topics as ‘Cold War issues’, one can ask where the boundaries of 
Cold War research are to be drawn. Does the very notion of the Cold War 
                                               
“Den Kolde Krig i international og dansk historieforskning”, p. 720ff.; Westad, 
“Introduction: Reviewing the Cold War”, p. 3f. 
18 Romero, “Cold War historiography at the crossroads”, p. 687. See also Mariager, 
“Den Kolde Krig i international og dansk historieforskning”, p. 723. An important 
contribution to the pluralistic turn in Cold War historiography is the three edited 
volumes of The Cambridge History of the Cold War published in 2010. On the 
background for this work and the need to place Cold War conflicts within the broader 
history of the twentieth century, see Westad, “The Cold War and the International 
History of the Twentieth Century”. 
19 The point about the flashy flagships has been made by the American historian of 
science, Gabrielle Hecht, see: Hecht, “Introduction”, p. 2. 
20 This is connected with the observation that the Cold War state in an unprecedented 
way became a patron for science and technology, since achievements in science and 
technology also became part of the superpower space race. See for instance Reynolds, 
“Science, technology, and the Cold War”; Hecht and Edwards, “The Technopolitics of 
the Cold War”. On the call for increased focus on technology’s role in the Cold War, 
see LaFeber, “Presidential Address: Technology and U.S. Foreign Relations”; Oreskes, 
“Introduction”; Westad, “The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth 
Century”, pp. 11-13; Hanhimäki and Westad eds., The Cold War, p. 273; Weinberger, 
“The Neutrality Flagpole”. 
21 The notion of technology-in-use is a reference to the British historian of technology 
David Edgerton. Edgerton has called for historians to rethink the notion of technological 
time and break with innovation-centrism, stressing the majority of actors engaged in 
technologies have been concerned with operation and maintenance and not innovation. 
However, my analysis will not follow an Edgerton-inspired focus on things and users. See 
Edgerton, The Schock of the Old, p. xi. 
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risk being diluted?22 For this purpose, the historian Akira Iriye has offered a 
clarification: To assign the central role to the Cold War in periodising post-
Second World War history must be to consider geopolitics the key to recent 
history.23 Put in another way, if the Cold War is to be understood as more than 
a historical period, research on Cold War history must bring the political-
ideological conflict into the centre of the analysis. Accordingly, the choice of 
this dissertation to study telecommunications in a Cold War perspective builds 
on the assumption that my object of study was somehow intertwined with 
geopolitics, i.e. the East-West conflict. However, if studies of the Cold War are 
to extend into areas such as telecommunications, it is necessary to confer with 
new research fields. 
 
Telecommunications 
The understanding of telecommunications as intertwined with geopolitics is not 
new. ‘Telecommunications’ as a term has been in use since the beginning of 
the twentieth century and widely refers to different kinds of communication 
over distances such as telegraphy and telephony.24 As an international research 
field, telecommunications history has been studied from many perspectives, 
but of particular interest for my examination are studies of the role played by 
telecommunications in international relations and the attempts made by 
governments and other actors to secure their communication facilities.25 
The historiography on telecommunications and international politics has 
mainly been concerned with the ‘formative period’ of modern 
telecommunications, from the birth of electric telegraphy in the mid-nineteenth 
century paving the way for global communication networks to the first half of 
the twentieth century.26 Historically, three groups of actors have fought over 
influence on global communications: States, businesses, and international 
                                               
22 This problematization has been raised by more scholars, see for instance: Nehring, 
“What Was the Cold War?”, p. 924; Romero, “Cold War historiography at the 
crossroads”, p. 687. 
23 Iriye, “Historicizing the Cold War”, p. 15. See also Mariager, “Den Kolde Krig i 
international og dansk historieforskning”, p. 740. 
24 According to the Swiss-Italian media scholar Gabrielle Balbi, the term was first coined 
in 1904 where it referred to all three telecommunication technologies available at the 
time: the optical and electrical telegraph and the telephone. Telecommunication became 
a term of common use in the 1920s and officially appeared in the name of the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) from 1932. Here, it first referred 
simultaneously to telegraph, telephone, and radio and later also to television, satellite, 
mobile phones, and the Internet. Balbi, “Telecommunications”, p. 209. See also 
Huurdeman, The Worldwide History of Telecommunications, p. 3f. 
25 For a general research overview on the history of telecommunications, see Balbi, 
“Telecommunications”; Balbi and John, “Point-to-point”. 
26 For the discussion on the character of the globalisation brought along by global 
telegraph networks, see Müller, “From Cabling the Atlantic to Wiring the World”. 
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technical organisations such as the ITU.27 A central topic in the historiography 
is the domination by the British empire in global communication networks and 
the French, German, and later American attempts to challenge this hegemony. 
The research field has not least been brought forward by the American 
historian Daniel Headrick, who in the 1980s characterised telecommunications 
as a “tool of empire” and in the early 1990s as an “invisible weapon” in 
international politics, stressing how flows of communications from the late 
nineteenth century onwards were perceived as a potential threat to national or 
imperial security and a dangerous weapon in the hands of potential enemies.28 
Building on this tradition, other scholars have since discussed the 
understanding of global communications as a site of struggle between the great 
powers of the pre-First World War world and the role of private corporations 
and technocrats in this regard.29 One of the aspects that has been examined in 
this connection is the strategic necessity for states to protect their global 
telecommunications networks from enemy interference or sabotage, whether 
this has been done through physical security measures, by building redundancy 
into networks, or by attempting to control flows of information in different 
ways. The potential security risk of communication networks was not least 
underlined in the two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century, in 
which the military potential of modern communications was demonstrated.30 
                                               
27 Tworek and Müller, “Introduction”, p. 407. The general tendency was that landline 
networks, besides in the United States, were primarily government-owned and 
submarine cable networks primarily controlled by multinational cable companies, 
although these were in different ways linked to nation states. 
28 Headrick, The Tools of Empire; Headrick, The Invisible Weapon. See also 
Headrick, “Strategic and Military Aspects of Submarine Telegraph Cables”. For an 
example from Danish history, see Kurt Jacobsen’s description of how being cut off from 
Britain during the dramatic events of 1864 led Danish decisionmakers to the conclusion 
that it was essential for the nation to control its own telecommunications: Jacobsen, 
“Small Nation, International Submarine Telegraphy, and International Politics”, p. 119f. 
29 See for instance Hugill, Global Communications Since 1844; Hills, The Struggle for 
Control of Global Communication; Hills, “What's New?”; Hills, Telecommunications 
and Empire. For the discussion of whether the development of global communication 
networks until the early twentieth century was driven by business and technocratic 
interests more than state rivalry, see: Headrick and Griset, “Submarine Telegraph 
Cables”; Winseck and Pike, Communication and Empire; Laborie, L'Europe mise en 
réseaux; Müller, Wiring the World; Müller, “From Cabling the Atlantic to Wiring the 
World”; Tworek, “How not to build a world wireless network”; Tworek, News from 
Germany. 
30 As stressed by Winkler, the value and vulnerability of cables had indeed become 
manifest to the great powers by 1918: Winkler, “Bridging the Gap”. For the role of the 
world wars, see Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, chapters 8-9, 12-13. For censorship as 
a control mechanism, see Hills, The Struggle for Control of Global Communication, pp. 
15, 70ff. As for the First World War, Elizabeth Bruton has shown how the British global 
telegraph network known as the ‘All Red Line’ had multiple redundancies built into it 
and only landed at safe spots and therefore remained essentially uninterrupted during 
the war, whereas Britain quickly succeeded in cutting Germany’s worldwide network. 
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The post-1945 period is far less explored in the literature on 
telecommunications history. Examinations directly linking developments in 
communications technologies to the Cold War conflict have generally focused 
on computers, radio broadcasting, and signal intelligence.31 Moreover, scholars 
have studied international telecommunications as an arena for exerting Cold 
War diplomacy. Focusing on the governance of international communications 
in the ITU, Léonard Laborie has studied how collaboration within the 
organisation was hampered by the new geopolitical circumstances.32 Drawing 
on developments both within ITU and in other forums, Jill Hills has studied 
US attempts to breach state sovereignty and create an international US 
telecommunications empire, while Hugh Slotten has concentrated specifically 
on US soft power diplomacy in the area of satellite communications.33 
Turning the focus to the national level, developments in 
telecommunication sectors have mainly been studied from the perspective of 
business history paying particular attention to the long-standing competition 
between public and private management of communications.34 As for the Cold 
War years, previous research has suggested that the importance that postal, 
telegraphy, and telephony (PTT) services had for national security allowed 
governments to tighten their hold on them, but this relation has yet to be 
scrutinised in research.35 Literature on Danish communication history has 
mainly studied the sector from an internalist point of view paying special 
attention to organisational and institutional aspects.36 The Danish telecom 
                                               
Bruton, “The Cable Wars”. For more on cable protection, also in the Cold War era, see 
Starosielski, The Undersea Network. 
31 See for instance Edwards, The Closed World; Abbate, Inventing the Internet; Hecht 
and Edwards, “The Technopolitics of the Cold War”; Reynolds, “Science, technology, 
and the Cold War”; Badenoch et al. eds., Airy Curtains in the European Ether; Risso, 
“Radio Wars”; Aid and Wiebes, “Introduction on The Importance of Signals 
Intelligence in the Cold War”; Hills, “What's New?”, p. 201f. 
32 Laborie, “A Missing Link?”, p. 188; Laborie, “Fragile links, frozen identities”, p. 313; 
Beyersdorf, “Freedom of Communication”. 
33 Hills, Telecommunications and Empire; Slotten, “International Governance, 
Organizational Standards, and the First Global Satellite Communication System”; 
Slotten, “The International Telecommunications Union, Space Radio Communications, 
and U.S. Cold War Diplomacy”. For more on satellites or cable diplomacy in the Cold 
War, see also Ward, Information and Control; Dizard, Digital Diplomacy; Starosielski, 
The Undersea Network. 
34 Balbi, “Telecommunications”, pp. 209, 217. 
35 This argument has been brought forward by both Robert Millward and David 
Reynolds, see: Millward, “Business and the State”, p. 546; Reynolds, “Science, 
technology, and the Cold War”, p. 390. 
36 The history of the Danish Postal and Telegraph Services has been analysed in the five 
volumes of P&Ts Historie published in the early 1990s. For the period under study in 
this dissertation, see Blüdnikow, Post og Tele under samme tag and Johansen, Fra 
monopol til konkurrence. The history of the private, regional telephone companies has 
been documented in publications stemming from or supported by the companies 
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arrangement has been characterised as a hybrid between public monopoly and 
private service with competing agendas of nationalisation and privatisation, and 
the fact that the sector, despite several attempts, was not reorganised before the 
end of the Cold War has been explained with the concept of ‘path 
dependence’.37 The strong focus on explaining the inner workings of the sector 
means that there are only few examples of studies using the Danish telecom 
sector as a case study for a broader research agenda. These studies have 
focused on wars, security, and surveillance with a predominant focus in time 
on the two world wars.38  
It still remains to be examined how the Cold War influenced Danish 
telecommunications.39 The role of the Danish telephone companies in the 
Cold War intelligence apparatus has been examined as part of a major 
investigation of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (Politiets 
Efterretningstjeneste, PET) during the Cold War, which was initiated by a 
parliamentary decision in 1999 and published in 2009.40 Moreover, as 
mentioned previously, a few studies have briefly touched upon specific security 
arrangements for communications in Denmark during the Cold War, but only 
                                               
themselves. See Jacobsen, Jydsk Telefon; Birch, Linjer af Jydsk Telefons 100 årige 
historie; KTAS i hundrede år.  
37 Ibsen and Skovgaard Poulsen, “Path dependence and independent utility regulation”; 
Jacobsen, Jydsk Telefon, pp. 14ff.; Blüdnikow, Enhedsvæsenet, p. 113; Andersen, 
Omstillingen er klar; Henten, 100 års telefonlov; Henten, “Dansk telefonhistorie”; 
Olsen, Regulering af offentlige forsyningsvirksomheder i Danmark, p. 271ff. For 
comparative Scandinavian studies, see Jeding et al., “Regulatory change and international 
co-operation”; Rinde, Kontingens og Kontinuitet. 
38 See in particular Andreas Marklund’s research on the collaboration between the 
telecom sector and the state on surveillance, censorship, and other kinds of control 
mechanisms: Marklund, “A Stake in Public Confidence”; Marklund “Suspekte 
beskeder”; Marklund, “Listening for the state”; Marklund, “Global Peace and Bolshevik 
Agitation”. For the Second World War, see the 2007 PhD dissertation analysing the 
Danish telecom sector during the German Occupation, including the wartime 
censorship: Mau, Kampen om telefonen. The same topic has earlier been explored in 
Blüdnikow, Post og Tele under samme tag, p. 333f. For new perspectives on surveillance 
and wiretapping, see Nielsen, Er der nogen på linjen?; Marklund “Trawling the Wires”.  
Moreover, Kurt Jacobsen has used the Great Norterh Telegraph Company as a case 
study of small state diplomacy, see Jacobsen, “Small Nation, International Submarine 
Telegraphy, and International Politics”. 
39 However, I have previously conducted two studies that must be mentioned in this 
connection. One is my 2013 unpublished master’s thesis, which was a preliminary study 
to this PhD project. In the thesis, I examined how telecommunications were ‘securitized’ 
in the early Cold War years. Moreover, in a 2017 article I studied NATO’s engagement 
with the concept of infrastructure in the 1950s and also drew upon examples from 
Denmark. In this dissertation, I bring in a few of the empirical cases that I also dealt with 
in these previous studies, but my analytical focus is different. See: Jensen, Klartone efter 
atombomben; Jensen, “Connecting the Alliance”. 
40 See Schmidt and Miller, PET's virkemidler, p. 163ff. 
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as a short mentioning in examinations with another focus.41 An important 
source of inspiration for this dissertation is a 2005 three-volume publication on 
Norwegian telecommunication history, in which the examination of the Cold 
War period by the Norwegian business historian Harald Espeli pays special 
attention to how Cold War geopolitics and the NATO membership influenced 
the Norwegian telecom sector. Espeli suggests that lack of civilian-military 
collaboration in Norway became a decisive factor for the backlog in Norwegian 
telecom developments in the second half of the twentieth century.42 
 
Technologies, infrastructures, and the nuclear threat 
This dissertation falls within a turn in the historical research on technologies 
and infrastructures. In the last two decades, the traditional focus on national 
perspectives and internal logics of infrastructural and technological systems has 
been challenged by scholars paying increased attention to transnational and 
political aspects.43 This turn has for instance caused historians to rethink the 
history of European integration through the lens of transnational infrastructures 
and technologies, thereby introducing a ‘making Europe’ narrative.44 In this 
regard, transnational connections of infrastructures and technologies have been 
understood as an alternative or ‘hidden’ European integration process, 
fostering both concrete manifestations and visions of ‘Europe’.45 An important 
work to mention in this regard is the 2016 book Europe’s Infrastructure 
Transition written by Per Högselius, Arne Kaijser, and Erik van der Vleuten. 
The book outlines how nineteenth and twentieth century European 
infrastructures have both been integrative and divisive and how different 
system-builders and border-builders with different agendas have shaped and 
reshaped Europe as a geographical entity – all of which has had far-reaching 
                                               
41 See: ibid., p. 186; Jensen, Ulve, Får og Vogtere 2, p. 249f; Pedersen and Pedersen, 
Danmarks Dybeste Hemmelighed, pp. 153f., 328f.; Stevnsborg, Magt, krig og 
centralisering, p. 257. I shall get back to this in chapter five. 
42 See Espeli, Det statsdominerte teleregimet, p. 273ff. 
43 For the criticism that history of technology has been suffering from national bias and 
neglect of politics and for the call for a new, transnational perspective, see, i.a. van der 
Vleuten and Kaijser, “Prologue and Introduction”, p. 8.  
44 This research agenda is closely connected with the Foundation for the History of 
Technology’s project, ‘Tensions of Europe’, which began in 1998 (see 
https://www.tensionsofeurope.eu/). On the call for a new research agenda, see Misa and 
Schot, “Introduction: Inventing Europe”. An important result of this agenda is the six 
volume book series Making Europe: Technology and Transformations, 1850-2000 
(2013-2018). The narrative is presented in the common introduction to the series, see 
for instance Högselius et al., Europe's Infrastructure Transition, p. xii. 
45 Misa and Schot, “Introduction: Inventing Europe”; Badenoch and Fickers, “Europe 
Materializing?”; Schipper and Schot, “Infrastructural Europeanism”;  Kaiser and Schot, 
Writing the Rules for Europe; van der Vleuten and Kaijser eds., Networking Europe. 
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implications for political developments in Europe, both in terms of military 
planning and European integration.46  
This transnational turn is noteworthy as regards my study of NATO’s 
telecommunications infrastructure which was, exactly, transnational, as it 
crossed national borders, connected allied territories, and furthered circulation 
of information. The ‘networking’ of the NATO allies still constitutes a lacuna 
in historical research. In general, however, the number of large transnational 
technological projects in Europe increased dramatically in the Cold War 
period, and the attempts among NATO allies to connect existing and establish 
new infrastructural systems must therefore be understood as part of a larger, 
contemporary trend.47 Thomas J. Misa and Johan Schot have suggested to 
“interpret the Cold War as a massive de-linking and relinking of transport, 
energy, and communication infrastructures in the very middle of Europe”.48 
Building on this, Erik van der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser have stressed how the 
technological network building that took place in Europe in the post-war years 
intertwined with the emergence of an Eastern and a Western block divided by 
the Iron Curtain. Therefore, they argue, it is important to pay attention to how 
the ‘network builders’ behind this process – e.g. NATO – were products of the 
Cold War themselves.49 
Another important perspective in the newer historiography of Europe’s 
technology and infrastructure is the understanding of infrastructures as ‘critical’. 
Critical infrastructures have become a growing security concern since the 
1990s, but with ‘critical infrastructure’ as a lens, recent historical and social 
science research has traced both the ‘criticality’ of infrastructures and the 
governance of infrastructures as vulnerable back in time.50 In this regard, the 
2013 research anthology The Making of Europe’s Critical Infrastructure points 
towards the role of ‘critical events’ such as accidents or breakdowns in shaping 
understandings of infrastructure vulnerabilities by making risks more tangible. 
Moreover, the editors call attention to the interests of stakeholders in either de-
emphasising vulnerabilities or framing some infrastructures as particularly 
                                               
46 Högselius et al., Europe's Infrastructure Transition, pp. 3ff. Another volume in the 
same series is expected later in 2018: Fickers and Griset, Communicating Europe. 
This book analyses the role and function of Europe’s information and communication 
systems in shaping European spaces since 1850. For an examination of broadcasting with 
a similar approach, see Badenoch et al. eds., Airy Curtains in the European Ether. 
47 Trischler and Weinberger, “Engineering Europe”; Högselius et al., Europe's 
Infrastructure Transition, p. 225.  
48 Misa and Schot, “Introduction: Inventing Europe”, p. 9. 
49 van der Vleuten and Kaijser, “Networking Europe”, p. 36. 
50 For contemporary perspectives, see Aradau, “Discourse/materiality”; Aradau, 
“Infrastructure”; Aradau, “Security that Matters”. For an attempt to historicise 
information technologies along these lines, see Jackson, “Rethinking Repair”. 
 
 
21 
critical.51 On a different note, the media scholar Nicole Staroselski has in a 
study of submarine cables and ‘disruption narratives’ noted how such narratives 
reflect the dominant cultural fears of the time: In the telegraph era, breakdowns 
were traced back to the natural environment that threatened technological 
progress; during the Cold War, disruptions were coded as external aggression 
produced by hostile actors.52 The historicization of the perception and 
governance of critical infrastructures is important for this dissertation, given my 
aim of understanding the attempts to secure communications infrastructure 
during the Cold War in a wider technopolitical context. 
Since the Cold War remained cold, at least in a Western European 
setting, it can be referred to – as I did in the first pages of this chapter – as an 
era of preparedness. The British historian Matthew Grant has emphasised how 
preparing for nuclear war was “an obvious and natural consequence of taking 
part in the Cold War”.53 Such preparedness initiatives were based on an 
imagination or forecasting of the nuclear apocalypse and were part of what Mats 
Fridlund has referred to as “nuclearmindedness” – i.e. the way of coping with 
the nuclear threat during the age of ‘atomic anxiety’.54 The coping with the 
threat took place on both political and individual levels and found many 
expressions, e.g. in civil defence measures and in arrangements ensuring the 
functioning of governments and civil services in wartime. International research 
into these aspects has also pointed in many directions, highlighting both 
cultural, material, and political aspects hereof.55 Important for this dissertation 
                                               
51 Högselius et al. eds., The Making of Europe's Critical Infrastructure. See in particular 
van der Vleuten et al., “Europe's Critical Infrastructure and Its Vulnerabilities”, p. 6f.; 
Hommels et al., “Europe’s Infrastructure Vulnerabilities”, p. 266ff. Similar 
considerations can be found in contemporary cyber security studies, where scholars 
point towards the critical role played by ‘cyber doom scenarios’ or the mobilisation of 
the ‘specter of the future’ in national security discourses, see Christensen, Corporate 
Zones of Cyber Security, p. 34; Hansen and Nissenbaum, “Digital Disaster, Cyber 
Security, and the Copenhagen School”, p. 1164. 
52 Starosielski, The Undersea Network, p. 67. 
53 Grant, After the Bomb, p. 3. In this connection, the British historian Peter Hennessy 
has used the notion of the ‘secret state’ to explain the British Cold War state’s 
engagement in imagining and planning for unthinkable nuclear scenarios. Hennessy, 
The Secret State, pp. 2-3. 
54 Fridlund, “Buckets, bollards and bombs”, pp. 397, 402f. The imagining of risks has 
moreover been explored in research on Cold War exercises, see Davis, Stages of 
Emergency, p. 2ff.; Erickson and Barrat, “Prudence or Panic?”. 
55 Aspects of civil defence has i.a. been explored as a way of domesticating or privatising 
the Cold War, or, put in another way, as a militarisation of everyday life. Research into 
this has in particular focused on USA in the 1960s, see for instance Oakes, The 
Imaginary War; McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home; Rose, One Nation 
Underground; Garrison, Bracing for Armageddon. For a Danish perspective on the 
emotional aspects, see Sylvest, “Atomfrygten og Civilforsvaret”. For material aspects, see 
for instance Ziauddin, “Superpower Underground”. In Swedish research, the civil 
defence has been linked with wider societal developments, see Cronqvist, “Survival in 
the Welfare Cocoon”; Cronqvist, “Utrymning i folkhemmet”. 
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is a study carried out by the social scientists Stephen J. Collier and Andrew 
Lakoff, who have linked critical infrastructure perceptions to the Cold War 
total preparedness agenda. Examining the American context, Collier and 
Lakoff argue that ‘system-vulnerability’ was constituted as an object of thought 
among US security actors through the Cold War period, for which reason total 
preparedness evolved to be a national security problem in its own right rather 
than being directly related to the dealing with the Soviet threat.56 Collier and 
Lackoff’s study has its empirical limitations, as it is confined to a selection of 
policy documents prepared by US civil defence actors. However, it points 
toward a still quite unexplored development in Cold War preparedness 
planning, which is central to this dissertation, namely the emergence of a 
broader security framework.57 
In Danish historiography, the Cold War civil preparedness and total 
defence is still a virginal field. A few historians have used the preparedness 
initiatives beginning in the 1950s to demonstrate the threat perceptions of that 
time.58 Moreover, a handful of examinations have studied the material and 
organisational aspects of the total defence, including the civil-military 
balances.59 With a view to today, the main challenge in preparedness planning 
in the cyber area is how to involve the private sector.60 This challenge is brought 
about by the privatisation of communications services that has taken place since 
the late Cold War years, but the involvement of private businesses in the 
planning for wartime has a longer history. This is still a virginal field in historical 
research, but business historians have recently begun studying how the Cold 
War doctrine of total war have caused states to regulate particular industries in 
different ways, thereby both occasioning and restraining business 
opportunities.61 This dialectic between commercial vis-à-vis state security 
                                               
56 Collier and Lakoff, “The Vulnerability of Vital Systems”.  
57 In another article, Collier and Lakoff have coined the term ‘distributed preparedness’ 
in order to describe the domestic logic of domestic security that emerged in the United 
States during the Cold War. See Collier and Lakoff, “Distributed Preparedness”. 
58 Jensen, Ulve, Får og Vogtere 2, p. 217ff., 274ff.; Lidegaard, I Kongens Navn, p. 579; 
Villaume, Allieret med Forbehold, pp. 525, 542. 
59 Stevnsborg, Magt, krig og centralisering, p. 241ff.; Petersen and Jacobsen, 
“Totalforsvaret og det civile beredskab”; Pedersen, “Det totale forsvar til den totale krig”; 
Pedersen, “Beskyttelsen af civile”. For examinations of physical constructions related to 
civil preparedness, see Stenak et al. eds., Kold Krig; Pedersen and Pedersen, Danmarks 
Dybeste Hemmelighed. I shall get back to these research discussions in chapter five. 
60 See for instance Christensen and Petersen, “Public–private partnerships on cyber 
security”; Christensen, Corporate Zones of Cyber Security. By comparison, Hennessy 
has noted that it was more simple to exert command over public corporations during the 
Cold War. Hennessy, The Secret State, p. 371.  
61 For the latter, a study by the Swedish historian Magnus Linnarsson has demonstrated 
how the Swedish state kept a company producing rayon ‘alive’ due to its wartime 
importance. See Linnarsson, “Rayon för rikets försörjning”. In a recent research 
overview, Erik Lakomaa calls for further research into this area: Lakomaa, “The history 
of business and war: Introduction”. Apart from that, previous research on Cold War 
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interests in Cold War preparedness is noteworthy – not least with a view to the 
telecommunications sector in which, as shown above, the public-private 
division of responsibility has exactly been a key component. By examining how 
preparedness planning played out in a specific societal sector in Denmark, 
addressing both civil-military and public-private aspects, this dissertation will 
provide new perspectives to these issues.  
 
Cold War alliance politics 
Another central field of research for this examination is the historiography on 
NATO during the Cold War. This has first and foremost been concerned with 
deterrence and defence issues such as the development of the alliance’s military 
strategies. Furthermore, topics of ‘high-level politics’ have been explored, for 
instance transatlantic relations and NATO’s navigation in the international 
crises that played out during the Cold War.62 Studies hereof have been based 
on records from national archives and on what has so far been publicly 
disclosed from the NATO Archives since its opening in 1999. A central debate 
among NATO scholars has revolved around the level of American influence; 
shall NATO be interpreted as an extension of American foreign policy or as 
an organisation with a ‘will of its own’?63 However, parallel to the pluralistic turn 
in Cold War research and further to an increased attention to the history of 
international organisations, newer research on NATO has taken on a broader 
understanding of the alliance. Here, NATO is increasingly examined as a 
multilateral political forum or even as a ‘value-oriented union’ which played an 
                                               
business history has mainly focused on the direct participation of businesses in defence 
industries, for instance in the construction of new military facilities, see Andersen, 
“Erhvervslivet”, p. 216; Reynolds, “Science, technology, and the Cold War”, p. 383. 
62 Important for the historiography of NATO is the American historian Lawrence S. 
Kaplan who has contributed with several analyses of NATO both during and after the 
Cold War. See for instance Kaplan, The United States and NATO; Kaplan, The Long 
Entanglement; Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United. Among other central early 
accounts of NATO’s history are: Park, Defending the West. Newer contributions on 
NATO’s history based on archival material include the three-volume work published in 
the wake of NATO’s fiftieth anniversary, Schmidt ed. A History of NATO, as well as the 
German 13 volume publication Entstehung und Probleme des Atlantischen Bündnisses, 
edited by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt and published in the years 1998–2018, 
see for instance Greiner et al., Die NATO als Militärallianz. Also, the Parallel History 
Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (see www.php.isn.ethz.ch) has produced 
important research on NATO, see for instance Wenger et al. eds., Transforming 
NATO in the Cold War; Mastny et al. eds., War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War.  
63 Risso, “NATO and the Environment”, p. 535. Risso suggests that neither narrative is 
exact and that NATO instead should be understood as an ‘organised controversy’. The 
debate was initiated in 1970, when David Calleo described NATO as an American 
protectorate: Calleo, The Atlantic Fantasy, p. 24ff. 
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important role in forging the Cold War West. In this way the research focus 
has shifted away from the formerly predominant ‘crisis perspective’.64 
In recent years, historians have also begun looking into NATO’s 
collaboration in areas beyond high-politics, for instance in non-military fields 
such as science and technology. Cooperation in these areas has been 
interpreted in research as attempts to foster support, coherence, and political 
stability within the alliance.65 Important in this regard is the work by John Krige, 
who has demonstrated how NATO’s scientific and technical cooperation, 
along with the general reconstruction of science in post-war Europe, was an 
instrument of American soft power and a tool of American hegemony.66 The 
cooperation on communications in NATO is only scarcely explored and only 
in relation to nuclear command and control systems.67 In general, NATO’s 
member states invested heavily in common infrastructures and other large 
technological projects to facilitate Western European security, but much is yet 
to be discovered when it comes to NATO’s role as a system-builder in Western 
Europe and the American-European power balance in this regard.68 
However, previous studies have also highlighted challenges associated 
with examining NATO’s history. These are related to the general 
methodological challenge of studying the history of international organisations 
                                               
64 Risso, Propaganda and intelligence in the Cold War, p. 2-7; Hatzivassiliou, The 
NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, p. 5. The ‘crisis perspective’ 
has been identified by Geir Lundestad: Lundestad, No End to Alliance; Lundestad, Just 
Another Major Crisis.  
65 See for instance Turchetti, “Sword, Shield and Buoys”; Turchetti and Roberts eds., 
The surveillance imperative; Cantoni, “What’s in a Pipe?”. Moreover, a growing 
research field in these years is NATO’s environmental cooperation, see: Turchetti, 
Greening the Alliance; Risso, “NATO and the Environment”; Hatzivassiliou, The 
NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society; Hamblin, “Environmentalism 
for the Atlantic Alliance”. 
66 Krige, American Hegemony; Krige, “NATO and the Strengthening of Western 
Science”; Krige, Sharing knowledge, Shaping Europe. For an analysis of US 
technological collaboration with a non-NATO country, Sweden, as an act of hegemony, 
see Nilsson, “Amber Nine”, Nilsson, Tools of Hegemony. On soft power and science in 
the Cold War in general, see also Doel, “Scientists as Policymakers”; Aronova and 
Turchetti, “Introduction: Science Studies in East and West”; Oreskes, “Science in the 
Origins of the Cold War”. US soft power has also been analysed through the lens of 
‘Americanization’, see for instance Sørensen, “Amerikanisering”. 
67 Gregory, Nuclear Command and Control in NATO, pp. 43f., 63f.; Carter, 
“Communications Technologies”, p. 244; Wentz and Hingorani, “NATO 
Communications in Transition”. An exception is my aforementioned article on NATO’s 
infrastructure cooperation in the 1950s, see Jensen, “Connecting the Alliance”. 
68 One of the NATO systems that has been examined in detail is the NATO Air 
Defence Ground Environment (NADGE), an early warning system developed in the 
1950s. See: Högselius et al., Europe's Infrastructure Transition, p. 211f.; Trischler and 
Weinberger, “Engineering Europe”, pp. 60ff.; Gough, Watching the Skies. For the 
discussion of NATO’s role as a European system-builder, which I shall get back to in 
chapter four, see: Trischler and Weinberger, “Engineering Europe”, p. 74; Högselius et 
al., Europe's Infrastructure Transition, pp. 14, 215ff. 
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and reckon these as multilateral political forums when doing so. Historians 
must, as Linda Risso has pointed out, take into account a wide range of 
perspectives such as the institutional development of the organisation, the role 
of personalities, the changing geopolitical climate, and the developing priorities 
of member states.69 The choice of this project to study both the central level of 
NATO’s political forums and agencies and different settings in one of the 
member states, Denmark, builds on the assumption that important insights are 
to be gained by closely following the multilateral political interaction and the 
practical implementation of NATO policies in the area of telecommunications. 
This is done with inspiration from newer historiography on international 
organisations, which focuses on processes of transnational governance in 
relation to these organisations rather than their setting up and internal 
developments.70  
Lastly, I shall make a short mentioning of the existing research on 
Denmark and NATO. In Danish Cold War historiography, both the Danish 
integration into the alliance and the character of the Danish alliance politics 
have been explored. The first thorough examination hereof was Poul 
Villaume’s 1994 doctoral thesis Allieret med Forbehold investigating the 
period from 1949 to 1961.71 Villaume’s work gave rise to a debate among 
Danish historians on the character of Denmark’s alliance policy, e.g. how the 
low defence expenditures and the reservations about hosting foreign troops and 
nuclear weapons on Danish soil in peacetime are to be understood vis-à-vis 
Denmark’s liabilities and loyalty towards the alliance.72 A central point in these 
discussions regards the driving forces in the formulation of the Danish alliance 
policy. Here, it has been suggested that Danish politicians were motivated 
towards not provoking the Soviet Union; that domestic political agendas played 
an important part in formulating the alliance policy; or that the relation to the 
                                               
69 See Risso, Propaganda and intelligence in the Cold War, p. 4. 
70 See for instance Duedahl and Gram-Skjoldager, “De Internationale Organisationers 
Danmarkshistorie. En introduktion”, pp. 7-11; Christensen and Ydesen, “Internationale 
Organisationers Virkningshistorie”; Sluga, “Editorial - the transnational history of 
international institutions”. 
71 The thesis was published as a book in 1995 and still constitutes the most detailed 
examination of the political processes regarding Denmark’s integration into NATO. 
Prior to Villaume’s examination, Nikolaj Petersen had characterised the Danish NATO 
policy up to 1961 as a policy of adaptation, but Villaume, by contrast, accentuated how 
the Danish NATO policy – with the purpose of maintaining Denmark and its 
neighbouring area as a low-tension area – in more areas was characterised by reservations 
towards the common NATO standpoint. See: Villaume, Allieret med Forbehold, p. 
843ff.; Petersen, Denmark and NATO 1949-1987, p. 14ff. Villaume has later used the 
term of a “loyal allied with reservations”, stressing that Denmark was firmly rooted in 
NATO and perceived as so, but had relatively more political-military reservations than 
most other NATO allies. See: Villaume, “Nato og Danmark 1949-72”, p. 445. 
72 For an overview of the positions in this debate, see Mariager, “Den Kolde Krig i 
international og dansk historieforskning”, p. 732ff. 
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alliance and the allies was the overriding priority.73 However, previous research 
has also highlighted how Denmark in other areas of allied cooperation was 
influential and even agenda-setting, for example in the intelligence cooperation, 
in promoting non-military cooperation, and as regards NATO’s relation with 
the Eastern bloc.74 Still, given the strong focus on political-military dilemmas 
attached to the Danish NATO membership, many aspects of what we could 
call ‘low policy’ such as the technological cooperation are still unexplored.75 In 
particular, Denmark’s participation in NATO’s more specialised agencies and 
the character and incentives hereof needs to be further investigated. However, 
it is not the main objective of this dissertation to evaluate the character of 
Danish alliance politics, also not in the specific area of telecommunications. 
Instead, I aim to take a new approach by focusing on what it meant for a specific 
societal sector to become involved in the NATO cooperation. 
To sum up, the different research contributions discussed above all 
inform my analysis. It is a deliberate choice to draw upon insights from all of 
these fields of research, since I believe that the historiography of the Cold War 
can profit significantly from including studies of infrastructure and technology 
– and vice versa. Due to the vital role played by telecommunications in all 
societal sectors, civilian as well as military, the area of communications makes 
up a rewarding case for studying the interaction between political and 
technological factors in Cold War preparedness planning. 
 
1.3 Research focus and strategy 
Before presenting how I intend to carry my examination through, it is necessary 
to define – and delimit – the scope. The spatial focus of my research is 
                                               
73 As regards the former, Bent Jensen has interpreted the Danish security policy as being 
indulgent towards the Soviet Union: Jensen, Bjørnen og haren; Jensen, Ulve, Får og 
Vogtere 1. By contrast, the domestic context has been emphasised by Villaume, Allieret 
med Forbehold and Petersen, Denmark and NATO 1949-1987, whereas the latter 
argument was the overall conclusion of an inquiry about Denmark’s security policy 
situation during the Cold War, initiated by the Danish parliament in 2000 and published 
in 2005, see Danmark under Den Kolde Krig. A profound analysis of Danish foreign 
policy during the Cold War can be found in volume 5 and 6 of Dansk Udenrigspolitiks 
Historie, see Villaume and Olesen, I Blokopdelingens Tegn; Petersen, Europæisk og 
Globalt Engagement. 
74 For intelligence, see Schmidt and Miller, PET's virkemidler, p. 42f., 75f., 83f. 
Villaume and Olesen, I Blokopdelingens Tegn, pp. 228-229. For the latter, in particular 
related to the 1966-1967 Harmel process, Villaume, “Nato og Danmark 1949-72”, p. 
444; Villaume and Olesen, I Blokopdelingens Tegn, p. 587ff.; Danmark under Den 
Kolde Krig, bind 2, p. 171f.; Villaume, “Harmel-rapporten”.  
75 Villaume and Olesen, I Blokopdelingens Tegn, p. 229. An exception is a short 
mentioning of Danish participation in NATO’s scientific cooperation in Knudsen and 
Nielsen, “Naturvidenskab i Danmark under Den Kolde Krig”, p. 450f. For 
considerations on low policy aspects of Danish alliance policy, see Villaume, Allieret 
med Forbehold, p. 19.  
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NATO’s Western European territory with a particular emphasis on Denmark. 
Thus, NATO’s North American or Atlantic territories, including Greenland, 
will not be included. Although I do allocate attention to some national cases 
when relevant, I do not go into depth with other national spaces than the 
Danish one and do not aim for comparative analyses. This decision is 
necessary, since telecommunications emergency planning during the Cold War 
is still a virginal field of research. A comparative perspective bringing in cases 
from more national settings would therefore require thorough explorations of 
archive material from different countries. Although I have been tempted to do 
so, it would have the consequence that I would have to limit my examinations 
in another sense, by focusing on a shorter time period and paying less attention 
to wider societal implications of emergency planning in the field of 
telecommunications.  
As for the time frame, my examination covers the entire Cold War 
period, from the signing of the Atlantic Treaty in 1949 to end of the Cold War 
in the years around 1990. It is debatable when the Cold War began, but by 
1949 it was a reality and the partition of Europe was settled. Although the post-
war reconstruction of Western European security, including considerations on 
the role of telecommunications, began before 1949, the catalysing events of that 
year serve as a good starting point for my analysis: In 1949, first of all, twelve 
Western nations joined forces with the signing of the Atlantic Treaty leading to 
the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and, second, as the 
USSR tested a nuclear bomb, the US monopoly on nuclear weapons was 
broken. The end point of 1990, on the other hand, is more round-edged, since 
the end of the Cold War was more of a transition process.76 The decision to 
study the entire Cold War period is made with the ambition of covering the 
diachronic developments that took place. A diachronic perspective is useful 
when trying to understand the entanglements of political and technological 
developments, since a discrepancy or ‘delay’ in time between the two might 
occur, given the circumstance that planning and execution of large 
technological projects are typically long-term processes.77  
This has the consequence, however, that my examination will be less 
detailed in some ways. As such, this study does not intend to give a full 
chronological account of the development in telecommunications security 
from 1949 to 1990. Instead, I pay particular attention to cases which I consider 
                                               
76 A number of events marked the end of the Cold War: In 1989 the electoral triumph 
of Solidarność in Poland and the fall of the Berlin wall, in 1990 the reunification of 
Germany, and in 1991 the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
77 Regarding the temporal aspects of infrastructures, Paul Edwards has emphasised how 
infrastructures chiefly exist in “historical time” as they develop at another speed than 
other societal processes. This speaks against studying infrastructures in a too narrow 
temporal perspective. See Edwards, “Infrastructure and Modernity”, p. 194f. 
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to be of wider importance for the Cold War security governance of 
telecommunications and leave unmentioned the more particular examples of 
how Cold War preparedness planning in the area of telecommunications took 
shape. Furthermore, another consequence is that the long period leaves behind 
a disproportion as regards the available source material. As I will elaborate on 
later, the extent of the source material from the last part of my period is smaller 
and the material is more fragmented. The reader will notice that I pay much 
attention to the security initiatives that were launched in the 1950s, both when 
studying developments in NATO and in Denmark. The reason for this is that 
many of the measures taken and projects initiated from the 1960s onwards had 
roots in the initiatives launched in the first decade of the Cold War. In order 
to understand the later developments and the technopolitics at play, it is 
necessary to look into the background. Indeed, as the dissertation will 
demonstrate, the construction of security systems of communications is a 
‘layered’ process, in which existing systems are continuously extended, 
upgraded, and improved. Since this kind of technological system-building is a 
long-term process, I will not structure my examinations along the traditional 
periodization of the political developments in the Cold War, but along the 
technopolitical developments that I identify. 
The main object of my research, telecommunication, calls for a 
clarification too. Gabriele Balbi has identified three elements that distinguish 
telecommunications from other technologies of communication over distances 
(such as transport systems, postal services, broadcasting radio or television). 
First, telecommunications are one-to-one communications as they transmit 
messages from one point in space to another.  It follows from this that 
telecommunications differ from means of mass communication, since they 
transmit unique, in contrast to uniform, messages between two social units 
instead of from one social unit to a large number of social units. Second, 
telecommunicating means sending a message without the physical 
transportation of the message. And third, telecommunication networks are 
interactive as they allow people or institutions to reply to the received 
messages.78 In my examinations, I understand telecommunications as the 
technical systems allowing transmission of messages to take place, i.e. both the 
technological devices, in my case primarily telephones and teleprinters, the 
technology that lies behind, i.e. the practical application of scientific knowledge, 
and the infrastructure that enables the communication of messages, in my case 
cables, radio chains, or satellites and facilities such as repeater stations and 
exchanges. For clarification, it is necessary to mention that my examination 
does not concentrate on the content, the information passing through the 
telecommunications infrastructure. Moreover, I do not consider neither data 
                                               
78 Balbi, “Telecommunications”, p. 209.  
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switching networks, i.e. early versions of the Internet, nor military signal 
services used by fighting forces for tactical and operational communications. 
These choices rely on my interest in the overlap with civilian and public 
communications and thereby with the society in a broader sense. 
Furthermore, it is important to clarify that my dissertation is not 
concerned with surveillance or signal intelligence. Signal intelligence (SIGINT) 
refers to the gathering of enemy signals through different means of surveillance. 
Since my focus is on NATO’s internal communications infrastructure and the 
security hereof, intelligence directed towards the enemy is not within my scope. 
Obviously, the prospect of enemy interception of allied communications plays 
a key role for how the security of internal communications is orchestrated, but 
an examination of surveillance counter measures would entail an analysis of 
communications security understood as protection of contents through 
encryption etc. Since my focus is on telecommunications infrastructure rather 
than contents of information, I only consider such aspects when they have an 
influence on infrastructural matters, for instance when the risk of enemy 
interception is used to problematise or renew existing infrastructure. Moreover, 
I do not focus on the participation of the tele sector in security measures 
directed towards the inner enemy, such as for instance wiretapping.79 Lastly, the 
dissertation does not examine the preparedness planning in the area of public 
information, e.g. civil defence warning systems and the participation of the 
press in the ‘psychological defence’ in case of war. Such systems however relied 
on the general emergency planning in the area of communications.80 
 
Analytical framework 
In order to present the analytical framework that I draw on in the dissertation, 
I find it useful to make a short mentioning of one of the cases from the source 
material. The case in point is an extensive emergency plan to be carried out in 
the Danish telecom sector, agreed on by the Danish government in the late 
1950s and later known as the ‘60 million kroner plan’. The plan involved a 
number of investments in the Danish telecom infrastructure in order to make 
it more resistant, for example by relocating the switching nodes for inter-urban 
traffic that were placed in Denmark’s two largest cities, Copenhagen and 
Aarhus. 
As mentioned previously, I take inspiration from the analytical concept 
of ‘technopolitics’ in order to explore how both technological and political 
factors shaped attempts to provide secure telecommunications such as the 60 
                                               
79 For the Danish context, this aspect has been examined in Schmidt and Miller, PET's 
virkemidler, p. 168f.; Schmidt, PET's Overvågning af Arbejdsmarkedet 1945-1989, p. 
253.  
80 For more on this, see Jensen, Ulve, Får og Vogtere 2, p. 260f.; Høj et al., Tryghed på 
tryk; Pedersen, “Presseberedskabet under Den kolde krig”. 
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million kroner plan. The American historians Gabrielle Hecht and Paul 
Edwards have defined technopolitics as “the strategic practice of designing or 
using a technology to enact political goals.”81 Hecht and Edwards have used the 
concept to gain new insights into Cold War nuclear and computing 
technologies, but I shall suggest that the concept has wider analytical 
application. For my purpose, technopolitics can help illuminate how 
technological artefacts and infrastructures like telecommunications can have 
political visions embedded in them in different ways. When studying 
technological systems of telecommunications, they will often not appear 
political at first sight. For instance, much of the source material related to the 
60 million kroner plan is concerned with specific technical calculations and 
considerations. However, what appears to be the solution to a technological 
challenge is also a process in which different actors have contributed and 
choices and rejections have been made. Hecht and Edwards have argued that 
the design and use of a technology is a process of “mutual orientation”. This 
builds on the observation that when political actors work with engineers or 
designers to solve problems – even when this cooperation happens indirectly, 
for instance when it is mediated through institutions – they orient each other to 
particular solutions: Emerging technical capabilities both create and constrain 
political possibilities, and, at the same time, technical capabilities expand and 
take on directionality to the extent that they acquire political support and 
effectiveness. In this way, technopolitical processes do not just result in 
politically constructed technologies.82 
The drafting of the 60 million kroner plan can very well be understood 
as a mutual orientation process involving political actors, military actors, and 
technical experts from the telephone sector each making use of their different 
competences and powers. The content of the plan was, on the one hand, 
defined by what was technically possible and, on the other hand, what was 
politically desirable. The technopolitical perspective pushes me to ask with 
what approaches the different actors took part in the mutual negotiations. 
Before the plan was prepared, military experts had evaluated which parts of the 
Danish telecom infrastructure that were particularly vulnerable. This was based 
                                               
81 Hecht and Edwards, “The Technopolitics of the Cold War”, p. 274. Originally, it was 
Gabrielle Hecht who in 1998 introduced the notion of technopolitics as an analytical 
tool, see Hecht, The Radiance of France, p. 15. Hecht has used the concept of 
technopolitics to link together processes of nuclear technology development with 
national identity discourses, while Edwards has linked together advances in computer 
technologies with Cold War agendas. See: Edwards, A Vast Machine, p. 215, or for 
more general perspectives, see Edwards, The Closed World. 
82 In continuation hereof, Hecht and Edwards also stress that the focus on mutual 
orientation is a way to avoid technological determinism. See: Hecht and Edwards, “The 
Technopolitics of the Cold War”, p. 274; Hecht, The Radiance of France, p. 15. For 
further reflections on how to avoid determinism, see Högselius et al., Europe's 
Infrastructure Transition, p. 9; Weinberger, “The Neutrality Flagpole”, p. 299. 
 
 
31 
on threat scenarios and defence strategies negotiated in NATO and in 
Denmark. But the final plan also harmonised with developments and 
extensions of networks already planned to be carried out by the telephone 
administrations. The plan therefore served more purposes: By means of 
technology, political goals were pursued and by taking advantage of a political 
agenda, technological objectives were achieved. 
The notion of a mutual orientation means that the role and agenda of 
actors – whether individuals, governments, or institutions – come to the 
foreground. To borrow a concept from the American historian of technology 
Thomas P. Hughes and his work on ‘large technical systems’, such actors can 
be regarded as ‘system-builders’.83 Hughes understands technology not as 
individual devices but as systems linking both technical and social elements. 
Building on this, I view the telecommunications infrastructure that I study as a 
sociotechnical system not only including technical artefacts like teletype 
printers, cables, or satellites, but also economic, legislative, and organisational 
aspects and a large number of institutional and individual actors such as 
national tele administrations, technicians, governmental representatives, and 
military commanders. The ‘system-builders’ are the motive forces in such 
systems, they push for the construction and development of the sociotechnical 
system by using the power they possess by controlling knowledge, artefacts, or 
practices.84 From this perspective, technological security systems like the 60 
million kroner plan did not emerge as a result of geopolitical forces nor of 
technological developments in themselves, but from concrete preferences and 
choices of its makers.  
This leads me to another analytical point, namely the transnational and 
international framework. International, in this sense, means between or among 
nations; in a basic sense, NATO is an international organisation as it involves 
more nations. Transnational, basically, is what crosses national borders. The 
two terms coalesce, and in the area of communications, historically as well as 
                                               
83 See Hughes, “The Evolution of Large Technical Systems”, p. 25-26; Hughes, 
Networks of Power. Hughes has inspired many scholars to analyse the dynamics in 
developments of large-scale technological systems by bringing in social and organisational 
components. See van der Vleuten, “Understanding Network Societies”. The LTS 
approach, however, has also be criticised for understanding infrastructures as centrally 
governed and top-down controlled thereby ignoring the inverse perspective. See Egyedi 
et al., “Centralization and Decentralization”. Hughes has developed an advanced 
theoretical apparatus as part of the LTS approach, which I shall not go further into in 
this dissertation. For my purpose, the notion of the system-builder is sufficient.  
84 Hecht and Edwards, “The Technopolitics of the Cold War”, p. 274. 
While ‘system-builders’ in Hughes’ early terminology are individuals, later research has 
broadened the concept and studied the role of for instance international organisations or 
governments as system-builders, van der Vleuten, “Understanding Network Societies”, p. 
304f.; Laborie, “A Missing Link?”, p. 194f.; van der Vleuten et al., “Europe’s System 
Builders”, p. 326. 
 
 
32 
today, communications crossing national borders are usually referred to as 
international communications. I shall not go further into this ‘quibbling’, and 
through the dissertation, I shall only highlight the difference when I find it 
necessary. Analytically, however, I do find that there can be different insights 
to gain when applying the two terms in a historical examination. When studying 
the background of the 60 million kroner plan in an international context, it 
appears that the occasion for the plan was that NATO’s agencies on civil 
emergency planning had issued a number of demands for the member states 
to carry out, among them initiatives to avoid a total breakdown of 
communications in case a larger city would be destroyed as a result of enemy 
action. As such, the Danish participation in an international defence alliance is 
an important context for understanding the 60 million kroner plan. But in the 
practical negotiations on the plan, the NATO context also found expression in 
transnational influences. 
In historical research, transnational history refers to the study of cross-
border flows. A transnational ‘turn’ in research has occurred during the last 
three decades, and many debates among historians on how to define and 
perform transnationalism have played out.85 For my purpose, I use 
transnationalism as a lens and rely on a broad definition of transnational 
history, namely one that focuses on flows and circulations across borders.86 The 
object of my interest, telecommunications, is border-crossing in itself in a 
material sense, but transnationalism is not only a matter of the empirical object. 
Instead, the transnational angle “cares for movements and forces that cut across 
national boundaries”, to borrow a definition from Pierre-Yves Saunier.87 In my 
case, this means that a transnational lens directs me to look for transnational 
movements and flows of for instance expert knowledge, technologies, capital, 
and perceptions of risks and vulnerability. By example, the drawing of the 
effects of an atomic bomb with which I opened this chapter was made by a 
military officer that represented Denmark in a NATO agency on 
communications. This officer was hence part of a transnational network, since 
he regularly met with officers from other countries possessing similar expert 
knowledge as he did himself. His knowledge about the effect of a nuclear bomb 
                                               
85 A central contribution to the field of transnational history is Iriye and Saunier eds., 
The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History. For research discussions, see Saunier, 
“Transnational”, Clavin, “Defining Transnationalism”, Sørensen, “Den transnationale 
vending?”, and for a discussion on transnational history of technology, see Vleuten, 
“Toward a Transnational History of Technology”.  
86 See for instance Vleuten, “Toward a Transnational History of Technology”, p. 978. 
In line with other researchers, I find that the transnational perspective must be defined in 
respect to the concrete object of research. Clavin, for instance, stresses that 
transnationalism’s value lies in its openness as a historical concept: Clavin, “Defining 
Transnationalism”, p. 434, 438. See also Fossat et al., “Transnational historie”, p. 10. 
87 Saunier, “Going transnational?”, p. 119.  
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is very likely a result of his transnational connections which were then brought 
into play in national negotiations. 
Finally, I shall make a comment on a central concept already briefly 
presented in this chapter, namely that of ‘security governance’. Studying 
governance means studying a political process broader than that of decisions 
taken by governments or other higher authorities.88 Governance can be defined 
as “interaction and decision-making among the actors involved in a collective 
problem”, and in my case that problem was telecommunications security.89 The 
60 million kroner plan, for instance, was approved by a governmental decision, 
but in the entire governance process different stakeholders engaged in both the 
making and implementation of the plan. I understand the plan as an element 
in the overall security governance of the area of telecommunications during the 
Cold War. I draw on an understanding of security politics as “decisions and 
actions deemed imperative to protect domestic core values from external 
threats.”90 If security is basically understood as the absence of threat, this 
approach highlights how security policy is subjective in the way that it is based 
on perceptions of threat – what is ‘deemed imperative’, in other words, is a 
matter of negotiation.91 When studying processes of security governance, I 
therefore pay attention to how different actors in this interplay for example 
took notions of security and insecurity in use and problematised existing 
telecommunications infrastructures and called for actions to be taken. 
However, as my examinations will show, threat perceptions were only one of 
many factors in the security governance of telecommunications.92 
                                               
88 The concept is related to a development in political science from a focus on 
‘government’ to a broader focus on ‘governance’, which also studies political processes in 
areas further ways from a central political authority. For more, see Krahmann, 
“Conceptualizing Security Governance”, p. 11. In European integration studies, for 
instance, the governance turn has shifted scholarly attention from treaty-making to the 
study of day-to-day policies. See Schipper and Schot, “Infrastructural Europeanism” 
89 Hufty, “Investigating Policy Processes”, p. 405. 
90 This is a definition of national security policy presented by Melvyn P. Leffler, who in 
1990 argued that the national security approach was a suitable framework for historians, 
since it invited for analysing both foreign and domestic factors as shaping policy – in 
contrast to realist studies focusing on power and idealist studies focusing on peace. See 
Leffler, “National Security”, p. 143. Today, scholarly approaches to security policy are 
typically more global. Yet, as the editors of The Handbook of Global Security Policy 
point out, security policy is, on a basic level, “supposed to address insecurity”, and when 
studying the Cold War years, this task was first and foremost carried out by nation states 
and political blocs. See: Kaldor and Rangelov, “Introduction: Global Security Policy in 
the Twenty-First Century”, p. 1. 
91 Pedersen, “Sikkerhedsbegrebet”, p. 47: Villaume, Allieret med Forbehold, p. 23.  
92 For this reason, with the aim of reaching a broad understanding of security 
governance, I do not draw on constructivist approaches to security. In the field of critical 
security studies, for instance, scholars identify and analyse ‘problematizations’ of security, 
i.e. ways in which things come to be treated as security problems. For more, see Aradau 
et al., “Introducing Critical Security Methods”, p. 1ff. For a constructivist approach to 
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Much of the security politics studied in this dissertation is related to 
preparedness planning. ‘Preparedness’ is not a well-defined concept and 
several terms are in play when studying preparedness in historical contexts. In 
Denmark, the term ‘beredskab’, which roughly translates as preparedness, was 
used. In NATO, the preparedness initiatives in the civilian area were labelled 
as ‘civil emergency planning’, and the same term was used in Danish 
documents when translated into English. Elsewhere, the term ‘contingency 
planning’ was used, and all of these terms are related to the idea of ‘total 
defence’, although it differs from country to country what the total defence 
covers. When using the term of preparedness in my examinations, I refer to 
the phenomenon of preparing all parts of a society for war and crisis, including 
both the practical planning and the underlying idea.  
 
1.4 Source material 
The analytical framework presented above has informed my search for relevant 
source material and my examinations of the material. My analytical focus on 
technopolitics and security governance involves examinations of both actors, 
policies, practices, and material aspects of Cold War telecommunications 
security, which necessitates inquiries into an extensive collection of source 
material of different origin. Before providing a brief presentation of the 
material, I shall shortly explain two overall concerns that have been decisive in 
my analytical process.  
First, my search for empirical material has gone hand in hand with my 
efforts to map out the development of telecommunications security governance 
in the examined period. As such, the primary task has been to create an 
overview of the governmental authorities, institutions, agencies, or working 
groups that were responsible for different aspects of telecommunications 
emergency planning at different times. This applies both in the case of NATO 
and the national Danish context. Throughout the period, responsibilities and 
concrete tasks were transferred from one authority to another on several 
occasions for which reason different agencies were established, relocated, 
restructured, and closed down. It follows from my analytical framework that 
these different stakeholders and the interplay between them is important. It is 
my belief that these organisational aspects are in themselves a key to 
understanding the governance of telecommunications security and it is 
therefore an aspect that I pay particular attention to. 
Second, the technopolitics perspective means that many of my efforts 
have gone into scrutinising the course of events in different case studies. In 
                                               
critical infrastructures, see Hommels et al., “Europe’s Infrastructure Vulnerabilities”, p. 
263. 
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doing so, I take account of the backgrounds leading to different decisions 
related to telecommunications security such as the adoption of the 60 million 
kroner plan. In reconstructing these developments, the different disputes or 
tensions that have played out between the involved actors come to the 
foreground. This means that much of the material that has caught my attention 
is related to different conflicts. This reflects the fact that telecommunication 
security matters were complex and involved many stakeholders, but it also 
appears to be a general tendency in historical records that negotiations 
involving conflicting interests have produced more material, for instance by 
triggering correspondence back and forth.93 
The source material used in this dissertation can be divided into two 
categories: NATO material and Danish material. The records produced by 
NATO are located in the NATO Archives (including its online collections) 
and, as for the material forwarded to national governments or agencies, in 
national archives in the member states.94 The archive material from NATO 
reflects the structure of the alliance agreed upon shortly after the signing of the 
Atlantic Treaty in 1949 as composed of a political-civilian and a military string. 
The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the supreme political decision-making 
body and meets either in ministerial sessions gathering the member states’ 
ministers for foreign or defence affairs or more frequently in sessions gathering 
the permanent council deputies from each country. The Military Committee 
(MC), consisting of national Chiefs of Staff, is the highest military authority in 
NATO and responsible for defence planning. Moreover, to facilitate the work 
of the MC, a Standing Group (SG) was established as an executive military 
body with representatives from the United States, France, and the United 
Kingdom.95  
The majority of the NATO material relevant for this dissertation stems 
from the North Atlantic Council or one of the many permanent or temporary 
committees or working groups, some of which existed for a very short time, set 
up with reference to the Council and composed by members of the national 
delegations. Memoranda from Council meetings and reports or working 
papers attached in annex to these have composed an important source 
material. A smaller amount of material stems from the military string, primarily 
the Standing Group. 
                                               
93 For methodological considerations on this kind of material, see also Trischler and 
Weinberger, “Engineering Europe”, p. 71.  
94 NATO Archives Online (http://archives.nato.int/) has made available documents from 
primarily the first 10 years of the alliance’s existence, but extends its database on an 
ongoing basis. 
95 The SG was responsible for the daily business of the MC, which did not meet 
regularly. “NATO Handbook”, January 1952, p. 18f. NA. 
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However, there is a disproportion as regards time in the available 
material. Although some NATO records up to the early 1980s have been 
released, the vast majority hereof stems from the first decades of the alliance’s 
existence.96 Furthermore, the disclosure process has generally prioritised the 
more common aspects of allied cooperation and not the most specialised 
agencies.97 In more cases, I have therefore located NATO material in Danish 
Archives that I have not come across in the NATO Archives. Moreover, the 
content of the NATO documents also poses challenges. First of all, the written 
language used has a quite administrative and consensual character focusing on 
the final decisions for which reason backgrounds, motivations, or disputes 
rarely find expression. Furthermore, in material from the technical and highly 
specialised working groups, one rarely finds expressions of the political or 
strategic context. The records do offer a clear picture of internal discussions 
and decisions, but they must be contextualised in order to identify the 
underlying factors of decisions and developments in NATO. An important 
group of documents are the yearly reviews of progress that were carried out in 
a number of the specialised agencies. However, these reviews are not always 
continuous – instead, in more cases it appears random when such reviews were 
carried out and when not. Furthermore, the reviews raise the question of 
comparability, since the information from national governments that the 
reviews build upon varies greatly in character due to structural differences. 
Therefore, as I will comment on when it comes up, there are methodological 
challenges associated with bringing in the member state level in the NATO 
material.  
The Danish material used for this study is located at the Danish National 
Archives (Rigsarkivet) and in the collections of the Danish Museum of 
Communication, ENIGMA. The Danish material can be divided into three 
categories: Material stemming from an agency abbreviated NALLA, material 
related to political processes, and material from the telecom sector.   
The National Long Lines Agency Denmark (NALLA Denmark) was 
first placed under the Ministry of Defence and later transferred to the Postal 
and Telegraph Services (P&T) and the National Telecom Agency 
[Telestyrelsen], later the National IT and Telecom Agency [IT- og 
Telestyrelsen]. NALLA was closed down in 2008, whereupon its field of 
responsibility and archives were transferred to the Danish Defence Intelligence 
                                               
96 The policy on public disclosure in NATO is a 30 year rule. However, the disclosure of 
NATO material is a complex matter involving the approval of all national delegations for 
which reason the disclosure proceeds slowly. See more at 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_120438.htm (Accessed March 16, 2018). 
97 I have for example not been able to find the collection of records from the European 
Long Lines Agency (ELLA) established in 1951 with reference to the Standing Group. 
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Services [Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste].98 NALLA’s records up until the late 
1990s were handed over to the Danish National Archives by the time this 
research project began. NALLA was the responsible agency as regards 
telecommunications security and preparedness planning in the period under 
study and its records have therefore been crucial for my examinations. These 
records are characterised by being ‘expert material’ related to operational 
concerns, registration of circuits, and exercise planning. The NALLA records 
contain material from the period from 1950 to 2000, including classified 
documents that I have been permitted access to on the condition that the 
Danish Defence Intelligence Services read my manuscript before publication. 
This has been a long-standing process but has not necessitated major changes 
in my writings. However, I have not been able to refer directly to all the 
documents that I have examined. Still, my studies hereof serve as background 
for my understanding of the development that I examine in the dissertation. 
Moreover, back in 2013 when I first embarked on this project, I carried 
out five interviews with informants who have been involved in NALLA’s 
activities during the Cold War.99 The interviews gave me background 
knowledge on the institutional history and the inner workings of NALLA and 
its collaboration with the telecom sector, which has helped me navigate in the 
archive material.  
In order to shed light on the political dimension, I have identified 
relevant archival material from a number of Danish ministries: From the 
Ministry of Defence material illuminating the defence political aspects; from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs material illuminating foreign policy aspects; and 
from the Ministry of the Interior material related to civil preparedness 
planning.100 Moreover, the Ministry of Public Works (from 1987 integrated into 
the Ministry of Traffic) is central for my examination, as this was the ministry 
responsible for telecommunications. Since the task of telecommunication 
preparedness fell in between different ministries, the intra-ministerial 
communication taking place between the ministries has been an important 
                                               
98 The Center for Cyber Security is now responsibile for coordinating preparedness 
planning in the area of telecommunications. See more: https://fe-
ddis.dk/cfcs/opgaver/Telemyndighed/Pages/Telemyndighed.aspx (Accessed March 16, 
2018). 
99 The interviews are now filed in the Enigma Archives. 
100 This ministry hosted the Secretariat for Civil Emergency Planning [Sekretariatet for 
Civilt Beredskab], the records of which requires a special mentioning here. They contain 
a number of reports written in 2004-2005 by Per Heikel Vinther, who was a central 
figure in civil preparedness planning for many years, as well as a selection of the records 
on which the reports are based. One of the reports, entitled “Teleberedskabet og 
Databeredskabet”, is an eleven pages overview of the emergency planning in the area of 
communications. Vinther’s summary however appears to be quite biased, and it has 
mainly served as an introduction for me, whereupon I have made further examinations 
in the available source material.  
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group of sources. Furthermore, I have consulted published material such as 
the official Report of Danish Parliamentary Proceedings (until 1953 
Rigsdagstidende, thereafter Folketingstidende) and newspapers and journals. 
The Danish telecom sector consisted of the four ‘tele administrations’, 
the Postal and Telegraph Services (P&T), which was a department under the 
Ministry of Public Works, and three regional telephone companies, 
Kjøbenhavns Telefon A/S (KTAS), Jydsk Telefon A/S (JTAS), and Fyns 
kommunale Telefonselskab (FkT). I shall elaborate on this structure in chapter 
three. Besides the archives of the Ministry of Public Works, including a 
supervisory organ, the Telephone Control Board, and the P&T, I use material 
from the company archives of KTAS and JTAS, whereas I have not examined 
the archives of the FkT, which was a considerably smaller enterprise. A large 
amount of the company records is located in the Danish National Archives, 
but central parts of the records are filed in the archives of Enigma. The Enigma 
Archives moreover contains a collection of material related to 
telecommunications preparedness planning, which is primarily based on 
personal archives from actors who have been involved in the field.   
In addition to the above-mentioned NATO and Danish collections, I 
have found relevant material in the British National Archives, the online 
collections of the International Telecommunication Union, and the official 
documentary record of US foreign policy, the Foreign Relations of the United 
States (FRUS). 
Lastly, it should be noted that when Danish sources are paraphrased or 
quoted, I have done the translation from Danish to English myself. In the case 
of notable wordings or the like, I have added the original formulation in square 
brackets. I have chosen to translate the most commonly used Danish names 
such as the Post and Telegraph Services to English. As a help to the reader, I 
have included a list of the many organisations, agencies, committees etc. 
mentioned in this dissertation in Annex A. 
 
1.5 Structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation is structured around five analytical chapters, each addressing 
a particular aspect of the overall topic. My narrative shifts between an 
international and a national point of departure. Two chapters (2 and 4) focus 
primarily on NATO, while four chapters (3, 5, and 6) focus primarily on the 
Danish context, although paying attention to the transnational interplay. I have 
chosen this structure in order to demonstrate the complex interplay between 
international and national settings. The first two chapters take their point of 
departure in the late 1940s and concentrate on developments in the early 
1950s, while the following chapters concentrate on later developments. 
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However, the chapters overlap chronologically since I have prioritised a 
thematic focus. 
In chapter two, Networked allies, I examine the role ascribed to and 
played by telecommunications in NATO’s quest for Western European 
security in the early Cold War years. The chapter shows how networking 
initiatives were a key component in the build-up of a common defence of 
Western Europe, which materialised in the construction of transnational 
communications systems relying on the use of national civilian infrastructures. 
By linking together these developments with general political developments in 
the area of communications in these years, I argue that NATO must be 
regarded as an important forum for telecommunications ‘system-building’ in 
post-war Western Europe. The consequence of this was that alliance issues 
increasingly entered into communication spheres. This aspect will be explored 
from a national point of view in chapter three, Making the home front, in which 
I examine how the Danish telecom sector ‘adapted’ to the Cold War. The 
chapter follows the consequences of the transnational telecommunications 
system-building in the early Cold War years in the Danish context, examining 
how Danish ministries, the Danish Defence, and the telecommunications 
sector engaged with new challenges brought along by the NATO membership 
and the new geopolitical circumstances. I argue that these developments 
became decisive for Danish telecommunications in the 1950s, since the 
increased need for military communications had to be balanced with other 
ambitions in the sector. 
In chapter four, Networked and nuclear allies, I shift the focus back to 
NATO beginning with the 1954 adoption of a new nuclear strategy. I examine 
how this affected the alliance’s conduct in the area of communications for the 
rest of the Cold War period, demonstrating how different technopolitical 
visions lay behind different phases of system-building. The last two analytical 
chapters follow up on the nuclear preparedness agenda in a Danish context. In 
chapter five, If war comes, I focus on the concrete task of securing the Danish 
communications infrastructure by looking into different cases of actions and 
measures taken to protect the physical infrastructure against nuclear attacks and 
ensure that networks would be functional in wartime. The chapter 
demonstrates how the responsibility of telecommunications preparedness 
increasingly came to rest with technical experts rather than with defence 
authorities due to political and technological developments. Chapter six, 
Public-private balances in communications security, delves into another related 
problem of telecommunications security governance, namely that of the public-
private division of responsibility. The chapter examines how the arrangement 
for telecommunications security governance in Denmark was challenged by the 
particular hybrid structure of both public and private management in the sector. 
Moreover, as a short epilogue, I discuss how the move towards liberalisation of 
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the area of telecommunications in the period around the end of the Cold War 
challenged existing practices of security governance. 
Finally, in the conclusion, I gather up the threads and discuss what my 
study of Cold War telecommunications security governance in NATO and 
Denmark provides to current understandings of communications and 
preparedness in the Cold War.  
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[2] 
Networked allies 
Telecommunications and the defence build-up  
in post-war Western Europe 
 
 
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the post-war struggle to shape the 
political landscape of Europe began. One of the many pieces in the puzzle was 
Europe’s national and transnational telecommunications infrastructure. These 
networks were generally in a poor condition, either because they had been 
directly affected by war damages or due to poor maintenance and lack of 
investment. Moreover, the political situation in Europe and the emerging Cold 
War tensions soon echoed in the area of telecommunications. By way of 
example, the Iron Curtain also appeared in the shape of communication 
networks: In the East, communication links were restored, but routed through 
Moscow, whereas in the West, national PTT networks were soon brought back 
to operation with aid provided via the Marshall Plan, and through the 1950s, 
the inner-Western connectivity, including transatlantic links, improved 
markedly.101 This process of reshaping Western Europe’s telecommunications 
did not only take place in civilian areas. In the context of first the Western 
Union Defence Organisation (WUDO) and then the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), existing national networks in Western Europe were 
connected, new common infrastructure was established, and a system including 
both military and civilian circuits evolved.  
In this chapter, I examine the technopolitical agendas that lay behind 
these military-political attempts to network Western Europe in the early post-
war years. Thus far, in research on the post-war reshaping of Western Europe’s 
telecommunications, military developments have generally been overlooked. 
Instead, focus has been on how existing forums for international cooperation 
on communications such as the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) were challenged by Cold War tensions, and on several attempts at 
regional integration in Western Europe – of which many failed to materialise.102 
In NATO, joint investments in communications infrastructure were made as 
part of the so-called ‘common infrastructure programme’, which also 
                                               
101 Huurdeman, The Worldwide History of Telecommunications, p. 363; Högselius et 
al., Europe's Infrastructure Transition, p. 51f. 
102 See for instance Hills, Telecommunications and Empire; Laborie, “A Missing Link?”, 
Laborie, “Fragile links, frozen identities”, Henrich-Franke, “Comparing Cultures of 
Expert Regulation”, Laborie, “Enveloping Europe”. 
 
 
42 
concerned investments in for instance the construction of airfields. While a few 
historical studies have explored some of the burden-sharing discussions that 
this programme caused among the allies, the majority of the literature on the 
programme stems from the organisation itself and focuses on internal alliance 
issues without paying attention to contemporary infrastructural developments 
in Western Europe. In these publications, the infrastructural cooperation is 
praised as an important “cornerstone of Alliance activity” and “a unique 
example of member nation solidarity”.103 
This chapter offers a different perspective. It starts from the assumption 
that an examination of the telecommunications system-building related to 
defence cooperation in Western Europe can contribute to an understanding of 
how the area of telecommunications was subject to Cold War technopolitics 
and security governance. The chapter makes a twofold argument, namely that 
telecommunications infrastructures played a crucial role in the military 
integration and quest for security in Western Europe, and, in continuation 
hereof, that NATO thereby emerged as an important forum for 
telecommunications ‘system-building’ in Western Europe, a forum also 
engaging actors in national public administrations and the telecom sectors. 
Thus, since the military communication system-building expanded well beyond 
defence purposes, it came to serve as a catalyst for developments in 
telecommunications networking in general.  
In order to do so, I explore the networking initiatives that arose from 
defence cooperation from both an external and internal perspective, taking 
both the general political development in the area of communications and the 
internal NATO developments into consideration. Hence, the chapter 
proceeds as follows. First, I look into the governance of transnational 
telecommunications in the early Cold War years, examining how new 
                                               
103 Foreword by Secretary General Lord Robertson in NATO, 50 Years of 
Infrastructure, p. 5. The infrastructure programmes are also commemorated by 
NATO’s first Secretary General Lord Ismay in his 1954 memoirs, see Ismay, NATO. 
The First Five years, pp. 114-124. Also, in 1956 the former chairman of the NATO 
Infrastructure Payments and Progress Committee, G.O.J. van Tets wrote a small piece 
about the birth of the programme: van Tets, “The Birth and Significance of Common 
Infrastructure”. A section on the infrastructure programme – based on the writings of 
Ismay and van Tets, NATO press releases, and interviews – is also included in a 1967 
study of NATO’s international administration: Jordan, The NATO International 
Staff/Secretariat 1952-1957, pp. 265ff. As for historical research on the topic, Wallace J. 
Thies has touched upon the infrastructure programme in his analysis of burden-sharing 
and burden-shifting in NATO. Thies shows how member states, attempting to “cut 
corners whenever possible”, prioritised those installations that qualified for common 
infrastructure funding such as large air bases over other types of investments needed for 
military effectiveness, for instance aircrafts and support equipment. See Thies, Friendly 
Rivals, pp. 11-12. In the Danish context, Poul Villaume has examined the controversies 
around establishing airfields in Denmark through NATO’s common infrastructure 
programme. See Villaume, Allieret med Forbehold, see pp. 248, 406-416, 572. 
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geopolitical agendas affected international cooperation in the area. This is a 
necessary context for understanding the significance of NATO’s collaboration 
on telecommunications infrastructure. This section builds primarily on existing 
research. Second, I turn the focus towards NATO’s telecommunications 
infrastructure with the purpose of examining – through the lens of 
technopolitics – the background, visions, and motive forces with which this 
infrastructure was established. This chapter only concentrates on the very first 
years of infrastructural integration in NATO, whereas the following phases of 
networking the alliance will be further explored in chapter four.  
 
2.1 International governance of telecommunications in the early Cold 
War  
By the mid-twentieth century, national telecommunications in Western Europe 
were typically governed by a public postal, telegraphy, and telephony (PTT) 
administration.104 As for transnational communications, governments 
negotiated specific issues bilaterally and international matters in international 
fora. In this section, I explore how the landscape of international 
telecommunication governance changed notably in the post-war years. On the 
one hand, the cooperation in ITU became, as described by the French 
historian of communications Léonard Laborie, “more permeable to world 
politics”.105 On the other hand, new regional initiatives for communications 
collaboration emerged in Europe.  
In the new geopolitical situation that emerged after the Second World 
War, ITU was restructured and turned into a specialised agency under the 
United Nations (UN) in 1947. The idea of integrating ITU into the UN 
structure grew out of the Second World War, during which the United States 
and Britain had begun discussing the post-war prospects for the international 
communications organisation.106 Léonard Laborie has demonstrated how the 
                                               
104 Research on communications history has called attention to how the very technology 
of telecommunications that developed through the nineteenth century had ‘natural 
monopoly’ characteristics. This is explained with the fact that although many telegraph 
and telephone networks in Europe were established in private – and for telephone 
networks very local – settings from the outset, long-distance telephone and telegraph 
networks were nationalised by the 1910s. See: Michalis, Governing European 
Communications, p. 32; Millward, “Business and the State”, p. 546; Millward, 
“European governments and the infrastructure industries”, p. 5; Reynolds, “Science, 
technology, and the Cold War”, p. 390. 
105 Laborie, “Fragile links, frozen identities”, p. 318. 
106 The US-British discussions were likely a response to Nazi Germany’s 1942 
establishment of a European Postal and Telecommunication Union (EPTU) in Vienna, 
which included Germany, Italy, and eleven other satellite or occupied countries, e.g. 
Denmark. Hills, Telecommunications and Empire, p. 46f. For more om EPTU and its 
pre- and post-war continuities, see Laborie, “Enveloping Europe”.  
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reshaping of ITU from 1944 to 1947 was a process in which the US and the 
USSR acted hand in hand, since both superpowers opted to integrate the ITU 
into the UN and thereby into the new world political order. By contrast, Britain 
and France favoured the ITU to have weaker links with the UN, thereby hoping 
to preserve ITU’s autonomy and its governance system which had historically 
been dominated by the old European powers, not least Britain.107 The future 
of the ITU was settled at a series of three global telecommunication 
conferences from May to October 1947 hosted by the United States in Atlantic 
City, New Jersey. One of the outcomes of the Atlantic City conferences was 
that the ITU was re-established as a specialised agency placed under the United 
Nations in accordance with Article 57 of the UN Charter. In this way, ITU was 
affiliated with, but not fully integrated into, the UN.108 
The idea of reorganising ITU was not welcomed in the circles of 
technical experts. Scholars have used the term of “technocratic 
internationalism” to describe the atmosphere within ITU since its 
establishment in the nineteenth century, noting how the structure of the union 
generally separated politics and expert governance and how the community of 
technical delegates meeting in ITU sought to minimise the role of international 
politics in the management of telecommunications. In the interwar years, the 
ITU had denied proposals to integrate the union into the League of Nations 
structure and had continued cooperating with Nazi Germany on international 
telecommunications management.109 In the post-war environment, however, 
                                               
107 Laborie, “Fragile links, frozen identities”, p. 314f. The future of the ITU was 
discussed at the 1946 Moscow Telecommunications Conference among the five powers 
dominating post-war world politics, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, 
and China. See: Documents of the Moscow Telecommunications Conference, volume I. 
ITU-H.  
108 The US hosting of the conference came into being after immense diplomatic efforts, 
as more European states favoured holding the ITU conference in Europe. This created 
what the Danish Foreign Ministry referred to as a “difficult situation”. See: Letter from 
UM to Danish embassies in Washington, London and Brussels, May 17 1947. UM 
92.B32a, I. RA. On British attempts to bring the ITU conference to Europe, see also 
Hills, Telecommunications and Empire, p. 48f. In general, the conferences appear to 
have been ascribed major political importance, and national technical delegations were 
given very specific orders by their foreign ministries on how to navigate in different 
matters. On the instruction of national delegations, see Laborie, “Fragile links, frozen 
identities”, p. 317. Besides that of the future affiliation of the ITU, a main issue 
discussed at the Atlantic City Conferences was the allocation of radio frequencies. On 
the basis of a US proposal, the delegates agreed to establish International Frequency 
Registration Board (IFRB). 
109 Henrich-Franke, “Comparing Cultures of Expert Regulation”, p. 286; Laborie, 
“Fragile links, frozen identities”, p. 312f. For more on the concept of technocratic 
internationalism, referring to a widespread mix of pragmatism, a-politicism, and faith in 
experts, see Kaiser and Schot, Writing the Rules for Europe, p. 6f.; Schot and Lagendijk, 
“Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar  Years”, p. 198. The League of Nations 
did set up a Committee for Communications and Transit (CCT), but this committee 
focused mainly of cross-border transport issues. 
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these technical expert concerns were trumped by foreign policy considerations. 
This can be illustrated with an empirical example from the records of the 
Danish Foreign Ministry. When the future of ITU was discussed in the 
summer of 1946, the Danish Postal and Telegraph Services (the P&T) argued 
in a note to the Danish Foreign Ministry for “retaining the purely technical, 
unpolitical line” within ITU. The P&T stressed how the current organisation 
of the ITU has, after all, proven to survive two world wars. The P&T feared 
how an ITU under the influence of the United Nations would fare in case of a 
new large-scale superpower conflict and underlined that “it can never be 
fortunate to let political factors be a part of a purely practical, technical 
cooperation”.110 The Danish Foreign Ministry however placed foreign policy 
concerns over the concerns expressed by the P&T, and along with many other 
states, Denmark supported the American proposal of integrating ITU into the 
UN.  
The reorganisation of ITU took place in the context of what John Lewis 
Gaddis has referred to as “the most remarkable polarization of politics in 
modern history.”111 The attachment to the United Nations meant that UN 
member states were now also automatically members of the ITU. As a result, 
the number of ITU members increased considerably and the Eurocentrism 
that had previously characterised the organisation came to an end.112 While the 
Soviet Union and the satellite states left most other specialised UN agencies, 
they remained members of ITU and thereby the East and West kept 
cooperating on telecommunications. In practice, however, this meant that ITU 
was also polarised. With the words of Laborie, ITU became “both a mirror of 
world political struggle and a distinctive site for shaping conceptions of the 
international order”, and Laborie and other scholars have observed how even 
the technical cooperation within ITU was highly politicised in these years and 
deeply affected by cold War politics.113 By example, a French technical expert 
                                               
110 Minutes, July 30 1946, UM 92.B32a, I. RA; Note on the relations of the 
telecommunications union to the UN, August 12 1946, UM 92.B32a, I. RA. Prior to 
this, the Danish Foreign Ministry had received a letter from the UN Economic and 
Social Council expressing hopes for a world conference on telecommunications to be 
convened as soon as possible to review ITU organisation and radio regulations and 
enable ITU relationships with the UN. 
111 Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 26. [Italics in original]. 
112 Laborie, “Fragile links, frozen identities”, p. 317; Henrich-Franke, “Comparing 
Cultures of Expert Regulation”, p. 290. Since participating countries in ITU did not 
need to be UN members, and thereby a recognised sovereign state, the system where 
European imperial states had formerly represented colonial territories ended. 
113 Laborie, “Fragile links, frozen identities”, p. 313 See also Laborie, “A Missing Link?”, 
p. 188. This tendency was observed by the ITU specialist George A. Codding in a 1952 
publication: Codding, The International Telecommunication Union. For the 
politicisation of the ITU cooperation, see also Slotten, “The International 
Telecommunications Union, Space Radio Communications, and U.S. Cold War 
Diplomacy”, pp. 318, 324.; Beyersdorf, “Freedom of Communication”. However, it has 
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noted that the Eastern bloc in ITU appeared as “Thirteen echoes from the 
East”.114 The Soviet Union increasingly viewed the ITU as an institution largely 
serving the interest of the United States and its allies and began actively to 
obstruct US efforts.115  
The ITU development is necessary to have in mind when studying the 
NATO allies’ cooperation on telecommunications. The emergence of an 
Eastern and Western bloc in the ITU meant that the NATO allies – which had 
previously been opposed in international telecom matters – now to a larger 
extent appeared as a united front in the ITU. For the United States, the ITU 
became an increasingly important forum through which NATO allies could be 
activated to support specific technopolitical agendas. This can be illustrated 
with another example from the records of the Danish Foreign Ministry. The 
example concerns the establishment of the long-range radio navigation system 
known as LORAN. The system, developed at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) during the Second World War, enabled ships, submarines, 
or aircrafts to determine their position by measuring the time difference 
between the arrivals of radio signals from a number of widely spaced radio 
transmitters.116 The system became increasingly important for US operations in 
the North Atlantic, and in February 1949, a conference was held in Geneva at 
the initiative of the United States with the purpose of authorising the 
continuation of LORAN operations in the Northern Atlantic. A resolution was 
passed at the conference, but only with a very small majority. By the summer 
of 1949, the United States was of the impression that attempts would be made 
to turn down the resolution at an upcoming ITU conference. If it came to a 
voting, the US feared that the Soviet controlled bloc, if this included Finland, 
would be able to obtain eleven votes, whereas only nine would vote for the 
continuation of LORAN operations. The United States therefore began 
putting major pressure on their new allies Norway and Denmark, who had both 
abstained from voting when the first resolution had been passed. In June, the 
director general of the Danish P&T, KJ Jensen, was directly ordered by the 
Danish Foreign Ministry not to vote for a discontinuation of the LORAN 
service. The permanent undersecretary in the ministry admitted that it was 
“deplorable” [“beklageligt”] that foreign political matters now intermingled in 
                                               
also been argued that the politicisation of international telecommunications cooperation 
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such matters that had previously been managed “on the basis of purely 
technical and factual viewpoints”.117 This was nonetheless the circumstance. 
The decision to allow LORAN operations in the North Atlantic proved to be 
essential for the NATO allies in the decade that followed.118  
When turning the attention towards the governance of border-crossing 
communications in Western Europe, the tendency in the early Cold War years 
seems to be one of increased regional cooperation on telecom matters – either 
on practical matters furthered by technical experts or in response to political 
pushes for European integration. In the interwar years, new expert forums for 
telecom cooperation in Europe had emerged in the shape of the Consultative 
Committees for Telegraphy, Telephony, and Radio (the CCIT, CCIF, and 
CCIR). These committees brought together experts from national PTTs to 
discuss regulation and standardisation of cross-border communications.119 
Right after the Second World War, in 1946, the work within CCIF was 
resumed. Here, in contrast to earlier achievements which had focused on rules 
and regulations, the technical experts in CCIF revisited plans that had been 
drawn up in the 1930s for a European system of trunk lines and translated these 
into a five-year development plan for the extension of the European network. 
In reply to the world war, thus, the perception in these technical expert circles 
was that the post-war situation in Western Europe necessitated infrastructural 
integration.120 
CCIF, however, was a technical consultative forum and not a political 
decision-making forum. Through the 1950s, several attempts were made in 
Western Europe to establish closer political cooperation on postal and 
telecommunication matters, both in the context of the Council of Europe, 
established in 1949 to work for greater European unity, and within the confines 
of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) established in 1951. 
Proposals were made for both a reinforcement of the technical cooperation, 
for financial cooperation on lowering the rates of cross-border 
communications, and for supranational integration of telecommunication 
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infrastructures.121 These ambitions reflected a general political push in favour 
of closer cooperation and integration between European nations in these years. 
In response, many other transnational forums for infrastructure collaboration 
emerged, for instance the European Conference of Transport Ministers in 
1953, and the European Commission of Civil Aviation in 1955.122  
In the area of telecommunications, however, things moved more slowly. 
While it has previously been suggested that telecommunication was not a 
priority sector within the context of European integration, newer research has 
clarified how it was infrastructure experts and national PTTs who successfully 
prevented attempts at supranational integration.123 Léonard Laborie and 
Christian Henrich-Franke have demonstrated how this reluctance was caused 
by different factors. First, given the poor condition of national telecom facilities, 
the implicated states prioritised reconstructing national (or imperial) networks 
and protecting domestic industries. The prospects for lowering rates on for 
example international telephone calls also caused concern, since these were a 
good source of income for the operators, in most cases the national PTTs. 
Second, in comparison to other infrastructures, e.g. transport technologies, 
transnational telecommunications required a lower level of interoperability and 
standardisation. This rendered possible a larger extent of ‘protectionism’ of 
national networks, since border-crossing communications did not require more 
than a gateway technology providing connection between national networks. 
Third, considerations were given to the fragile East-West relationship, as some 
PTT experts rejected the idea of further Western integration of 
telecommunications since this would risk paralysing the scarce cooperation 
with the socialist states within the ITU.124 
These attempts in Western Europe echoed in the East, where the Soviet 
Union in 1957 initiated the establishment of a forum for cooperation in the 
field of telecommunications and postal communications among socialist 
states.125 This did however not paralyse the cooperation in ITU, where the 
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Soviet Union in the Khrushchev era after the 1953 death of Stalin began taking 
on a more cooperative attitude.126 Western European cooperation therefore 
became less problematic, and in 1959, twenty European countries, both 
NATO allies and neutral countries, created the European Conference of Post 
and Telecommunication Administration (CEPT) as a regional sub-organisation 
of the ITU.127 However, the CEPT emerged as a purely administrative expert 
forum, controlled by managers of the national PTTs and not by politicians. In 
this way, it was the technocratic ambitions more than the political supranational 
ambitions put forward in for instance ECSC that were put into practice. CEPT 
became important for making practical improvement of technical services and 
for physically interconnecting national telecom systems, but did not work for 
the integration of international telecommunication infrastructures in Europe. 
Instead, the tendency towards prioritising national sovereignty and monopoly 
in telecommunication arenas in most European countries in these years 
continued. In this respect, CEPT remained a ‘handmaiden’ for national 
PTTs.128 
 
2.2 Defending – by connecting – Western Europe 
In continuation of the developments in international telecommunications 
governance in the early Cold War years, I shall suggest that NATO also 
appeared as an important forum for establishing border-crossing 
telecommunications infrastructure in Western Europe during the Cold War. 
In order to understand the great awareness paid to telecommunications 
in NATO’s early years, one must look back on the period prior to the 
establishment of the alliance. In 1948, five Western European nations created 
the Western Union Defence Organisation (WUDO) with the purpose of 
organising a common defence of Western Europe in case of a future war. 
Besides rearming forces, this cooperation involved the construction of 
common infrastructure installations needed for defence purposes. In 1951, 
WUDO’s cooperation on infrastructure was adopted and further broadened 
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by NATO. Hereby, the NATO allies initiated a first phase of ‘networking’ the 
alliance, which brought along a focus on other challenges related to the 
infrastructural integration of the alliance, for instance how to best make use of 
existing communication facilities in the member states. In this section, I 
examine the concerns and priorities that lay behind these networking initiatives 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s and the concrete outcome hereof in the form 
of a communications system relying on both military and civilian national 
infrastructure. By identifying the political and technological agendas that were 
at stake in this area and the practice of telecommunications management that 
emerged hereof, I shall demonstrate how NATO came to play an important 
role for the connection, standardisation, and further development of military 
as well as civilian communications in Western Europe. In order to do so, I first 
look into the political and military background for organising a defence of 
Western Europe. Second, I examine the technopolitical interactions in the 
construction of a common communications system in first WUDO and then 
NATO. Third, I look into the organisational challenges that emerged in this 
networking process, in particular the problem of military-civilian coordination. 
 
A new security arrangement for Western Europe 
By the end of 1947, negotiations between the four victory powers of the Second 
World War – the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Britain – to 
find a solution to the German problem collapsed, thereby leaving the rest of 
Europe in an uncertain situation. This caused Britain, France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to join forces in a union, formalised with 
the signing of the ‘The Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence’ on March 17 1948.129 Historians 
have emphasised how the treaty was mainly an important signal to Washington 
indicating that the Europeans were committed to enter into a coordinated 
Western defence cooperation.130 Prior to the signing of the treaty, US Secretary 
of State George Marshall had informed the British and French governments 
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that the countries of Western Europe had to show “what that they were 
prepared to do for themselves and for each other before asking for further 
American assistance”.131  
The intention of the Brussels treaty was both to promote the economic 
recovery of Europe and to provide mutual security. The latter was exemplified 
in the treaty with a ‘musketeer oath’, a mutual defence clause assuring that an 
attack against a member nation would commit the allies to come to its 
assistance. Both aims, however, relied on transatlantic assistance. From the 
outset, the European nations were aware that their own economic and military 
resources were insufficient and that their alliance had no meaning without 
American engagement. While the Brussels Treaty actually referred to a 
German rather than a Soviet threat, the British had made it clear to the 
Americans that they saw the treaty as the groundwork for a broader Atlantic 
cooperation directed specifically against the Soviet Union. Moreover, shortly 
before the treaty’s birth, the communist coup in Prague in February 1948, 
which placed Czechoslovakia under Soviet control, caused concerns about 
Soviet expansionism. By the signing of the treaty, US President Truman stated 
that the United States would “by appropriate means, extend to the free nations 
the support which the situation requires”, and by the end of March, George 
Marshall invited Britain and Canada to secret tripartite talks on Atlantic 
security.132  
This set the stage for the so-called Washington Exploratory Talks, which 
took place from July to September 1948 between the ambassadors of the 
Brussels Treaty nations, Canada, and the United States, resulting in a non-
binding agreement for a North Atlantic security arrangement.133 Subsequenty, 
                                               
131 Ismay, NATO. The First Five years, p. 8. 
132 Truman is quoted in Kaplan, A community of interests, p. 14. See also Kaplan, The 
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negotiations for a North Atlantic security pact also involving North Atlantic 
territories of other Western European countries continued throughout 1948. 
The vision in the US administration was to integrate Western Germany into 
Western Europe, but since this arrangement was regarded with scepticism in 
France, the American estimation was that a treaty could convince the French 
that their security was guaranteed.134 On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic 
Treaty was signed by the seven countries participating in the Washington talks 
along with Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, and Italy.135 Hereby, the 
Brussels Treaty had achieved a vital purpose, namely that of an American 
security guarantee towards Europe. 
At this point, the strategy for defending Western Europe was that of the 
‘tripwire’, according to which Europe would effectively have been abandoned 
in the first phase of a war and recaptured in a counter-attack. In this way, 
defence spending could be kept to a minimum, while the Western European 
countries were still struggling to recover economically after the Second World 
War.136 This strategy, however, relied on the US nuclear monopoly. When the 
Soviet Union tested an atomic bomb in August 1949, it caused worries about 
the military weakness of Western Europe. As a result, the United States 
increased its military aid to Western Europe.137 This marked a turn, since the 
Truman administration when launching the European Recovery Program 
(ERP), also known as the Marshall Plan, the year before had found that civilian 
economic aid should be prioritised over military aid to begin with.138 Moreover, 
with the ‘medium-term defence plan’ (MTDP) agreed upon in April 1950, an 
actual plan for defending Western Europe on the ground – and more 
specifically, at the Rhine – was in place.139 The outbreak of the Korean War in 
June 1950 became a further catalyst for the build-up of a defence of Western 
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Europe. The North Korean attack on South Korea gave rise to the concern 
that a similar situation could break out in divided Germany.140 Prior to the 
outbreak of the Korean War, the North Atlantic Council had discussed the 
prospects for creating an integrated military force adequate for the defence of 
Western Europe, and in the United States, the National Security Council had 
recommended President Truman to engage in a massive rearmament through 
a rapid build-up of air, ground, and sea forces, and of nuclear forces too.141 
These thoughts were now given new relevance. 
Catalysed by the Korean War, the primary focus within the North 
Atlantic Treaty cooperation shifted from political to military concerns. As 
explained by the French historian Frédéric Bozo, defence in the narrow sense 
now prevailed over security in the wider sense.142 In September 1950, the 
United States presented a proposal to establish a common European military 
command system led by an American supreme commander in control of 
standing, integrated forces. Upon discussion, the North Atlantic Council 
agreed on a plan calling for “the establishment at the earliest possible date of 
an integrated force under centralized command and control composed of 
forces made available by Governments for the defense of Western Europe”.143 
The American proposal included West German forces, and thereby German 
rearmament – an issue that the West European allies, not least France, had 
hitherto greatly opposed. However, it was now increasingly clear that the 
question of German forces was central for the realisation of the ‘forward 
defence’ strategy, according to which the line of defence was to be placed as far 
to the East as possible. This resulted in a proposal for rearming Western 
Germany within the context of a European army.144 In December 1950, the 
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Military Committee presented a report stating that “[i]n order to defend 
Western Europe to the maximum extent practicable, national forces which are 
to be contributed for this purpose must be formed into a unified whole”. 
According to the report, this required the establishment of an integrated force 
led by a supreme allied commander.145 This proposal was approved by the 
defence and foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty member states on 
December 18, and the following day, the American general Dwight D. 
Eisenhower was appointed as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR). Thus, the North Atlantic Treaty transformed from a tool of 
political reassurance into an actual defence organisation with a military 
command and integrated forces.146 In continuation, the financial aid to the 
European allies provided through the European Recovery Program was 
converted to being directly attached to defence build-up.147 
 
The technopolitics of ‘common infrastructure’ 
It is in this political and military context that the cooperation on infrastructure 
emerged, first among the Brussels Treaty nations and then within the context 
of NATO. 
After the signing of the Brussels Treaty, the five member states began 
studying their military needs. In September 1948, they set up the Western 
Union Defence Organisation (WUDO) with headquarters in Fontainebleau 
south of Paris. The following year, after the North Atlantic Treaty had been 
signed, WUDO agreed on a plan for the defence of Western Europe.148 
Subsequently, a ‘short term plan’ was drafted, which, besides rearming forces 
and providing them with modern equipment, also called for the construction 
of “infrastructure”.149 Infrastructure was a term that the WUDO nations 
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borrowed from the terminology of the French army, where it referred to “fixed 
installations necessary for the support of an army”.150 
Whereas all five countries needed to construct new infrastructure such 
as pipelines within their own territory, some of the needed facilities such as 
airfields, headquarter installations, and communications were regarded to be 
of a more common character and therefore planned to be jointly constructed. 
On a more detailed level, the elements contained in the infrastructure project 
had been reached on the basis of national studies of needed infrastructure 
facilities followed by collective negotiation hereof. For instance, concurrently 
with the short term plan, a specific ‘Signal Infrastructure Plan’ was, according 
to a later note, worked out in the following way:  
“It was built up by consolidating the communicating 
requirements of the Western Union Armies, Navies, Air 
Force and Civil Air Defence by matching these against 
existing resources and, after thorough discussions with 
National Post and Telegraph authorities and manufacturing 
agencies, by agreeing on the most economical and effective 
layout.”151 
As such, the plan was the result of a mutual orientation between military and 
civilian actors taking both political, technical, and economic perspectives such 
as the man-power and manufacturing capacity into consideration. The plan was 
”devised to fill in gaps, strengthen weak links, and provide alternate outlets” in 
the existing communications infrastructure. However, as it was difficult for the 
national telecom authorities to assess how much of the existing civil network 
that could be made available for military use, a figure rule was worked out 
according to which “50% of existing or firmly planned civil telecommunication 
facilities was deemed to be available for military use in emergency”.152  
In total, the infrastructure installations that were identified as jointly 
necessary amounted to a total cost of around 32 million pounds sterling. The 
question was how this cost should be allocated among the five members. In 
WUDO, the defence and finance ministers primarily met in separate forums, 
for which reason there was often a discrepancy between what was regarded 
militarily and financially recommendable. This was also the case with the 
infrastructure programme. When the finance ministers met in January 1950, 
they could not agree on authorising the funds for further programmes within 
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the Western Union. In particular, the British were reluctant to accept a 
commitment to defend the continent, also financially, and the sticking point 
about the infrastructure installations was that most of them would be 
constructed in France, where the headquarters was based. But in April 1950, 
when a joint council of foreign, defence, and finance ministers met, they 
reached an understanding in principle to support the infrastructure 
programme. Here, the British Defence minister declared that he had realised 
that the burden of the programme would fall disproportionately heavy on some 
allies more than others, and that the UK were willing to contribute – on the 
condition that the programme should be reduced to the absolute minimum.153 
The signal infrastructure plan both involved constructing infrastructure 
of a purely military nature, such as signal installations in headquarters or for air 
defence, and work which involved the civil PTT networks in the member states 
such as extension of long line cables and equipping of existing PTT 
installations. The peculiar thing about these signal installations was that some 
of the work once completed would “represent a not inconsiderable increase in 
capital value to the economy of the country concerned”. The WUDO nations 
estimated that the signal infrastructure of purely military interest amounted to 
4.4 million pound sterling, and the rest to 19.1 million pound sterling – of 
these, 12.3 million were of entirely economic interest to the PTTs. Much of 
the work was to be carried out by the French PTT.154 At this point, the French 
telecom sector suffered from credit shortages causing network developments 
to stagnate.155 Thus, while it was vital for the Western Union that these works 
were completed soon, they were not necessarily installations of particular 
urgency for the French PTT.  
After thorough negotiations, the five nations agreed on a cost sharing 
principle for the common infrastructure project in which France carried the 
heaviest burden, but where costs of the signal work of a purely military nature 
were divided among them.156 This project, which was later referred to as the 
first ‘slice’, involved extensive cable construction works. Within the French 
territory alone, a total of 963 kilometres of cable was constructed, divided into 
thirteen different sections. In Luxembourg, a cable was constructed in order to 
link up infrastructure in France with Western German networks, and in 
Belgium, links were made to France and the Netherlands, where domestic 
connections were improved. Moreover, the UK was linked better with the 
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The First Five years, p. 114. 
154 Annex II, WR/FC(50)22(Final), Enclosure to SG 35. April 24 1950. NA. 
155 For this reason, while the number of telephones doubled in Europe between 1945 
and 1955, they did not grow more than 50% in France. Laborie, “A Missing Link?”, p. 
194. 
156 Annex II, WR/FC(50)22(Final), April 24 1950, Enclosure to SG 35. NA. 
 
 
57 
continent, both by repairing and diverting existing submarine cables and by 
constructing a new one.157 As it appears, it was in particular border-crossing 
connections that were needed for the defence cooperation among the five 
nations.  
For the national PTTs, it was not uncommon to contribute to defence 
efforts, but it marked a turn that it now took place in an international setting. 
In this sense, WUDO’s cooperation on establishing new communications 
infrastructure was ground-breaking as it initiated a new kind of cooperation 
across borders. Moreover, it marked the beginning of a new kind of civil-
military cooperation on telecommunications. As a later briefing in a specialised 
communications committee in NATO commemorated:  
“In 1949 the military decided to integrate their operational 
long lines networks in the existing and planned national fixed 
(PTT) networks. […] From then on, military planning was 
no longer a specialized military affair, but one which 
required coordination with Civil Authorities (PTTs).”158 
Thus, what emerged among the WUDO allies was a ‘layered’ communications 
infrastructure. The concept of infrastructural ‘layeredness’ has been used by 
historians to stress how infrastructures can be deeply embedded within and 
dependent on other infrastructures or technologies. This means, moreover, 
that such infrastructures have different past visions and practices encapsulated 
in their materiality.159 As I shall get back to later in this chapter, the layeredness 
gave rise to a number of challenges as regards the organisation of the use of the 
infrastructure, which had to be balanced between both military and civilian and 
international and national needs. 
Communications infrastructure for an integrated defence 
In the beginning of 1951, the newly-appointed SACEUR, General Eisenhower, 
arrived in Paris and began the build-up of his new command. In April, the 
Allied Command Europe and its headquarters, the Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was activated. With this new intense focus on 
defence build-up and military integration, the infrastructure programme of 
WUDO, not least the signal communications projects, gained new importance.  
Prior to the establishment of SHAPE, a number of regional planning 
groups subordinated to the Military Committee had coordinated defence 
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planning within the different territories of the North Atlantic Treaty area, one 
of them being the Western Union. In September 1950, the Standing Group 
encouraged the regional planning groups to take the term of infrastructure in 
use in their planning – with reference to what the Brussels Treaty nations were 
already doing. For this purpose, infrastructure was defined as:  
“the static items of capital expenditure which are required to 
provide the material backing for operational plans necessary 
to enable the higher command to function and the various 
forces to operate with efficiency.”160  
The Standing Group also called attention to the necessity to include general, 
and not only military, infrastructure into the planning. It emphasised that the 
term infrastructure in its military context only covered a part of the static 
installations of a territory the whole of which served to permit the development 
and most efficient use of its available resources, and that it could be necessary, 
also for strictly military reasons, to develop or augment the existing civilian 
infrastructure of a territory.161 
In this way, infrastructure was perceived as a critical element ranking 
alongside other organisational and material aspects related to the build-up of 
forces. With the activation of SHAPE in April 1951, the regional planning 
groups were disbanded, and the Western Union’s cooperation on 
infrastructure was transferred to SHAPE.162 In a periodic report to the Standing 
Group in April 1951, SACEUR emphasised that one of the matters of highest 
priority was the acceleration of the infrastructure programme.163 SACEUR 
called for a conference of senior signal and communication officers to be held 
at SHAPE by the end of June 1951 “to discuss general communications 
policies and problems”.164 A document available in the NATO Archives from 
June 1951 contains a review of the “European Signal Infrastructure Program”. 
The review is probably produced in connection with the conference held in 
SHAPE and likely made by SHAPE personnel. In the document, WUDO’s 
signal infrastructure plan is reviewed with the purpose of adapting the plan to 
the current needs of the alliance.165 Since the first slice of WUDO’s programme 
had been cut down to a minimum, the original plan included signal projects 
which were not shortlisted in the first place. SHAPE recommended in the June 
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1951 review that these should be installed as devised, since they were “designed 
to produce a balanced and integrated Telecommunication System” in the area 
that the short-term plan covered. Curtailment or postponement hereof should 
be avoided, the document noted, “as it would have unbalancing repercussions 
on the whole Telecommunication System as envisaged”.166  
These signal projects – all of which were related to the long line cable 
network – therefore became part of the second slice of the infrastructure 
programme in what was now NATO’s central region. This slice contained 
thirteen new airfields, extension of eight existing airfields, and fifty-three signal 
communication projects.167 For instance, a submarine cable was planned 
between the UK and the Netherlands and on the continent, a large number of 
landlines and repeater stations was scheduled to be established – the majority 
of them, again, in France.168 The signal projects carried 61.1 per cent of the 
total budget of this slice, which was estimated to cost around 79 million pounds 
sterling.169 
This amount would be difficult to raise by the countries of NATO’s 
central region alone, but since the United States and Canada also planned to 
assign forces to SACEUR, they were expected to contribute to the financing of 
the second slice too.170 A cost-sharing agreement for the second slice was agreed 
upon at the North Atlantic Council’s ministerial session held in Ottawa in 
September 1951.171 Two remarks must be made in relation to the Ottawa 
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agreement. First, with the agreement, the burden-sharing principle and the 
understanding of common infrastructure was confirmed. Prior to the Ottawa 
meeting, the Standing Group of the Military Committee had reviewed the 
definition of infrastructure presented to the regional planning groups the year 
before. The Standing Group came to the conclusion that it was necessary to 
make a distinction between national and common infrastructure according to 
which each nation should finance and execute works of infrastructure required 
solely for its own forces, whereas the common infrastructure programmes 
should only be concerned with infrastructure of common interest to two or 
more nations.172 In NATO, the basic principle for defence build-up was that 
each national government was responsible for the logistic support of its own 
forces.173 But common infrastructure differed from other logistic tasks due to 
its border-crossing importance. In this way, the infrastructure cooperation was 
the “aspect of the Alliance which came nearest to supranationalism”, as Robert 
S. Jordan has noted.174 
Second, the US contribution to the second slice, which accounted for 
almost half of the total cost, must be understood as supporting a broader 
American political agenda for Western Europe. As highlighted in previous 
historical research, the construction of an integrated Western European 
defence system was a high-prioritised task for US administrations in the early 
1950s.175 When Eisenhower entered the post as supreme commander in early 
1951, he had declared that in the long run, 
“there is no defense for Western Europe that depends 
exclusively or even materially upon the existence, in Europe, 
of strong American units. The spirit must be here and the 
strength must be produced here. We cannot be a modern 
Rome guarding the far frontiers with our legions if for no 
other reason than that these are not, politically, our frontiers. 
What we must do is to assist these people [to] regain their 
confidence and get on their own military feet.”176 
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As such, Eisenhower made it clear that sooner or later the Europeans would 
have to defend themselves.177 For the moment, however, Eisenhower’s 
impression was that the European allies were still too weak to stand on their 
own and that the United States therefore had to make it clear that they “meant 
business” and take the lead in organising a defence system.178 This included 
financing infrastructure for common use.179 
At this point, the infrastructure programme only covered NATO’s 
central region, and, as the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson underlined in 
the fall of 1951, the accomplishment of the second slice projects “is no more 
than [a] start of [the] infrastructure program”.180 Since the spring, when SHAPE 
had adopted the infrastructure programme, plans for broadening the 
programme to the other NATO regions had been considered. As for signal 
infrastructures, the review conducted by SHAPE in June 1951 of the original 
WUDO plans called attention to the fact that the plan only covered the area 
west of the Rhine. Therefore, SHAPE initiated an examination of the 
corresponding needs in the northern and southern region of SHAPE’s 
responsibility.181  
In this planning, SHAPE involved the national civilian telecom 
authorities in the member states. For instance, as Danish records reveal, the 
Danish tele administrations were asked in March 1951 to appoint a delegation 
consisting of three persons to participate in the work of an Atlantic committee. 
The military officer who made the request did not specify which committee he 
referred to, but he underlined that the reasoning behind this was that the allies 
now had “a fully finished plan for the coordination of telephone connections 
between these countries” – probably a reference to the countries which were 
not yet covered in NATO’s infrastructure planning. According to the officer, 
this plan was now to be discussed with the national telecom authorities in order 
to make sure it could be carried through.182  
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SHAPE’s examination of the northern region revealed “Several vital 
communication bottlenecks” as well as a lack of direct routes between Norway, 
Denmark, and the United Kingdom. Additionally, the examination pointed out 
the far from optimal circumstance that all communication routes from the 
Netherlands went through Western Germany, at this time not a NATO 
member. However, planning for a defence of the Northern Region was 
challenged by the fact that NATO’s defence plans for this flank were not yet 
settled. Therefore, the signal infrastructure plan was “based on producing a 
reasonably secure network which we hope will be adequate to serve whatever 
Military plan for the North may ultimately be produced”. For the Southern 
Region, for which SHAPE also had no settled defence plans, similar problems 
of big distances, sea gaps, and incoherent networks were identified.183 
Through 1951, the infrastructural needs of the central, northern, and 
southern regions were further negotiated, and in the beginning of 1952, plans 
for a third slice of the infrastructure programme including Denmark, Norway, 
and Italy were on the table. The third slice was discussed at the February 1952 
ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon. At this session, 
agreements were reached on an immense reorganisation of the military and 
political structure of the alliance, making NATO a permanent organisation with 
a secretary general, an international secretariat, a permanent North Atlantic 
Council, and headquarters in Paris. Moreover, the member states agreed to 
embark on massive rearmament efforts with the goal of establishing 96 NATO 
divisions by 1954, and the enlargement of NATO to include Greece and 
Turkey was accepted.184 The increased mobilisation and new force goals were 
reflected in the third slice, which included fifty-three new airfields, twenty-seven 
extensions to existing airfields, fifty-eight communications projects, and ten new 
headquarters, adding up to a cost of 152 million pounds sterling. Once again, 
now with ten contributors to the programme, it proved extremely difficult to 
agree on cost allocations, since member states were also challenged by the 
general pressure for increased defence spending and the fact that the second 
slice already appeared to be much more expensive than expected.185 
In general, the problem of how to balance military security with 
economic security was a topic of heavy discussion in NATO’s early years.186 
The balancing of defence expenditures with general societal economic 
considerations in Western Europe led to conflicts among the allies on what 
could be included within the definition of ‘common infrastructure’. A working 
group established with the purpose of working out a more clear-cut definition 
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concluded in the beginning of 1953 that “a rigid and academic definition” 
would have the consequence that too many projects could potentially be 
included in the common funding.187 Instead, the working group argued that 
future projects should always be examined according to a list of criteria, 
whereupon member countries would negotiate if they should finance the 
proposed works in common. The criteria were that the projects applied to 
buildings and installations that were fixed, essential to the training of forces or 
implementation of the operational plans, and with a sufficient degree of 
common use or interest.188 Since the communications projects constituted a 
special problem, the Infrastructure Committee set up a working party of signals 
experts with the purpose of screening all the communications facilities 
proposed to be included in the common infrastructure programme. The 
experts were asked to make sure that the new projects would be “kept to a strict 
minimum” and in all cases justified by common military needs. Furthermore, 
the experts should make sure that full use was being made of already existing 
or planned civilian facilities, also in case of emergency, and that the proposed 
signal installations were “linked to the civilian networks at the nearest points”.189 
By the mid-1950s, more than 300 communication projects covering the 
area from Northern Norway to Turkey had been launched, providing 16,000 
kilometres of long lines cables, 10,000 kilometres of radio relay circuits and 
1,700 kilometres of submarine cables.190 In addition to this came the national 
infrastructure needed for defence communications for which each member 
state was responsible. As evident from above, NATO’s international 
communications – that is, the infrastructure installations regarded to be 
necessary for more NATO nations, although it did not necessarily cross 
borders – relied on the use of the existing civilian communications 
infrastructure in Western Europe. This principle had been inherited from 
WUDO, but from the available archive material related to the infrastructure 
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projects and the adoption of the programmes from WUDO, it appears that 
this principle was not questioned at this point. 
The background for the reliance on civilian communications was 
addressed by SHAPE’s Chief Signal Officer in December 1955, when he gave 
a presentation to the Military Committee in which he looked back at the past 
year’s system-building in the area of communications:  
“When NATO was formed, the policy was adopted that the 
Commands would rent circuits from the national PTTs, that 
is, the civilian telephone companies of the various countries, 
rather than construct a military system.”191 
According to the Chief Signal Officer it “was felt that a military system would 
be too expensive”.192 This message was repeated a year later, when a general 
from SHAPE gave a briefing to the Council in which he underlined that it at 
that time had been “apparent that it would be economically impossible to 
construct and operate an exclusively military long lines system for all military 
headquarters and agencies of ACE [Allied Command Europe].”193 The 
consequence of this decision was that NATO and the national defences would 
have to engage in a close cooperation with national civilian telecom authorities. 
I shall examine this aspect further in the following section.  
Before doing so, however, I shall make another comment to the 
common infrastructure projects. Apart from the military value that these 
projects constituted, they were also important additions to civilian networks and 
thereby a reinforcement of the peacetime communication systems in Western 
Europe. This was for instance stressed at a later occasion, in 1957, in a survey 
in which the member states reported on their progress in the area of 
communications. The reply from France outlined how the country by 1950 
had been linked up with capitals in the allied neighbour countries by a single 
cable only. With the extensions of transnational links carried out as part of the 
infrastructure programmes in WUDO and NATO, French connections to the 
capitals of the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, and Italy were now 
doubled.194 From a security point of view, this meant that French transnational 
communications were less vulnerable to destruction in wartime, but from a 
peacetime, civilian point of view, the extensions created increased capacity in a 
period, where transnational communication in general increased. In these 
years, Western European PTTs were under pressure with increased demands 
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for communication facilities, lack of materials, and credit shortages.195 The 
construction work related to NATO signal infrastructure experienced similar 
problems. Delays in delivery of equipment, shortages of raw materials, 
insufficient capacity of factories and contracting issues slowed down the 
process.196 Nonetheless, NATO’s signal projects were brought to completion 
and this happened quite fast in comparison with other planned projects. It is 
therefore a reasonable assumption that the political and military awareness that 
went along with the NATO projects served as a catalyst for advancements. 
 
Organising and distributing communications 
Since the infrastructure projects were based on the use of national 
communications infrastructure, the design and management hereof also 
became a NATO concern. In this manner, telecommunications system-
building was not only a question of building and connecting infrastructure, but 
also of solving problems related to the organisation and distribution of 
communications. As an April 1952 review from SACEUR called attention to, 
a problem was caused by the fact that for military communications  
 “…a clear cut division between military and civilian 
requirements cannot be drawn with exactitude. Much of the 
military signal and electronics systems will be provided from 
national resources in long line and frequencies which of 
course are among basic national resources.”197 
Already when obtaining responsibilities for the signal area in the spring of 1951, 
SACEUR had initiated a study on the emergency use by SHAPE of 
governmentally and commercially owned communications.198 When SHAPE 
was formally established and the regional planning groups phased out, the 
Standing Group pointed out in a note to SACEUR in June 1951 that among 
the problems likely to be the most difficult to resolve in the planned 
reorganisation were infrastructure and communications, because they involved 
using civilian resources to meet military requirements.199 A month later, 
SACEUR came back with a proposal for a new arrangement. Emphasising that 
“European-wide Signal planning and coordination” affected both 
“international, national, and civil interests”, SACEUR suggested to establish 
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three new permanent signal agencies: A European Long Lines Agency (ELLA), 
a European Frequency Agency (ERFA), and the European Military 
Communications Coordination Committee (EMCCC).200 
The idea behind SACEUR’s suggestion was that the EMCCC should be 
responsible for coordinating studies of what work needed to be done to 
implement the agreed signal communications plans. ELLA should coordinate 
“matters concerning the use of national telecommunications facilities in 
support of the military effort for the defense of Western Europe”, while ERFA 
should coordinate matters concerning the use of radio frequencies for the same 
purpose.201 Accordingly, since the defence planning relied on the use of 
national communication infrastructure, a better coordination between NATO 
military plans in Europe and national plans in the area of communications was 
necessary. Or, as the Standing Group emphasised: “Due to the vital importance 
of communications to the European operational commands and to the various 
national implications involved, some form of coordination in the 
communications sphere was found to be essential.”202 
Regarding ELLA, the reference to ‘long lines’ requires an explanation. 
Long lines refer to the lines in the long-distance telecommunications networks, 
such as for instance the cables connecting different cities or regions. The 
distinction between long lines communications and local communications 
reaches back to the early years of telephony, which at that point was a very local 
technology. In ELLA’s terms of references, it was highlighted that the agency 
should maintain up-to-date information on telecommunications in Western 
Europe and that in cases where civilian interests were involved, ELLA’s 
members – primarily military signal officers from the member states – were 
expected to obtain the official position of civilian national authorities. Thereby, 
ELLA would be able to coordinate the overall military requirements for 
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telecommunications facilities and to determine how they would best be met by 
available facilities.203 
When examining the records related to ELLA in the years following the 
1951 establishment, the work carried out by the agency can be summarised in 
two categories: peacetime and wartime. The peacetime planning revolved 
around the coordination of technical and organisational matters with national 
telecom authorities. In April 1957, a briefing given by ELLA summarised that 
“Although the military, for obvious operational interests, 
would like to consider the joint national networks as an 
entity, in effect, the networks are technically and 
administratively national in nature.”204 
The coordination task carried out by ELLA involved the challenge that there 
were “considerable differences between nations in technical solutions and 
handling by PTTs”.205 Historically, the international agencies such as the ITU 
working to connect different national communications systems at borders have 
generally solved this problem by establishing ‘gateways’ that have made the 
different technological systems able to cooperate.206 The challenge posed by 
ELLA was different, since it was also a matter of coordinating how domestic 
infrastructures were designed and handled. In the 1957 briefing, the ELLA 
representative further emphasised the challenge “of having one procedure for 
the NATO military on the one hand and respecting already existing PTT 
procedures on the other”. He explained that “[t]he military often require PTTs 
to employ special techniques and to supply a type of facility which is not 
normally supplied to PTT customers.” Therefore, the briefing continued, it 
had often been necessary to “add new facilities to the existing PTT networks” 
in order to “adapt the PTT networks to military requirements” – in practice, 
this meant “the “translation” of such NATO requirements into standardised 
national demands.”207 
In the first two years, ELLA, ERFA, and EMCCC were peacetime 
agencies planning with a view to wartime requirements. In April 1953, EMCCC 
suggested that the terms of reference for the three agencies should continue to 
be effective in the event of an emergency, a suggestion that was approved by 
the European Ministries of Defence.208 One of the main tasks of the agencies 
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was to plan how to best overcome deficiencies in existing facilities to meet the 
minimum foreseeable essential needs for the national and civil interests in 
wartime. In practice, given the way that the common infrastructure 
programmes were designed, national PTTs were in charge of installing and 
operating circuits to be used for wartime purposes. A general from SHAPE 
later explained how this arrangement worked: 
“For wartime use, a priority plan was developed by which 
additional circuits could be ‘called up’ and leased from the 
PTTs as the build-up of tension occurred between NATO 
and the Soviets.”209 
The general also added that this plan “was sound and reasonable except for 
one thing”, namely that many of the PTTs did not have available the sufficient 
circuits required by the military in wartime – or even in peacetime.210 Hence, 
NATO’s defence plans relied on immense extensions of the national 
telecommunication networks. By 1955, SHAPE had made plans to have about 
5,000 additional circuits placed into being as soon as an emergency was 
declared.211 This arrangement necessitated a high level of preparedness 
planning on a national level. For this purpose, the member states were asked 
to establish a national equivalent to ELLA. It appears from the Danish and the 
British context that these National Long Lines Agencies (NALLAs) were 
established in 1954.212 This is an aspect that I shall examine further in chapter 
five. 
 
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have delved into the process of the ‘networking’ the allied 
nations in Western Europe in the early Cold War years. This took place first 
within the context of the Western Union Defence Organisation established 
between France, Britain, and the Benelux countries in 1948 and thereupon 
within the context of the North Atlantic Treaty cooperation. The fact that the 
establishment and connection of telecommunications infrastructure was on the 
agenda from the very beginning of the common defence build-up reflects the 
central role that communications were ascribed in modern defences and not 
least in international defence cooperation at this point. 
                                               
209 Briefing by General Garland, October 3 1956. Annex to C-R(56)53. NA. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Presentation made by SHAPE’s Chief Signal Officer, December 12 1955. Enclosure 
to MRM-7-56. NA. 
212 Minutes of SU meeting, January 14 1954. TM, TTS, Bilag til samarbejdsudvalgets 
møder. RA; Memorandum on the United Kingdom National Long Lines Agency, 
November 28 1958, COS(58)265. DEFE 5/86. National Archives, UK. 
 
 
69 
In the first phase of telecom system-building in NATO, the main task 
was that of connecting the different allied territories of Western Europe, 
thereby preparing the continent for a future war. In this way, when viewed 
through the lens of technopolitics, it appears that telecommunications were 
designed and used strategically to enact a political goal, namely to form a crucial 
element in the military build-up of Western Europe catalysed by Soviet atomic 
bomb tests and the outbreak of the Korean War. When NATO’s military 
commands – led by Americans – problematised how the lack of integrated 
telecommunication facilities among NATO’s territories was a weak link, and 
how the effective management hereof in wartime was a vital task, it served the 
purpose of furthering the defence build-up. While NATO’s cooperation on 
telecommunications infrastructure were of major importance for internal 
developments in the alliance – also on a symbolic level, as the internal 
publications from NATO suggest – the common signal infrastructure 
programmes appear significant in another way when understood in a broader 
context. 
First, it represented a new kind of transnational cooperation on 
communications system-building. As this chapter has demonstrated, the 
agenda of common infrastructure and security problematisation of 
telecommunications created a momentum for establishing common 
telecommunications infrastructure. For the NATO allies, communications 
infrastructure was not only a national, but also a common concern, and the 
communication projects carried out in the infrastructure programmes were the 
result of multilateral, mutual negotiation among the member states. In this way, 
new trends in mutual defence planning led to new ways of cooperating on 
communications infrastructures. WUDO and NATO thereby became driving 
forces for establishing transnational communications infrastructure in post-war 
Western Europe. As illustrated in this chapter, many border-crossing facilities 
were constructed in relation to the defence cooperation which would perhaps 
otherwise not have been a top-priority at this point. Importantly, this 
transnational networking took place in a period, where domestic networks were 
underdeveloped, and the lack of resources, capacity, and capital posed 
challenges for further development. Moreover, contemporary attempts made 
at integrating Western European telecommunication facilities in supranational 
settings fell through due to national resistance from the telecom sectors. In the 
context of NATO, however, security concerns generally took priority over 
domestic sector concerns, and the fragile East-West relations in institutions 
such as the ITU were not given consideration. 
Second, the consequence of this development was that civilian and public 
communications infrastructure in the member states was now made a NATO 
concern. Rather than constructing an isolated military system, a practice 
evolved in this initial phase of telecom system-building according to which the 
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military commands would rent circuits from the national PTTs. This resulted 
in NATO-funded construction of facilities which were recognised to be of 
primarily civilian interest, but important for defence purposes in the event of 
war. Since NATO developed a communications system based on resources of 
national public telecom authorities, the communications sectors in the member 
states became key actors in implementing a secure and reliable 
communications system for the alliance. In the following chapter, I shall 
explore how this networking of NATO appears from the perspective of 
Denmark. 
As these military networking initiatives expanded well beyond defence 
purposes, NATO must be regarded as an important forum for 
telecommunications ‘system-building’ in post-war Western Europe. This 
aspect has not yet been acknowledged in historical research, but based on the 
empirical examinations carried out in this chapter, I suggests that we need to 
take the military system-building into consideration in order to understand 
post-war telecommunication developments in Western Europe. Certainly, it 
was the nation states who were responsible for constructing and operating the 
communication facilities, and, more specifically, this task was carried out by 
national PTTs. Yet, the politicisation of international telecommunication 
governance, which was both caused by geopolitical tensions and by the fact that 
communications technology was vital for offensive and defensive war planning, 
meant that national policies and practices on communications were 
increasingly formulated with a reference to security considerations and the 
NATO membership. This was for example illustrated with the 1949 ITU 
discussion on LORAN communications. In this way, as the following chapters 
of this dissertation will explore, the post-war reshaping of telecommunications 
set the scene for a larger interference of security policy. 
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[3]  
Making the home front 
Adapting the Danish telecom sector to the Cold War 
 
 
In this chapter, I turn the focus to the Danish telecom sector. The NATO 
membership and the new security political framework of the Cold War 
ushered in a new situation for Danish politicians and actors in the telecom 
sector. As shown in chapter two, the cooperation in NATO both manifested 
in an increased need for communications facilities and, on a more abstract 
level, in the introduction of another kind of ‘system-building’ different from 
earlier traditions. In a Danish context, this meant that the telecom sector 
became increasingly involved in defence and security issues. This materialised 
in major construction works in order to provide sufficient communication 
facilities for international and national defence purposes and in a closer 
collaboration between defence authorities and the telecom sector than what 
had previously been the case.  
This chapter delves into these developments with the purpose of 
demonstrating how the Cold War and the NATO membership altered existing 
policies and practices of telecommunication governance in the 1950s and early 
1960s. In doing so, I suggest that defence and security problems became 
determining factors for developments in the Danish telecom sector in this 
period. I argue that the new security agenda found expression in two different 
ways. First, through the 1950s, as military authorities became more involved in 
public telecommunications, they also entered the scene as a new kind of 
stakeholder engaged in defining internal developments in the sector. Second, 
by the 1960s, a number of tasks related to military communications was 
transferred from defence authorities to the telecom sector, whereby the 
telecom sector acquired new responsibilities, which came to define it for the 
rest of the Cold War period. In this way, the chapter offers new perspectives 
to current understandings of both Danish defence and security politics and the 
developments in the telecom sector in the early Cold War period.  
The chapter proceed as follows: First, I examine how the framework for 
civil-military cooperation on telecommunications was reorganised in response 
to Denmark’s entry into NATO and the new defence agenda brought along by 
this reorientation and internationalisation of Danish defence politics. Second, 
I turn the focus towards the principal task in the civil-military cooperation on 
communications in the 1950s, namely that of meeting increased demands for 
telecom facilities for international and national defence purposes. I analyse 
how these needs were balanced with a pressing need for developing and 
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extending the civilian communication networks. Third, I examine the 
organisational changes introduced in the first years of the 1960s and discuss 
how these are to be understood vis-à-vis the governance of 
telecommunications. Before doing so, however, I shall shortly elaborate on the 
previous research on Danish security and telecommunications policies in the 
1950s.  
 
The 1950s: A decade of adaptation? 
In Danish Cold War historiography, the 1950s have been described as a 
‘decade of adaptation’ as regards Denmark’s political and military integration 
into NATO.213 As for the military aspects, historians have shown how the 
Danish defence was profoundly reorganised and reinforced during the 1950s. 
The military adaptation process was brought to an end around 1961/1962 with 
the establishment of an integrated command responsible for the defence of 
Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein.214 Moreover, by the 1960s, with the help of 
substantial American military aid, the Danish defence had been built up to a 
state where it, to some extent at least, was able to take up the fight in case of an 
enemy attack while waiting for allied reinforcements. Prior to this, when 
NATO’s line of defence was placed no further to the west than along the Rhine, 
it was, in reality, improbable that the Danish territory could be defended in 
case of an enemy attack.215 As for the political aspects hereof, historians have 
paid particular attention to the ‘defence opt-outs’ that were formulated as part 
of Danish alliance politics in the 1950s: The rejection in 1953 of stationing  
                                               
213 This process has in Danish historiography often been studied through the lens of the 
‘alliance dilemma’, inspired by the theory of the security dilemma in alliance politics and 
the abandonment-entrapment balance presented by the American political scientist 
Glenn Snyder. For this purpose, the Danish terms of integration and afskærmning 
[shielding] has been applied in order to understand Denmark’s alliance politics, stressing 
both the wish for seeking security and protection by participating in NATO’s common 
deterrence and, at the same time, a wish for shielding against those aspects of alliance 
politics regarded as disadvantageous for Danish security. See Snyder, Alliance politics, p. 
4; Mouritzen, “Alliancedilemma”, Petersen, “Abandonment vs. Entrapment”, p. 183; 
Petersen, ”National strategies in the integration dilemma”; Villaume, Allieret med 
Forbehold, p. 19, 26f.; Villaume, “Nato og Danmark 1949-72”, p. 440f; Petersen, 
Denmark and NATO 1949-1987, p. 14f. 
214 The Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (BALTAP), an integrated command for the 
southern part of NATO’s Northern Region responsible for the defence of Denmark and 
Schleswig-Holstein and thereby the access to the Baltic Sea. BALTAP consisted of air, 
naval, and land forces, all under the command of a Danish chief (COMBALTAP) with 
headquarters in Karup in Jutland. See Lammers and Villaume, “Østersøkommandoen”. 
215 Villaume and Olesen, I Blokopdelingens Tegn, p. 292ff.; DIIS, Danmark under Den 
Kolde Krig, pp. 661, 676. At times, the reception of military material from allies, 
primarily heavy weapon systems, amounted to around 40% of the yearly defence 
budgets. Petersen, “Forsvarspolitik”, p. 277. The military integration took many shapes, 
e.g. in the introduction of new techniques, see for instance Stenak et al. eds., Kold Krig, 
p. 38f. 
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allied air forces, and the 1957 formulation of a reservation towards import of 
atomic weapons in peacetime.216 Moreover, historians have noted how the 
defence build-up sparked political discussions on how to balance military 
expenditures vis-à-vis investments in the welfare state, but it is still an 
underexplored aspect how this balancing was put into practice.217 In particular, 
much remains to be discovered as to how the defence mobilisation and the 
military integration into NATO affected other parts of the Danish society 
outside of the direct military sphere. In this context, Per Boje et al has argued 
that the Danish trade policy in the early Cold War years was based on a broad 
understanding of security that perceived growth, welfare, and democracy as 
enhancing in terms of security.218 
This chapter offers a novel perspective by examining how the integration 
into NATO translated into concrete undertakings in a specific societal sector, 
namely telecommunications. Thereby, the chapter will demonstrate how the 
1950s was also a decade of ‘Cold War adaptation’ for the telephone sector. For 
this purpose – building on this dissertation’s theoretical framework of security 
governance and technopolitics – I understand ‘adaptation’ as a process in which 
adjustments to new circumstances happen in a dynamic interplay between 
different stakeholders, in this case politicians, civil servants, military personnel, 
and representatives from the telecom sector. Adaptation, according to this 
approach, was not a transformation process imposed on the sector from 
outside. Instead, it was a process of mutual negotiation in which the scope of 
action was also defined by technological capabilities and political possibilities.219 
Thus far, the developments of the Danish telephone sector in the early 
Cold War years have primarily been studied from an ‘internalistic’ point of 
view, where changes have been explained with internal factors or domestic 
                                               
216 See for instance Petersen, “Forsvarspolitik”, p. 277; Villaume, “Atomvåbenpolitik”, p. 
106f.; Agger and Wolsgård, “All Steps Necessary”. 
217 In particular, the social democrats maintained how investments in the welfare state 
was just as important in the fight against communism as military investments, see 
Petersen, “Forsvarspolitik”, p. 277. Bo Lidegaard has argued that this was possible due 
to a ‘strategic alliance’ between US administrations and the Danish social democrats that 
allowed Denmark to give the military build-up a lower priority in order to ensure welfare 
build-up. See: Lidegaard, “Et andet syn på dansk diplomati”, p. 521; Lidegaard, I 
Kongens Navn, p. 578ff. For more on the relation between the Cold War and the 
development of the Danish welfare state, see Petersen, “Velfærdsstaten”. In international 
research, this balancing has been addressed with the concept of a ‘warfare-welfare nexus’. 
This nexus has recently been addressed by Danish historians – although with a focus on 
the pre-Cold war period, see: Petersen and Sørensen, “From Military State to Welfare 
State”. An important work on this nexus in the British context is Edgerton, Warfare 
State 
218 See: Boje et al., Handelspolitikken som kampplads under Den Kolde Krig, p. 412. 
The authors have however also noted that the relations between security, growth, and 
welfare is still underexplored in Danish Cold War research. 
219 It is neccessary to stress, therefore, that I do not use ‘adaptation’ as a theoretical 
concept. See above.  
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politics, while geopolitics or transnational influences have been more absent.220 
While these examinations have highlighted the difficulties faced by the sector 
in these years caused by financial circumstances and domestic politics, I shall 
suggest another perspective through which to understand the Danish telecom 
sector in the 1950s, namely as a vital element in building up the home front.  
 
3.1 Civil-military cooperation on telecommunications 
The question of how to organise civilian and military cooperation on 
telecommunications following the entry into NATO fed into an already 
ongoing discussion in the telecom sector related to the division of responsibility 
between the state and private actors. Therefore, in order to examine how the 
change in circumstances brought along by the Cold War affected the sector, it 
is necessary first to take a closer look at how the sector was organised.  
 
Public-private organisation in the Danish telecom sector 
Similar to the arrangement in most other European countries, postal, 
telephony, and telegraphy services were under the control of a government 
department in Denmark, namely the Post & Telegraph Services (P&T). This 
arrangement had roots in the 1897 law on telephony, which gave the Danish 
state a monopoly on carrying out telecommunications through the public 
network. However, the law provided the state with the possibility of giving other 
companies a concession for operating in different regions for a certain period. 
As previously mentioned, three companies were operating under concession 
in the post-war years: Kjøbenhavns Telefon A/S (KTAS), Fyns kommunale 
Telefonselskab (FkT) and Jydsk Telefon A/S (JTAS). KTAS and JTAS were 
joint stock companies, in which the government had taken over more than half 
of the subscribed capital, while FkT was a cooperative society in which the local 
municipalities within the Funen area were partners. Along with the P&T, these 
companies were referred to as the ‘telephone administrations’, a collective 
designation for the suppliers in the Danish telephone sector.221 While the 
telephone companies each ran the local telephone traffic in their region, the 
inter-urban, i.e. long-distance, traffic and the international traffic was handled 
by the P&T. Moreover, the P&T also ran telegraph traffic, including wireless 
                                               
220 The telephone company JTAS’s development in the post-war years has been dealt 
with in detail in Jacobsen, Jydsk Telefon, p. 75ff. Organisational and technological 
developments of the P&T has been examined in Blüdnikow, Post og Tele under samme 
tag, and the public-private division of responsibility between the P&T and the telephone 
companies in Blüdnikow, Enhedsvæsenet. 
221 Paper read before the ELLA meeting, October 1953. TM, TTS, Enhedssagen 1945-
1966. RA; Jacobsen, Jydsk Telefon, p. 13; Blüdnikow, Enhedsvæsenet, p. 19f.  
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services, e.g. the coast radio stations; the local telephone traffic in certain 
regions, e.g. in Sønderjylland; and the state broadcasting service.222 
Politically, telecommunications were under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Public Works.223 The General Directorate of the P&T was a 
department – in Danish referred to as an ‘etat’ – in the ministry, in the same 
way as the Danish State Railways and the Danish Road Directorate. With these 
departments, the Ministry of Public Works was closely intertwined with its 
spheres of responsibility. In the last resort, the Minister of Public Works was 
politically in charge of the area of telecommunications. In the period under 
study in this chapter, the ministry was primarily headed by social democratic 
ministers, apart from the years 1950 to 1953 where it was headed by 
conservative ministers.224 Supervision of and coordination within the telephone 
sector happened in the context of the Telephone Control Board 
[Telefontilsynet], a committee established under the Ministry of Public Works 
in 1919. The Control Board supervised the development in the telephone 
sector and oversaw that the private telephone companies operated in line with 
the concessions, for instance as regards tariffing. In 1948, a Coordination 
Committee [Samarbejdsudvalget] with representatives from the P&T and the 
telephone companies was established under board with the purpose of 
coordinating the technological development and furthering standardisation 
within the sector.225 
In the early post-war years, the division of responsibility between the 
P&T and the three telephone companies was brought up for discussion. Ahead 
of this, a state takeover of the telephone sector had been considered on more 
                                               
222 The long-distance telephone service was referred to as Rigstelefonen. The P&T’s local 
telephone service, referred to as Statstelefonen, covered Sønderjylland [South Jutland] 
and Møn. Moreover, a number of smaller exchanges, e.g. in Skagen and on smaller 
islands, were operated by Statstelefonen until handed over to the telephone companies 
during the 1950s. See Blüdnikow, Post og Tele under samme tag, p. 41, 63, 71f. 
223 The ministry, responsible for traffic and communication matters, was first founded in 
1892 in connection with a reorganisation of the Ministry of Interior. It was renamed the 
Ministry of Traffic in 1987, a name that had also been used informally prior to this. Of 
the areas serving under the Ministry of Public Works in the period under study, traffic 
maters generally attracted the most political attention, e.g. the large-scale and long-term 
development plans for the extension of traffic infrastructure in Denmark launched in the 
1950s. Due to the advanced technological character and the peculiar organisation of 
telecommunications, large-scale planning in this area was a special task that was not in 
the same way integrated into the general large-scale infrastructure planning. See 
Jørgensen, “Velfærdsstaten sættes på hjul”, pp. 114-122; Hertz, “Ministeriet for 
Offentlige Arbejder”; Kaarsted, De Danske Ministerier 1929-1953, p. 478; Kaarsted, De 
Danske Ministerier 1953-1972, pp. 332f. 364. 426f. 
224 See Statsministeriet, “Regeringer siden 1848”. 
225 From 1962, Samarbejdsudvalget was renamed Samordningsudvalget and its purpose 
was slightly changed. I shall get back to this in section 3.3 My use of the English term the 
Coordination Committee refers to both. For more on regulation and coordination of the 
sector, see Henten, “Dansk telefonhistorie”, p. 13f.; Blüdnikow, Enhedsvæsenet, p. 78f. 
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occasions, as the 1897 law was based on the expectation that the development 
in the telephone sector would in the end lead to a unitary system driven by the 
state – in Danish coined as an ‘enhedsvæsen’.226 However, when the expiry of 
the concessions granted to the telephone companies approached in the late 
1910s and again in the late 1930s, the governments in office found that 
economic conditions did not speak in favour of a state takeover at that point.227 
In 1938, the social democratic led government decided that the state, as a first 
step, should acquire the majority of the companies’ shares and by 1952 take 
over all the telephone companies and form a united service under the P&T. 
While the first step was carried through with KTAS in 1939 and JTAS in 1942, 
the further plans were put on hold due to the Second World War and the 
German occupation of Denmark.228 According to Mark Mau, who has 
examined the telephone sector during the German occupation in detail, these 
years disturbed the balance of power in the sector to the benefit of the 
telephone companies, who had argued heavily against a state take over.229 
Thus, when the question of a state takeover of the telephone companies 
was brought up again after the Second World War, the situation was very 
different to the one foreshadowed in 1938. The state was, according to the 
concessions, authorised to redeem the remaining parts of the share capital in 
the companies, but in 1948, much to the annoyance of the P&T, the issue was 
postponed when the Minister of Public Works, social democrat Carl Petersen, 
declared that it was not the government’s intention to do so at his point. Instead, 
the concessions were extended to 1962. This was done with considerations for 
the state of crisis that the telephone sector was in due to the general post-war 
monetary crisis and short supply situation and to the pending extension and 
modernisation of the telephone sector, which was also needed. In such a 
                                               
226 For a thorough examination hereof, see Blüdnikow, Enhedsvæsenet. Given the 
technical circumstance that telephony was mainly a local matter from the outset, a large 
number of local companies emerged in the late nineteenth century, but as technical 
possibilities for telephony over longer distances improved, many local services were 
centralised and the ground thereby prepared for a unitary system. 
227 The new concessions granted in 1920 contained a right for the state to take the 
majority control of the companies by the time of expiration of the concessions. Ibid., p. 
28f.; Olsen, Regulering af offentlige forsyningsvirksomheder i Danmark, p. 274. 
228 Moreover, agreements were reached that 10 smaller companies in Southern Jutland 
were taken over by JTAS in 1939. The state also took majority control of Lolland-
Falsters Telefon-Aktieselskab and Bornholms Telefon in 1939, and both companies 
were taken over by KTAS in the post-war years. A similar agreement as the one for FkT 
was made for Samsø Telefonselskab, until the company was gradually taken over by 
JTAS from 1948. See: Blüdnikow, Enhedsvæsenet, p. 45-61; Blüdnikow, Post og Tele 
under samme tag, p. 139ff. 
229 Mau, Kampen om telefonen, pp. 4., 40f., 278, 287. However, JTAS also tried to get 
permission for an extension of the concession and thereby avoid the 1942 state takeover 
of its majority share, but without success. See ibid., p. 284.  
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situation, the Ministry of Public Works found that larger organisational changes 
were inconvenient.230  
Since the new concessions lasted for the period until 1962, the question 
of a unification of the telephone sector was not on the table through the 1950s. 
Nonetheless, it is an important context for understanding the balance of power 
between the Ministry of Public Works, the P&T, and the telephone 
companies. The companies, on the one hand, had an interest in demonstrating 
their competences and ability to run an efficient sector, while the P&T, on the 
other hand, had an interest in highlighting problems with the existing 
arrangement of the sector. As regards the concessions, three additional aspects 
must be highlighted. First, the concessions determined that the telephone 
companies were not allowed to raise prices in order to finance construction 
works. Such investments were therefore financed with loans. Second, it is 
moreover important to note that while the telephone companies enjoyed the 
exclusive right to deliver telephone services in the regions where they operated, 
this right was also accompanied with a duty to deliver such services – even when 
not profitable. The latter could for instance be the case with certain military 
installations, which were not used on a daily basis. Third, the concessions 
assigned a special priority to the telecommunication services needed for the 
state.231 In the following years, these circumstances all contributed to 
discussions around how to organise civil-military cooperation on 
communications. 
Despite the strained relations, a close and constructive cooperation on 
practical matters emerged between the P&T and the telephone companies in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s. This was not least caused by the technical 
development, which set the framework for a clearer division of responsibilities 
and placed the companies in a more submissive position vis-à-vis the state.232 In 
1945, the development activities, which had been put on hold during the 
occupation, were resumed, and the telephone companies obtained large loans 
in order to make extensions of both cables, exchange stations, and telephone 
devices.233 An important development in this regard was the introduction of the 
carrier frequency technology allowing a much larger capacity of traffic to pass 
through the cables. Moreover, the automation of the exchange centrals, which 
had been projected and effected in some local areas before the war, was further 
                                               
230 Blüdnikow, Post og Tele under samme tag, p. 144f.; Jacobsen, Jydsk Telefon, p. 39; 
Blüdnikow, Enhedsvæsenet, p. 74f. 
231 For more on the duty to deliver tele services (in Danish referred to as 
‘forsyningspligten’), see Petersen, “Linien til Larsen på landet”. 
232 Ibsen and Skovgaard Poulsen, “Path dependence and independent utility regulation”, 
p. 55; Olsen, Regulering af offentlige forsyningsvirksomheder i Danmark, p. 275. 
233 During wartime, the companies had generated long waiting lists of future subscribers; 
by 1945, circa 41.000 orders for telephones awaited.  Blüdnikow, Enhedsvæsenet, p. 
71f.  
 
 
78 
implemented. Next in line was the exchanges for long-distance telephony, in 
which the introduction of semi-automatic expedition would enable telephone 
operators to directly connect a call to a receiver in most places of the country 
and also a few destinations abroad. These developments enabled the 
combination of short- and long-distance traffic and therefore called into 
question the previous division of responsibility between the P&T and the 
companies.234 Accordingly, an agreement – referred to as ‘the concordat’ – was 
reached in 1950 that the companies should establish automated installations 
for telephone traffic meant for both inter-urban and long-distance telephony 
within their operating area, while the P&T established and maintained cables 
connecting the different regions and operated the main repeater stations.235  
 
Military relations 
Denmark’s entry into the cooperation on the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 led 
to three organisational changes in the area of telecommunications, paving the 
way for a close and regular cooperation between tele administrations and the 
defence authorities.  
The first was the appointment in March 1950 by the then Ministry of 
War of a lieutenant colonel named P.O.H. Jessen to serve as a liaison officer 
the telephone services. The purpose of doing so was to let the liaison officer 
participate in meetings in the aforementioned Coordination Committee under 
the Telephone Control Board in which the officer should “represent the 
interests of the defence” in order to make sure that the future expanded 
telephone network would gain a dimension “that would satisfy the overall 
military demands.”236 The military need for a closer cooperation with the 
telephone sector emerged in a period in which the Danish Defence was 
profoundly reorganised as a consequence of the new alliance membership. 
This involved the introduction of a new military structure as well as a three-year 
programme for the build-up of forces, which implied a major increase in 
defence spending.237 Despite initial scepticism from the tele administrations of 
                                               
234 Blüdnikow, Post og Tele under samme tag, pp. 66f., 131.  
235 Blüdnikow, Enhedsvæsenet, p. 84f. The designation of ’Konkordatet’ was a reference 
to the historical conventions between the Papal State and sovereign states. 
236 I have shown previously how this appointment was done with inspiration from 
Norway, where the defence had engaged in similar relations with the tele sector: Jensen, 
Klartone efter atombomben, p. 39. For the appointment, see: Note from the 5th Office in 
the Ministry of War to the 4th Office, March 18 1950. FM 6. Kontor, Sagsakter 1950-
1982, A097, 730-3/47.2. RA. Later in 1950, the Ministry of War and the Ministry of 
Naval Affairs was merged as part of the larger defence reorganisation, leading to the 
establishment of the Ministry of Defence. See Petersen, “Forsvarsministeriet”, p. 274; 
Kaarsted, De Danske Ministerier 1929-1953, p. 428. 
237 This included the establishment of the position as a Chief of Defence, see Heurlin, 
“Forsvarskommandoen”, p. 268f.; Petersen, “Forsvarspolitik”, p. 276f. As for defence 
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including the liaison officer in their internal discussions, Jessen came to be a 
frequent participant at meetings in the Coordination Committee through the 
1950s.238 Thus, as many of the general, coordinating discussions on civil-
military cooperation came to take place in this forum, the records of the 
meetings in the Coordination Committee are a good source for investigating 
the civil-military discussions around telecommunications.  
The second change came in April 1952, when the Minister of Defence, 
Harald Petersen, established a special defence department to deal with 
communications called the Defence Telegraph Administration [Forsvarets 
Telegrafforvaltning, FTF] and appointed Jessen, now a colonel, as chief hereof. 
FTF was given the task of managing the coordination of “technical and 
economic planning and administration” of the Danish Defence’s permanent 
telecommunications, as it was recognised that the “increased volume and 
importance” of telecommunications made more coordination necessary. 
Thereby, the division of responsibility between the defence and the tele 
administrations was formalised, as the circular calling for the establishment of 
FTF emphasised how the establishment, operation, and maintenance of 
telecommunication services for defence purposes was to be carried out by the 
civilian administrations “to the extent possible as compatible with 
considerations for the military preparedness”. FTF’s responsibility, then, was 
to make sure that the needed facilities were designed in the most technical and 
financial appropriate manner, that facilities were sought to be as standardised 
as possible, and that provisions were made for replacement and reserve 
material.239 In this way, all requests for communications for defence purposes 
would now be forwarded through FTF as the central agency, but previous 
traditions in the tele sector were upheld, as the tele administrations would 
continue to be the primary suppliers of the requested communications services. 
The third change was a decision taken by the government in November 
1953 to set up an Inter-Ministerial Signal Committee [Den Interministerielle 
Signalkomité (IMSK)] with representatives appointed by the Minister of 
Defence and the Minister of Public Works. The director general of the P&T, 
KJ Jensen, served as chairman of IMSK, which was a consultative organ with 
the task of considering “all the important telecommunication questions for 
which a coordination of civil and military interests seems necessary”, thereby 
                                               
spending, the defence budget was tripled between 1949/50 and 1954/55. See Villaume, 
Allieret med Forbehold, p. 926. 
238 For the scepticism, see Jensen, Klartone efter atombomben, p. 39f. 
239 Announcement for the defence B.17-1952, FM, April 26 1952. 974A-1. EA. 
Importantly, the communication facilities for the air defence and the coast defence sites 
were not subject to the rule that they should be carried out by the civilian tele 
administrations. Instead, the construction, operation, and maintenance of these facilities 
was coordinated between the Defence Telegraph Administration and the military 
authorities in question. 
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ensuring that Danish telecommunication services “most effectively can meet 
the demands raised under war or extraordinary conditions.”240  
The establishment of FTF as well as IMSK must be understood as direct 
consequences of the NATO membership and the increased attention to 
telecommunications given within the alliance. As a result of both the 1951 
establishment of the European Military Communications Coordination 
Committee (EMCCC) and the European Long Lines Agency (ELLA) and the 
1952 extension of NATO’s infrastructure programme to cover Denmark, the 
Danish defence was met with an increased demand for reporting on and 
coordinating national telecommunication matters with NATO agencies.241 As 
touched upon in the previous chapters, NATO’s conduct in the area of 
telecommunications relied on a close cooperation with national authorities on 
both military and civilian matters, and the EMCCC and ELLA directly stressed 
the need for national delegates who were able to represent both military and 
civil interests in telecommunications.242 In Denmark, liaison officer Jessen was 
appointed to represent Denmark in ELLA and he therefore also represented 
Danish civilian telecom interests in NATO.243 Once in a while, however, 
representatives from the telecom sector would also be drawn into the work in 
NATO’s telecom agencies.244 On a national level, the increased NATO 
collaboration raised a number of issues in which civilian and military interests 
collided, and which necessitated decision-making on a ministerial level, i.e. in 
IMSK.245 
Thus, by late-1953, an organisational set-up had been worked out for 
how to deal with security aspects in the area of telecommunications, both on a 
practical and a political level. In the following section, I show how the FTF 
became an influential and agenda-setting actor in the Danish telecom sector 
through the 1950s. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to mention that it 
was not novel for the Danish telecom sector to engage in a close cooperation 
with ‘security authorities’ such as the Defence, the Foreign Ministry, the 
Ministry of Justice, and the intelligence services. Indeed, this had been a 
                                               
240 Note on the establishment of IMSK, FM, November 26 1953. 471A-1. EA. 
241 Minutes of CC meeting, January 14 1954. TM, TTS, Bilag til samarbejdsudvalgets 
møder; Review of FTF, April 22 1959. FM, Forsvarets Rationaliseringsudvalg, 
Kommissionspapirer 1953-1959, V013. RA. 
242 Memorandum from SG Liaison Officer, June 4 1953. Annex to C-M(53)77. NA. 
243 Note on the establishment of IMSK, FM, November 26 1953. 471A-1. EA. 
244 This was for instance the case in October 1953, when a representative for the 
companies and the PTT presented a report to ELLA on how the cooperation on civil-
military communications was organised in Denmark. See: Paper read before the ELLA 
meeting, October 1953. TM, TTS, Enhedssagen 1945-1966. RA. 
245 Unfortunately, I have not been able to locate a file of records stemming from IMSK 
in neither the archives of the Ministry of Defence, under which IMSK was placed, nor 
the P&T, where the chairman was located. Instead, I have found IMSK documents in 
other case files in other archive groups. 
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common practice since the late nineteenth century, not least in times of crises. 
As previous research has shown, this relationship materialised in different 
measures as regards control of transnational communications, censorship, and 
surveillance. During the First and Second World War, for example, the tele 
administrations carried out important security-related tasks in terms of 
censorship for the Danish state, military authorities, or the occupying power.246 
However, due to the NATO membership and the consequent build-up 
and internationalisation of the Danish defence, the cooperation between the 
telecom sector and military authorities assumed a new and more formalised 
shape, which reached beyond previous experiences. This reflected a general 
tendency related to the integration into NATO. By example, the 
aforementioned investigation of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service 
(Politiets Efterretningstjeneste, PET) during the Cold War revealed that the 
NATO membership and the cooperation on NATO intelligence issues caused 
the PET to systematise its work, for instance as regards the registration and 
security clearance of persons.247 Moreover, similar kinds of civil-military 
cooperation on defence and preparedness issues as in the telecom area 
emerged in other societal sectors too, although this is still quite unexplored.248 
Moreover, we know from an examination of the Norwegian telecom sector 
carried out by the Norwegian business historian Harald Espeli how the sector 
was highly impacted by the NATO membership and the adaptation to Cold 
War circumstances. In Norway, an agency similar to the FTF, namely 
Forsvarets Fellessamband (FFSB), was established in 1953, also as a direct 
cause of the increased demands for military communications within NATO.249 
However, as I shall get back to later in this chapter, the civil-military 
cooperation on telecommunications in Norway took on a very different shape 
than what was the case in Denmark. 
 
                                               
246 See for instance Marklund, “Listening for the state”; Marklund “Trawling the Wires”; 
Nielsen, Er der nogen på linjen?. For the nineteenth century historical roots of this 
cooperation, see Marklund, “A Stake in Public Confidence”; Marklund “Suspekte 
beskeder”.  
247 See Schmidt and Miller, PET's virkemidler, p. 76. 
248 An exception is the railway sector, which has been examined in a master’s thesis by 
Asbjørn Rune Riis-Knudsen. Here, a liaison officer from the Army to the Danish State 
Railways [DSB] was appointed in 1955 with the purpose on ensuring a close 
coordination between the Defence and DSB on the planning for mobilisation and war, 
which also included much coordination with NATO agencies. See: Riis-Knudsen, 
Totalforsvar på skinner, part of which is also published in the 2014 article: Riis-Knudsen, 
“Totalforsvar på skinner”.  
249 Espeli, Det statsdominerte teleregimet, p. 343. 
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3.2 Telecommunications for defence purposes  
The primary task for civil-military cooperation on telecommunications in the 
early 1950s was to meet the increased demands for telecommunication facilities 
for defence purposes caused by the defence build-up in NATO and Denmark. 
This involved more than just constructing new facilities, it also raised some 
more fundamental questions, namely how international installations for 
defence communications were to be understood vis-à-vis the Danish state 
monopoly on communications and the division of responsibilities between the 
P&T and the telephone companies, and how they were to be balanced against 
existing civilian needs for construction works in the sector.  
In order to examine how this problem was dealt with in the Danish 
sector, I shall now study four main issues which were raised in the civilian-
military cooperation in the early 1950s. First, agreements had to be reached 
regarding what facilities that needed to be constructed and how – and by whom 
– this work should be carried out. The civilian telecom authorities were 
commissioned to carry out the construction work, but the Danish government 
furthermore decided that the military needs for new communication facilities 
should be sought combined with civilian needs. Second, because of this 
decision, the question arose of how the cost of the construction works and the 
use of the facilities should be allocated between military and civilian authorities. 
Third, I show how the participation in NATO’s infrastructure programme 
introduced new ‘infrastructural agendas’ into Danish telecommunications, and, 
fourth, I look into the negotiations regarding the conditions for the daily 
peacetime use of the facilities. 
 
Construction of military communications infrastructure 
As described above, the P&T and the companies were projecting immense 
construction works in the late 1940s and early 1950s, of which the planned 
long-distance carrier frequency network formed a substantial part. The 
Minister of Public Works, Carl Petersen, was therefore aware already in late 
1949 that the wishes for new communications circuits for military purposes 
would potentially pose a challenge.250 In order to coordinate the civilian and 
military needs, the Telephone Control Board established a working group with 
the purpose of considering the military wishes for telephone and telegraph 
connections. In a November 1950 report, the working group summarised the 
communication needs reported by the different branches within the Danish 
defence in an overall plan. According to the information provided by the 
                                               
250 Petersen therefore informed his colleague, Minister of Defence Rasmus Hansen, that 
it was “very urgent” that the defence authorities notified the telephone sector about their 
needs for communications extensions so that they could be coordinated with civilian 
plans. Minutes of TTS meeting, April 27 1950. TM, TTS, Tilsynets Mødereferater. RA. 
 
 
83 
defence, this plan would “cover the defence’s needs also during increased 
alert”. The report concluded that since the civilian long line network was 
already “completely utilized”, the plan could only be implemented gradually as 
the ongoing expansion of the carrier frequency network made progress. The 
working group also considered the army’s special needs for links for 
operational purposes during a war. It found, however, that extending the 
network in such a way that the lines needed for the army’s operation in wartime 
would be available at any time without reducing the civilian traffic “would be 
financially irresponsible”, since very large sums would then be placed in 
telephone facilities, “which will perhaps never come into play.”251 It appears 
from the relevant material in the following period that this recommendation 
was met; in the negotiations between the defence and the tele administrations 
on extending the network for military purposes, facilities for operational 
aspects in wartime were not part of the equation.252 
Following the submission of the report, the chairman of the Telephone 
Control Board, Steenbuch, informed the Ministry of Public Works that 
meeting the military needs would require extensive construction works. 
Steenbuch emphasised that in some cases, there was a reserve capacity in the 
planned long line cables that could be taken in use to meet military demands, 
although this would mean that there was no capacity left for the expected 
increase in civilian communications. In other cases, he noted, the telephone 
administrations would have to construct new cables that were not, at least for 
the time being, needed from a civilian point of view. Steenbuch concluded his 
address by stressing that these questions were “of far-reaching engineering and 
economic importance”, for which reason he had found it necessary with 
political negotiations.253 
The position of the government on this issue does not appear to have left 
behind many traces in the available archive materiel. Upon Steenbuch’s 
request, the Ministry of Public Works hosted a meeting in April 1951 with 
participants from the ministry’s own department along with delegates from the 
Ministry of Defence, the defence, as well as personnel from the tele 
administrations. The participants discussed the challenge of meeting the 
demands for defence communications in a situation where civilian needs were 
                                               
251 Report from the working group for the consideration of the defence’s wishes for 
telephone and telegraph connections, November 23 1950. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, 
Emneordnede Sager 1950-1985, 1. RA. 
252 I shall therefore not go further into the question of operational military 
communications in this chapter. See for instance: Second report from the working group 
for the consideration of the defence’s wishes for telephone and telegraph connections, 
December 1951. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Emneordnede Sager 1950-1985, 1. RA.  
253 Note from Steenbuch to the Ministry of Public Works, December 2 1950. 974A-1-
27, EA. See also Minutes of TTS meeting, February 1 1951. TM, TTS, Tilsynets 
Mødereferater. RA. 
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also pressing, but resources scarce. The minutes of the meeting give an insight 
into how the problem was approached, also politically. As I will outline below, 
the discussions reveal how both defence and security politics and general 
political priorities in relation to public telecommunications were in play. 
At the meeting, liaison officer Jessen began by elaborating on the plans 
for extending communication facilities for defence purposes. He referred to 
plans for international long lines, which were planned to be financed under a 
common fund in NATO – i.e. a reference to the common infrastructure 
programme which at this point was being adopted by SHAPE. Moreover, he 
outlined the need for establishing new national lines operated by the defence 
and requested the tele administrations to inform him when planning to lay out 
long lines, so that defence authorities could expand their network as part 
hereof. Jessen stated that it was of high priority for the defence that 
communication facilities in Jutland were extended and he pointed towards the 
town of Kolding in Jutland as the future junction of national and international 
communications. Thereby, transiting Copenhagen and the Eastern parts of 
Denmark could be avoided.254 In this manner, he referred to general 
considerations on Danish security in the early 1950s, as he specifically called 
attention to the possible scenario that the Danish islands, i.e. Eastern Denmark, 
were occupied in a future war.255 In such a situation, Jessen stated, maintaining 
contacts between Paris and Oslo would be crucial. At this point, the build-up 
of the Danish Defence was still in an early stage and a defence of Denmark’s 
territory in case of an enemy attack depended fully on receiving allied 
reinforcements.256 For this reason, maintaining communications with Paris 
where SHAPE was located was paramount. The importance of 
communications with Oslo can be explained with the circumstance that 
Denmark served as a point of transit between Norway and NATO’s Central 
European region and with a view to the close cooperation between Danish and 
Norwegian defence authorities constituting the northern flank of NATO.257 
The military plans for extension of communication networks 
corresponded roughly with the civilian plans already drafted in the telecom 
sector. For instance, the P&T’s post-war assessment was that if Denmark 
                                               
254 Minutes of meeting in MOA, April 25 1951. 974A-1-27. EA. 
255 As demonstrated in previous research, this was one of the threat scenarios that the 
Danish defence planned for. See Larsen, “Vejen til Danmarks sidste kystforter”, p. 187. 
256 Villaume and Olesen, I Blokopdelingens Tegn, p. 162f. However, as Nikolaj 
Petersen, among others, has noted, allied reinforcements remained hypothetical until the 
early 1960s, Petersen, “Forsvarspolitik”, p. 277. 
257 Denmark and Norway had since 1950 worked for the establishment of a special 
military command for the region, which later materialised with the establishment of the 
headquarters in Kolsås outside of Oslo of the Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNE or 
AFNORTH), led by a Commander in chief, CINCNORTH. See: Villaume, Allieret 
med Forbehold, p. 213f. 
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should position itself as an important transit in international communications, 
new cables both north and south of Denmark were needed.258 At this point, 
Denmark was linked with its southern neighbour Germany through submarine 
cables in the East and landlines in the West.259 However, given the post-war 
chaotic situation in Germany, the P&T found a bypassing of both the Eastern 
and Western zones of occupation desirable from a practical and financial point 
of view. This was the primary reason for the P&T’s most extensive post-war 
investment, namely a submarine cable between the Netherlands and Denmark, 
which began operation in September 1951.260 As previously mentioned, the 
bypassing of German territory was also a key element in NATO’s 1951 
recommendations for communications infrastructure in the northern region.261 
However, the majority of the circuit capacity in the submarine cable to the 
Netherlands had already been reserved for commercial purposes when the 
military plans were discussed in the spring of 1951, and since further increases 
in traffic were expected, the P&T planned to keep in use the old cables through 
the Russian zone of Germany.262 
Other studies have shown how the balancing of the defence build-up with 
other societal economic matters was a major political challenge in Denmark in 
these years. In the summer and fall of 1950, following the outbreak of the 
Korean War and the decision in September among the Atlantic Treaty 
countries to establish an integrated military command in Europe, Danish 
politicians and civil servants were concerned about the consequences the 
mobilisation would have for the “societal economic balance” in Danish 
society.263 In particular, the balance of payments deficit posed a challenge, both 
                                               
258 The income from potential transit traffic was of great importance to the P&T. Given 
the political situation of post-war Europe, Sweden was increasingly interested in routing 
traffic through Denmark instead of using the Swedish submarine cables to Stralsund in 
Eastern Germany. Holmblad, “Koaksialkabelanlægget Danmark-Holland”, p. 2. 
259 Prior to the Second World War, communications with the European continent had 
mainly happened through the Nykøbing-Rostock cable and the Kolding-Flensburg cable. 
Ibid., p. 1. 
260 The construction of the submarine cable was the largest engineering work that the 
Danish P&T had conducted at this point. The problem of communication through 
Germany was caused by the lack of a German authority with which the Danish P&T 
could collaborate and the fact that much of the capacity in German networks was 
occupied for military use due to the occupation of the German zones. Moreover, the risk 
of control and tapping of communications transiting Germany was accentuated in the 
political process prior to the approval of the submarine cable to the Netherlands. Ibid., 
p. 1ff.; Blüdnikow, Post og Tele under samme tag, p. 131. 
261 Note on the European Signal Infrastructure Program, June 1951. NA. 
262 Minutes of meeting in MOA, April 25 1951. 974A-1-27. EA. 
263 This phrase was used in a note prepared to the government by The Economic 
Secretariat [Det Økonomiske Sekretariat] in September 1950, outlining the financial 
challenges raised by the increased expenses for the military and the civil defence and 
Denmark’s participation in the Atlantic Treaty. The note is quoted in: ”Den centrale, 
generelle planlægning.”, p. 5. IM, SCB, Sager vedr. det civile beredskab, 5. RA. 
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because the import of new material needed for the defence build-up required 
foreign capital and because global prices on raw materials generally increased 
after the outbreak of the Korean War. This caused the social democratic 
government led by Hans Hedtoft to begin studying adjustments of military 
investments to the general financial circumstances in Denmark.264 Moreover, 
the liberal-conservative government led by Erik Eriksen that took over in late 
October 1950 imposed credit restraints and a suspension of civilian 
construction work in different societal sectors. This also affected the tele 
administrations who were asked to downscale their construction plans and 
found it increasingly difficult to be granted loans for new investments.265 As the 
director of JTAS, Draminsky, noted at a meeting in the Telephone Control 
Board in February 1951, the “present unwillingness” of the credit institutions 
to borrow money to the company meant that JTAS would only be able to keep 
up the current pace until May, after which the company would have to give up 
the ongoing construction work. Draminsky emphasised how this would also 
have “an adverse impact on the national defence”.266 
Given this situation, the construction of new telecommunication facilities 
for military purposes raised a dilemma of a principal nature: How should the 
military needs for communications be prioritised vis-à-vis the needs for 
extending the underdeveloped public network? At the April 1951 meeting in 
the Ministry of Public Works, the ministry’s permanent secretary, Palle 
Christensen, invited the meeting participants to consider how military and 
civilian interests could be coordinated. A colonel representing the Ministry of 
Defence stated that the Defence “was interested in the cheapest possible 
solution” according to which the defence authorities did not finance the 
construction work themselves. He intended to submit the case to the Minister 
of Defence “who would probably choose [the solution] that the telephone 
administrations constructed the installations by means of loans or funding and 
that the defence thereafter rented [circuits]”. In reply, the chairman of the 
                                               
264 For this purpose, the government established the Committee for Defence Economy 
[Det Forsvarsøkonomiske Udvalg], which I shall get back to later. See: Villaume, Allieret 
med Forbehold, p. 298; Jensen, “NATO og danske økonomisk-politiske interesser 
1949-56”, p. 85; Jensen, “Det Forsvarsøkonomiske Udvalg”, p. 280. In the Atlantic 
Treaty cooperation, Denmark also put forward the view that the military build-up was to 
be considered in the light of the strains put on the general financial situation in the 
member states. Documents related to this can i.a. be found in: ØM, Journalsager 1949-
1959, 17, B23. RA. 
265 Jacobsen, Jydsk Telefon, pp. 59f., 87. The records of a special construction 
committee [Anlægsudvalget] give a further insight into the general reduction of 
construction works. See for instance: ØM, Journalsager 1949-1959, 7, B5, 
Anlægsudvalget. RA. 
266 Minutes of TTS meeting, February 1 1951. TM, TTS, Tilsynets Mødereferater. RA. 
The difficulty of obtaining loans was also addresses at meetings in the Coordination 
Committee: Minutes of SU meeting, February 22 1951 and January 10 1952. TM, TTS, 
Bilag til samarbejdsudvalgets møder. RA. 
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Telephone Control Board, Steenbuch, stressed that if the tele administrations 
constructed the needed military installations, the government would have to 
respect not to reduce the extent of civilian construction work at the expense 
hereof. Moreover, the tele administrations stressed that if they would have to 
reserve circuits for military use in the already planned cables, for example the 
submarine cable to the Netherlands, they would also miss out on important 
incomes they could otherwise have earned from commercial lease of the 
circuits. 267 
In reply, permanent secretary Palle Christensen informed the 
participants that the government’s policy was that the military construction 
needs would have to take priority, “perhaps at the expense of civilian [needs]”. 
He added, however, that “the standpoint would have to be, though, that we try 
to place the military construction programme on top of the civilian”.268 The 
latter comment made by Christensen can be understood as a proposal to let 
the construction needed for defence purposes follow the patterns of the already 
planned civilian programme, whereby military and civilian needs could be 
combined, for example with new cables containing circuits for both military 
and civilian use. When perceived through the lens of technopolitics, this 
statement can be understood as an attempt to further specific political priorities 
through technological possibilities. This interpretation is supported by a further 
comment made by Christensen that it would probably be easier for the P&T 
to obtain funding for new constructions if civilian and military needs were 
combined.269 Given the lack of archive material on the governmental standpoint 
on the prioritisation between military and civilian needs for new 
communication facilities, the comments made by permanent secretary 
Christensen are noteworthy. It remains unclear to what extent Christensen’s 
statements were directly derived from a political standpoint taken by the 
government and how much was his own translation hereof. Anyhow, the 
decision to combine military and civilian construction needs in common 
facilities was recalled on later occasions.270 
It is noteworthy that no references to NATO were made in these 
negotiations. As outlined in chapter two, it was a central concern in NATO’s 
infrastructure planning at this point that military communication needs should 
to the greatest possible extent be based on the existing civilian infrastructure. 
On a practical level, many of the circuits needed for defence purposes were 
established as so-called ‘reserved circuits’ [forberedte kredsløb], which were 
                                               
267 Minutes of meeting in MOA, April 25 1951. 974A-1-27. EA. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Ibid. 
270 For instance, the decision was explained in: Memorandum on the defence extension 
of the signal network, August 15 1956; Letter from the Ministry of Defence to the 
Finance Committee, July 25 1957. 974A-1-31. EA. 
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not established on a permanent basis, but could be coupled in and taken into 
use when needed. This was in line with the general practice in NATO. In a 
note sent to the Coordination Committee dated September 11 1951, liaison 
officer Jessen summarized how this arrangement had come about: 
“For designing the telecommunications network that has 
been planned for the use of the Atlantic Treaty defence and 
which includes international as well as national circuits, the 
proceeding has been that important parts of the network in 
peacetime shall remain as so-called reserved circuits.”271  
The reserved circuits could be made available for the military authorities at 
minimum 24 hours’ notice, for instance by the declaration of alert. With this 
arrangement, more capacity was reserved in the network for civilian purposes 
in peacetime, but when the reserved circuits were coupled in, they would 
occupy parts of the civilian network. In a second report submitted in December 
1951, the aforementioned working group considering the military wishes for 
telephone and telegraph connections recognised that from the point of view of 
the tele administrations, the projected decrease of civilian capacity in an 
emergency situation was undesirable. However, the solution with the reserved 
circuits was still favoured by the working group, which found that it at the time 
being would be “financially irresponsible” to establish the reserved circuits in a 
manner where they would not draw on the civilian network.272  
In a similar vein, later notes recall how the decision to construct a large 
part of the needed military facilities as reserved circuits was a temporary 
solution decided upon by the telephone administrations with a view to the poor 
situation of the common network. The expectation was that when the network 
was adequately extended, the solution should be abandoned and the circuits 
established on a normal, permanent basis.273 The arrangement with reserved 
circuits therefore serves as a case in point for how the telecom sector tried to 
balance military and civilian needs in the early 1950s and minimise the 
proportion of construction work needed for defence communications. In this 
way, the telecom sector adapted to the general economic situation by not 
scaling down their own construction programmes – and future income base – 
more than necessary. The arrangement with the reserved circuits later came to 
cause disputes in the sector – an aspect that I shall examine in chapter six. 
                                               
271 Note by the liaison officer to the CC, September 11 1951. TM, TTS, 
Rådighedskredsløb. RA.  
272 Second report from the working group for the consideration of the defence’s wishes 
for telephone and telegraph connections, December 1951. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, 
Emneordnede Sager 1950-1985, 1. RA. 
273 Background note by SO on reserved circuits, August 24 1962. TTS, 
Rådighedskredsløb. RA; Note by KTAS on preparedness circuits, September 6 1967. 
Unfiled. EA. 
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By contrast, the solution in Norway was very different from the Danish 
one. As mentioned, an agency similar to the Danish Defence Telegraph 
Administration, namely Forsvarets Fellessamband (FFSB) [The Defence 
Communications Agency] was set up in Norway in 1953. While the 
establishment of FFSB was also caused by the NATO membership and the 
increased needs for military communications in Norway, it was also occasioned 
by a decision in Telegrafverket – the Norwegian equivalent to the P&T – not 
to participate in the establishment of a radio link network in Norway at the 
request of the Norwegian defence and with funding from NATO. As Harald 
Espeli has outlined, this decision was apparently rooted in a distrust by the 
director of Telegrafverket to the radio link technology, which was a relatively 
new invention at this point, but in the eyes of NATO the communication needs 
within the impassable Norwegian territory could best and most affordably be 
met with this technology. As a result, Norway ended up having two different 
communication networks, a civilian and a military, with almost the same 
capacity.274 
  
Financing military construction works 
In continuation of the Danish decision to establish common civil-military 
facilities to the extent possible, an outstanding issue remained to be settled, 
namely the financial aspects. At the turn of the years 1951-1952, two political 
decisions were reached as regards the funding of the construction work needed 
in order to meet military communication needs. The first involved providing 
the telephone companies with the opportunity to obtain loans from the so-
called counterpart fund of the European Recovery Programme. The second 
was related to Denmark’s participation in NATO’s common infrastructure 
programme. 
The counterpart fund was financial means that had been set aside in the 
Danish National Bank when receiving support from the European Recovery 
Programme (the Marshall Plan). In 1948, for instance, as part of the Marshall 
aid, the telephone companies were allocated a sum of 27 million kroner in 
foreign currency in order to import material for their construction work 
planned in 1949, on the condition that the companies raised a corresponding 
amount to be deposited in the National Bank.275 The counterpart funds could 
only be spend on purposes on which the United States administration agreed, 
and beginning in the fall of 1951, in accordance with the American agenda of 
                                               
274 Espeli, Det statsdominerte teleregimet, p. 352. It is important to keep in mind in this 
regard that Norway served a different strategic purpose for the United States and 
NATO, not least in terms of SIGINT. See: Riste, “Cold War Intelligence in 
Scandinavia”; Aid, “In the Right Place at the Right Time”. This raised other demands for 
Norwegian military communications.  
275 Jacobsen, Jydsk Telefon, p. 61. 
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promoting increased defence build-up in Western Europe, the United States 
began demanding the funds to be spend on defence purposes.276 In this context, 
the Danish government decided in late 1951 to grant the telephone companies 
a 50 million kroner loan from the fund.277 
I have dealt with this decision in a previous examination, in which I 
showed how the Danish government at the same time framed this loan as a 
civilian and a military investment.278 When presented to the Parliament in 
January 1952, the Minister of Public Works, Victor Larsen, emphasised that 
the loan in question was a civilian investment, adding that “besides reducing 
waiting times on most stretches would also have a crucial importance for the 
defence”.279 As the Danish historian Leon Dalgas Jensen has shown, the Danish 
government favoured spending the counterpart funds on reducing national 
debts, but began changing its tactics in the fall of 1951 in response to increased 
US pressure.280 Accordingly, the government endorsed civilian investments that 
directly or indirectly could also be framed as having military importance, and 
the telecommunications infrastructure appears to have served this purpose.281 
Shortly before the law proposal was drafted, the aforementioned working group 
established in 1950 in order to consider military communication needs had 
finished a new and updated report. Here, the committee stressed that a 
necessary precondition for the establishment of the defence installations in 
question was that certain stretches of the civilian carrier frequency network was 
extended as planned, since these stretches would also carry the planned 
defence communications.282 Besides extending these stretches, the estimation 
was that the military construction work amounted to a cost of 26 million Danish 
                                               
276 The increased focus of canalising the American aid into defence investments was 
related to the passing of the Mutual Security Act October 1951. After this, the European 
Recovery Programme was superseded by a military aid programme, the Mutual Security 
Programme. See Jensen, “Marshallplanen”, p. 423; Jensen, “Dansk forsvar og 
Marshallplanen 1947-1960”, p. 465; Villaume and Olesen, I Blokopdelingens Tegn, p. 
385. 
277 This was formulated in a law proposal in January 1952: Law proposal in RDT 1951-
1952, A II, col. 3673. 
278 Jensen, Klartone efter atombomben, p. 41f. 
279 RDT 1951-52, FT Forhandlinger II, col. 1974.  
280 Jensen, “Dansk forsvar og Marshallplanen 1947-1960”, p. 484. In total, almost 60% of 
the counterpart funds were used to write off debts, while 25% were used for investments 
in production facilities and infrastructure. From the fall of 1951 onwards, the Danish 
government began sharpening its position on American aid, which was increasingly 
perceive a challenge to the national room for manoeuvre. 
281 For practical reasons, I have not included the negotiations with the Americans on the 
counterpart funds in my examination. Such an approach would undoubtedly shed light 
on important aspects, but would require comprehensive studies in for instance the 
archives of the Ministry of Finance.  
282 Second report from the working group for the consideration of the defence’s wishes 
for telephone and telegraph connections, December 1951. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, 
Emneordnede Sager 1950-1985, 1. RA. 
 
 
91 
kroner, and in the Telephone Control Board, the law proposal on the 
counterpart loan was presented as a means for covering this cost.283 
The law was passed in late May 1952, after which the telephone 
companies themselves negotiated how the 50 million kroner should be 
allocated between them.284 With this loan, the telephone companies received 
the necessary financial injection to begin constructing the facilities needed by 
the defence, but also to resume the construction of public communications 
installations, which had been put on hold due to the reduction of the 
construction plans imposed by the government with a view to the balance of 
payments.285 For the government, investing in the telecommunications 
infrastructure was therefore a way of prioritising civilian aspects as part of the 
defence build-up that took place in the early 1950s. This must be understood 
as part of a general political priority in these years, where the defence 
mobilisation, as mentioned above, posed major challenges to the civilian 
economy. Previous research has shown how the three ‘Atlantic Treaty parties’ 
– the liberals, conservatives, and social democrats – generally agreed in this 
period that increased military spending had to be balanced with other societal 
investments.286  
The second political decision related to the funding of construction of 
military communications facilities – which had to do with Denmark’s 
participation in the third slice of NATO’s common infrastructure programme 
– also demonstrates the political balancing between military and civilian 
                                               
283 Minutes of TTS meeting, December 6 1951. TM, TTS, Tilsynets Mødereferater. 
RA. 
284 At a meeting among the telephone directors in March 1952, they agreed that the 50 
million kroner should be allocated so that KTAS received 27.5, JTAS 19 and FkT 3.5 
million. Minutes of meeting in De Samvirkende Telefonselskaber, March 27 1952. 
Unfiled. EA. See also: Minutes of SU meetings March 27 and April 24 1952. TM, TTS, 
Bilag til samarbejdsudvalgets møder. RA; Minutes of TTS meeting, June 6 1952. TM, 
TTS, Tilsynets Mødereferater. RA. 
285 This decision had posed a great challenge for the sector. By example, the directors of 
the telephone companies discussed in October 1951 the proportions of the dismissal of 
personnel they would have to carry through. Minutes of meeting in De Samvirkende 
Telefonselskaber, November 1 1951. Unfiled. EA. In November, the Minister of Public 
Works received a visit from a delegation from two telephone factories which were at risk 
of closing down due to the decrease orders caused by the reduced construction plans. 
Minutes of TTS meeting, November 1 1951. TM, TTS, Tilsynets Mødereferater. RA. 
286 Through shifting governments, these three parties cooperated on alliance politics and 
thus formed a consensus standpoint the first decades of the Cold War. In the early 
1950s, the Social Democratic Party in particular maintained that defence spending 
should be held at a reasonable level in order to invest in welfare as part of a broader 
security strategy. But whereas the two parties in power from 1950 to 1953, the liberal 
party Venstre and the Conservative Party were both more positive towards defence 
mobilisation, they also favoured keeping defence costs at a reasonable level. Petersen, 
“Forsvarspolitik”, p. 276f. 
 
 
92 
demands.287 As outlined in chapter two, the policy agreed upon in NATO was 
that the common infrastructure projects had to be of a common interest to 
more NATO nations. As for communications, this involved border-crossing 
links and domestic communications linking up to military facilities such as 
commands, airfields, and naval bases. By contrast, the nation states themselves 
were responsible for communications needed for national defence purposes 
within their own territory. The Danish defence communications installations 
constructed with the counterpart funds belonged in this latter category. 
The financial aspects of Denmark’s participation in NATO’s 
infrastructure programme, including the allocation of costs and benefits hereof, 
was dealt with in the Committee for Defence Economy.288 Following the 
February 1952 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, where the 
third slice of the common infrastructure programme was agreed upon, the 
Committee for Defence Economy approved a plan for the construction of 
communication infrastructure installations, primarily cable facilities, in 
Denmark at a total amount of 35 million Danish kroner. As the layout of 
NATO’s programme prescribed, this amount would be partly funded by 
Denmark, and partly by common NATO funds.289 
The Committee for Defence Economy decided that the Danish P&T 
and the telephone companies were to serve as advisors in the planning of the 
infrastructure projects and as contractors in the construction of the planned 
installations. Moreover, in line with the signal that had been given by the 
government in the spring of 1951, the committee encouraged the tele 
administrations to seek to combine military and civilian needs for 
communication circuits. When discussed at a meeting in the Coordination 
Committee of the Telephone Control Board in March 1952, the chairman 
underlined that many of the military cables to be constructed were planned in 
stretches where the tele administrations would probably themselves be 
interested in laying cables. Accordingly, he found it necessary “seriously to 
consider whether one should take the opportunity to also get the civilian needs 
in such stretches covered” – even if this would have the consequence that other 
                                               
287 For other aspects of the Danish part of NATO’s infrastructure programme, see 
Villaume, Allieret med Forbehold, p. 411f.; Larsen, “Vejen til Danmarks sidste 
kystforter”, p. 222f. 
288 The Committee for Defence Economy [Det Forsvarsøkonomiske Udvalg] was 
composed of representatives from different ministries and was headed by the permanent 
secretary of the Ministry of Defence. The work of the committee reflects how financial 
politics and defence and security politics were deeply intertwined in the early 1950s; the 
defence build-up had to be adjusted to economic circumstances and financial politics 
had to accommodate the challenges posed by the defence build-up. See Jensen, “Det 
Forsvarsøkonomiske Udvalg”, p. 280f. 
289 Minutes of SU meeting, March 27 1952. TM, TTS, Bilag til samarbejdsudvalgets 
møder. RA. 
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planned construction works had to be postponed.290 In order to support this, 
the Committee for Defence Economy recommended that “the economic 
benefit” of common installations should be given to the tele administrations in 
order to “encourage them to perform the work, if necessary at the expense of 
purely civilian facilities.”291 This meant, more specifically, that the defence 
budget would cover the majority of the cost of the construction work, whereby 
the tele administrations would only pay for the “additional expenditures” 
related to the extra work for strictly civilian purposes.292 
 
NATO infrastructures 
A closer examination of the communication projects that were part of the 
Danish share in the third slice can help illuminate how the participation in 
NATO’s common infrastructure programme introduced new ‘infrastructural 
agendas’ into Danish communications.  
The Danish communication projects in the third slice were a submarine 
cable between Hanstholm in Northern Jutland and Kristianssand in Southern 
Norway, a number of landline cables linking up to airfields (Thisted, Karup, 
Vandel, Skrydstrup, and Værløse) and other important military sites (e.g. 
Frederikshavn, Henriksholm, Gedser, and Kjeldsnor on Southern Langeland), 
and a radio link to Bornholm.293 Some of these projects are depicted in figure 
1, which shows a map of the extension of the Danish cable network under the 
signal infrastructure programme as of October 1953. The map was made by 
the Danish P&T in connection with a paper presented at a meeting in ELLA. 
  
                                               
290 Ibid. 
291 This recommendation was, according to a later note, agreed upon at a meeting in the 
committee in March 1952: Note from MOD on financial issues related to the defence 
telecom facilites, March 16 1955. ØM, Journalsager 1949-1959, 17, B23. RA. 
292 Memo written by P.O.H. Jessen, January 17 1955. 974A-1-31.EA. 
293 For a map showing these projects, see Annex B. More specifically, the following 
projects were listed as part of the third slice for Denmark in a 1952 report by the 
Working Party of Signals Experts under the Infrastructure Committee: Hanstholm-
Kristiansand (submarine cable), Thisted-Esbjerg (quad cable), Aalborg-Thisted (quad 
cable), Herning-Karup (underground cable), Vejle-Vandel (quad cable), Haderslev-
Skrydstrup (quad cable), Frederikshavn-Skagen (quad cable), København-Værløse 
(underground cable), København-Henriksholm (quad cable), Vordingborg-Skovhuse 
(quad cable), Nykøbing-Gedser (quad cable), Nakskov-Rudkøbing (quad cable), 
Rudkøbing-Kjeldsnor (quad cable), Odense-Beldringe (this project was postponed due 
to change in airfield plans), and Zealand-Bornholm (VHF link). See: Report by the 
Working Party of Signals Experts, August 30 1952, AC/4-D/93. NA. 
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Figure 1. The extension of the cable network in Denmark as part of NATO’s 
signal infrastructure programme as of October 1953. The dotted lines mark 
the public network and the bold lines show the military extensions.294 
 
 
As mentioned in chapter two, NATO had established a group of signal experts 
given the task of examining all the proposed signal projects for the 
infrastructure programme. This group took in use the aforementioned ‘50% 
figure rule’, which had been used for signal infrastructure planning in the 
Western Union Defence Organisation, stating that 50% of the existing or firmly 
                                               
294 Enclosure no. 9 to paper read before the ELLA meeting, October 1953. TM, TTS, 
Enhedssagen 1945-1966. RA. 
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planned civil telecommunication facilities was deemed to be available for 
military use in emergency.295 NATO’s working party of signal experts adopted 
the rule in the way that when reviewing the proposals for new facilities made by 
the member states, the construction of these facilities could be justified if the 
total military requirements on a route exceeded 50% of the then present 
facilities or new projects planned by the PTTs. As for the Hanstholm-
Kristiansand cable, for example, NATO’s signal experts estimated that the 
military use of the cable would only amount to 3% in times on peace. In case 
of a crisis, however, defence and security authorities would require 24% of the 
cable’s capacity within 48 hours, additional 13% within 7 days and thereafter 
furthermore 26% and 34% - in other words, a possible military occupation of 
100% of the cable’s capacity could be expected in wartime.296 In peacetime, 
however, the spare capacity could be used for civilian communications. In 
general, when reviewing the Danish proposals for the third slice, NATO’s 
signal experts concluded that the proposed signal installations were all 
considered to belong to a category of projects “which add facilities to the 
existing civil network and will probably be used for civil purposes but which 
would not be undertaken by the PTTs except for the military necessity”.297  
The radio link to the island of Bornholm in the Baltic Sea serves as a 
case in point in this regard. At this point, most telephone traffic between 
Bornholm and the rest of Denmark were routed via Sweden.298 From a civilian 
point of view, this was the most favourable solution, but it was less fortunate 
from a military point of view, since Sweden was neutral in the Cold War. In a 
forthcoming article, the Danish-Swedish historian Andreas Marklund shows 
how the connections to Bornholm had also posed a challenge during the 
Second World War. Since all communications across borders were perceived 
as a potential security threat, both by the P&T before the German occupation 
of Denmark and later by the occupation power, daily communications between 
Bornholm and the rest of Denmark were subject to mass surveillance.299 In the 
post-war years, the general public traffic to and from Bornholm increased, 
causing the P&T and KTAS – the company who operated the local traffic on 
the island from 1946 – to discuss the future circuit requirements. Increased 
                                               
295 Note on the European Signal Infrastructure Program, June 1951. NA. 
296 Report by the Working Party of Signals Experts, August 30 1952, AC/4-D/93. NA. 
297 However, the Zealand-Bornholm link also belonged in the category “Projects which 
add to the available circuits in the civil network and which can be agreed from the outset 
to have a specific amount of civil and national military interest of 50% or more”. See: 
Report by the Working Party of Signals Experts, August 30 1952, AC/4-D/93. NA.  
298 A submarine cable was established between Ystad in Sweden and Rønne on 
Bornholm in 1931 containing ten telephone circuits. Prior to this, telephony to and from 
Bornholm was made through a radiotelephony link that opened in 1923. Nielsen, 
“Kabler og forstærkerstationer”, p. 286; Bramslev, “Radiotelegrafi og radiofoni”, p. 370. 
299 Marklund “Trawling the Wires”. 
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demands could be met either by extending the links via Sweden, including 
constructing a new submarine cable between Ystad in Sweden and Rønne on 
Bornholm, or by constructing a direct link between Eastern Denmark and 
Bornholm.300 It is difficult to conclude to what extent the construction of a 
direct radio link as part of the common infrastructure programme affected the 
civilian considerations, but it did at least stress the advantages of bypassing 
Sweden. Upon this, the P&T decided to construct a direct submarine cable 
from the Copenhagen area to Bornholm, which opened in 1960. In 1967, this 
was followed up by a submarine cable from Nykøbing on the island of Falster 
to Bornholm.301 
The construction of a submarine cable between Hanstholm in Northern 
Jutland and Kristiansand in Southern Norway serves as another example of 
how military and civilian agendas in communications infrastructures correlated. 
The submarine cable was of great importance to NATO, since it provided a 
direct link within NATO’s Northern European Region, and, moreover, 
through the Denmark-Netherlands cable linked up the north with the Central 
European Region, thereby by-passing Germany and neutral Sweden. At this 
point, Denmark and Norway were already linked with two submarine cables 
established during the Second World War (Hirtshals-Arendal and 
Frederikshavn-Sandefjord), but the capacity in these was insufficient, for which 
reason much traffic transited Sweden.302 Thus, a further cable to Norway was 
also desirable from a civilian point of view – and the Danish P&T already had 
plans on the drawing board for the construction of an additional cable. Military 
authorities, by contrast, wished to place the cable “along more westerly routes 
than desirable for civilian purposes”.303 While the P&T wished for the 
Hirtshals-Arendal to become the main route of telephone traffic from Norway 
                                               
300 These plans are outlined in the aforementioned 1953 presentation given at an ELLA 
meeting by the P&T and the telephone companies. The title of the presented paper was 
“The organization of telecommunication in Denmark, particularly with a view to the 
military telecommunication services”. See Paper read before the ELLA meeting, 
October 1953. TM, TTS, Enhedssagen 1945-1966. RA. 
301 Nielsen, “Kabler og forstærkerstationer”, p. 288f. 
302 The Hirtshals-Arendal and Frederikshavn-Sandefjord cables were established by the 
German occupation army during the Second World War and after the war taken over by 
the P&T. The Frederikshavn-Sandefjord cable was an old coil loaded cable, which had 
formerly been used in the Baltic Sea, between East Prussia and the rest of Germany in 
order to evade the Polish corridor. The removal of the cable caused many defects, for 
which reason more than half of the circuits in the cable were by 1953 out of use. See: 
Paper read before the ELLA meeting, October 1953. TM, TTS, Enhedssagen 1945-
1966. RA. For a general overview of Danish international cables in the early 1950s, see 
Holmblad, “Koaksialkabelanlægget Danmark-Holland”, p. 2. 
303 Paper read before the ELLA meeting, October 1953. TM, TTS, Enhedssagen 1945-
1966. RA. 
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to Denmark and onwards to Western Europe, military authorities favoured the 
Hanstholm-Kristiansand route. 304  
The military concerns about the physical location of the submarine cable 
reflects a historical challenge which has been related to the construction of 
submarine cables since the mid-nineteenth century. As historians of 
communications have shown, the location of submarine cables at the sea floor 
and their landing sites have posed great challenges for states and private 
businesses.305 Moreover, in the world wars of the twentieth century, the location 
of global submarine cables turned out to be pivotal, since the cutting of enemy 
cables became a commonly used weapon.306 From a reliability point of view, 
the two existing cables between Denmark and Norway had demonstrated the 
challenges related to submarine cables. The two cables had been laid by the 
German Army during the occupation of Denmark. As they were established in 
wartime for military purposes, they were effectuated differently than what 
would probably have been desired for civilian requirements in peacetime. The 
Frederikshavn-Sandefjord cable was an old coil loaded cable, which had 
formerly been used by Germany in the Baltic Sea, more specifically between 
East Prussia and the rest of Germany in order to evade the Polish corridor. 
When the cable during the Second World War was relocated to the Skagerak 
in the North Sea, the removal caused many defects on the cable, for which 
reason more than half of the circuits in the cable were by 1953 out of use. The 
Hirtshals-Arendal cable was a new coaxial cable, but due to its location it was 
much exposed to damage by fishing vessels.307 
In addition to this, however, the military considerations for a Danish-
Norwegian submarine cable also seem to have been part of a broader 
infrastructural strategy. In Jutland, long-distance communications were routed 
via the carrier frequency network. This network was concentrated along an 
eastern route with Aalborg-Aarhus-Kolding as the backbone, and the Hirtshals 
and Frederikshavn cables to Norway were linked up with this long-line 
network.308 However, the military authorities found it desirable to establish their 
                                               
304 Moreover, the cable was much exposed to damage by fishing vessels, and this is 
probably why the military authorities favoured another route. See: Paper read before the 
ELLA meeting, October 1953. TM, TTS, Enhedssagen 1945-1966. RA. 
305 The struggles for establishing the first transatlantic telegraph in the 1850s and 1860s 
serves as a case in point. See for instance Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, p. 17f.; 
Winseck and Pike, Communication and Empire, p. 16f. As for cable landing sites, 
Simone Müller has shown how both technical and diplomatic concerns were at stake 
when planning cable landings. See Müller, Wiring the World. 
306 See for instance Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, pp. 138f, 243f.; Bruton, “The 
Cable Wars”.  
307 Paper read before the ELLA meeting, October 1953. TM, TTS, Enhedssagen 1945-
1966. RA. 
308 At this point, the carrier frequency network in Jutland ran from Hjørring in Northern 
Jutland via Aalborg, Randers (with a western link to Viborg and then north to Thisted or 
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circuits along a more western route in Jutland. This was due to the fact that 
large military sites such as the airfield in Karup was located in Western 
Jutland.309 This was a sparcely populated area, where civilian requirements for 
communications were low. As part of NATO’s infrastructure programme, a 
supplementary military extension was therefore made of the civilian cable 
network in Western Jutland, through which traffic in the Hanstholm cable 
could be routed to Esbjerg, from where military authorities planned to build 
an addition to the Netherlands cable, which would also follow a more western 
route than the existing stretch.310 In this way, the long-distance network in 
Jutland was supplemented with a western backbone of which much was 
sponsored by NATO and the Danish defence. In peacetime, this link also 
constituted a civilian extension. For instance, the cable between Viborg and 
Karup contained 150 circuits, of which 100 were used by defence authorities 
and 50 by JTAS.311 The military need for communications thus resulted in 
construction of infrastructure stretches that would probably not have been 
prioritised at this point from a civilian point of view, since traffic requirements 
were generally low in this area. Besides this, the military extension also 
introduced more flexibility into the network by following another route than 
the one favoured by the civilian administrations, i.e. the cheaper option. 
Thus, since the technopolitical visions behind the military 
communication plans were different from those drafted by the civilian tele 
administrations, the participation in the third slice of the infrastructure 
programme introduced new infrastructural agendas into Danish 
telecommunications. Examples similar to the ones related to the third slice can 
be found when looking into later infrastructure projects.312 Prior to this, the 
military communications planning had relied more on the construction plans 
worked out by the administrations. As recalled, in the spring of 1951 liaison 
officer Jessen had asked the tele administrations to inform him about their 
                                               
south to Holstebro), Aarhus (with a western link via Silkeborg and Herning to Skjern), 
Kolding (with a western link to Esbjerg and an eastern link to Odense and Copenhagen), 
to Aabenraa in Southern Jutland. See: Enclosure 7 to Paper read before the ELLA 
meeting, October 1953. TM, TTS, Enhedssagen 1945-1966. RA. 
309 For more on Karup as an important Danish Cold War site, Stenak et al. eds., Kold 
Krig, p. 55. 
310 The western ‘backbone’ included military extensions from Hanstholm to Thisted and 
from Holstebro to Esbjerg. Moreover, via NATO infrastructure cables, the military 
airfield of Karup was linked up with Viborg and Herning, from where traffic could be 
routed in the civilian network. As for the Netherlands link, military authorities favoured 
the longer and more expensive route from Esbjerg to Den Helder over the existing 
Rømø-Oostmahorn. See: Enclosure 9 to Paper read before the ELLA meeting, October 
1953. TM, TTS, Enhedssagen 1945-1966. RA. 
311 Minutes of meeting in MOA, October 10 1952. 974A-1-27. EA. 
312 By example, the existing voice frequency telegraph system was widely extended as part 
of the infrastructure programme, as this technology suited military purposes. See: Paper 
read before the ELLA meeting, October 1953. TM, TTS, Enhedssagen 1945-1966. RA. 
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cable plans so that the military authorities could join in on these. The 
participation in NATO’s infrastructure programme created a momentum for 
military initiatives in communications planning. To a certain extent, the 
initiative shifted, as the tele administrations were now given the choice of 
deciding whether they wanted to join in on the military plans. This also meant, 
however, that the tele administrations would have to prioritise differently than 
what they had planned for, if they wanted to have civilian circuits in the cables 
planned to be established for military purposes. JTAS director Draminsky 
addressed this problem at the aforementioned meeting in March 1952. 
Draminsky stated that he had “long feared this situation”, since the companies 
would now be forced to set aside other projects for the sake of defence works, 
which could very likely delay the ordinary activities of the companies to such 
an extent that it would be loss-making.313 However, while it may be reasonably 
supposed that some of the Danish installations would probably not have been 
prioritised as highly at this point if it were not for the military interest, it is a 
more difficult task to find out which other projected installations were given a 
lower priority due to the military agenda. 
 
A special kind of customer? 
Following the political decisions to provide a loan from the counterpart fund 
and include a number of communication projects in the Danish part of 
NATO’s infrastructure programme, the tele administrations set in motion the 
comprehensive construction work needed in order to fulfil the needs for 
military communications for both NATO and the Danish defence. This was, 
as evident from above, a new kind of task, which also raised new issues as 
regards the conditions for use of the facilities.  
The construction work can be divided into two categories: Work which 
was financed by the tele administrations, e.g. with funding provided through 
the counterpart loans, and work for which capital had been raised by defence 
authorities, whether partly or totally, e.g. the installations part of NATO’s 
infrastructure programme. This created different circumstances as for 
agreements on rental costs, ownership rights etc., and the matter was further 
complicated by the status of the telephone companies as concession granted 
businesses. 
From the outset, the defence authorities had insisted on the need for a 
favourable arrangement in terms of the rent they should pay for using the 
civilian-owned facilities. They argued, on the one hand, that they were now 
such a large customer that they were entitled to a “wholesale discount”, and 
maintained, on the other hand, that “[p]rivate shareholders should not make 
                                               
313 Minutes of SU meeting, March 27 1952. TM, TTS, Bilag til samarbejdsudvalgets 
møder. RA. 
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money on defence build-up”.314 Upon request, the legal department of the 
Ministry of Public Works began examining to which extent the telephone 
companies according to the concessions were obliged to execute work needed 
by the defence at specified terms. The ministry concluded in the autumn of 
1952 that this was not the case: The issue of payment between the 
administrations and the defence was not a matter regulated by the concessions, 
and the ministry did therefore not have the authority to determine the prices. 
Accordingly, the matter had to be dealt with per se between the administrations 
and the defence without political involvement. The Ministry of Public Works 
however encouraged the parties to negotiate a common solution on the 
payment issue in order to have common standards all over the country.315 
A settling of the payment issue however proved very difficult. The 
representatives from the defence and the tele administrations formed a working 
group for the purpose, and as a passing remark, it is quite telling of the 
atmosphere in the group that a collection of the letters sent back and forward 
among the members has ironically been nicknamed “love letters”.316 Eventually 
– upon four years of negotiation and the involvement of more ministries – an 
agreement was reached in the autumn of 1956 and finally approved by different 
instances during the fall of 1957.317 When the chairman of the working group, 
JTAS director Draminsky, in 1957 looked back at the negotiations, he 
commemorated how the difficulties had revolved around  
“working out formulations that both the defence, which had 
to pay regard to demands from NATO, and the telephone 
companies, which had to take financial aspects into account 
                                               
314 Minutes of meetings in MOA, April 25 1951 and October 10 1952. 974A-1-27. EA. 
315 Letter from the MOA the TTS, September 30 1952; Minutes of meeting in MOA, 
October 10 1952. 974A-1-27. EA; Minutes of SU meeting, September 30 1952. TM, 
TTS, Bilag til samarbejdsudvalgets møder. RA. 
316 The working group was established upon a meeting in the Coordination Committee in 
late October 1952. It was later refered to as the ‘Draminsky committee’ since the JTAS 
director Paul Draminsky served as chairman in the group. See: Minutes of SU meeting, 
October 30 1952. TM, TTS, Bilag til samarbejdsudvalgets møder. RA. The letters have 
been filed in a dossier by the former telephone liaison engineer to the defence sector, 
whose successor inherited the dossier and later submitted it to the Enigma Archives. See: 
974A-1-28. EA. In general, the dispute has left behind many traces in all the involved 
actor’s archives. 
317 As an illustration of how the problem had gained complexity, approval of the final 
agreement was, besides the tele administrations and FTF, also needed from the Ministry 
of Public Works, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Finance, and the finance 
committee of the Danish parliament. See: Memorandum on the defence extension of 
the signal network, August 15 1956 and Letter from FTF to SU chairman, October 15 
1957. 974A-1-31. EA. 
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and make allowances for their regular subscribers, could 
agree to.”318 
Draminsky’s remark point towards an important technopolitical basis for 
understanding the conflict, namely that the scope of action was in the end 
defined by the NATO membership, on the one hand, and by the technological 
and organisational layout of telecommunications, on the other hand. 
As for the rent issue, the final agreement reached between the tele 
administrations and the defence stated that work carried out for the defence 
authorities should follow the regular “Terms and tariffs” that applied to all the 
work that the companies conducted.319 In his way, the Defence Telegraph 
Administration was not – as it had argued heavily in favour of from the outset 
– treated as a special kind of customer. In the negotiations, the tele 
administrations repeatedly stressed that their concerns were not a matter of 
making profits but of having their expenses covered, so that their ordinary 
subscribers would not be met with the bill.320 The operating costs of the NATO-
financed installations were a national concern, and there existed no common 
standards for this in NATO to begin with.321 Later, in 1955, the Danish Ministry 
of Defence notified Draminsky’s working group that a decision of principle 
had been reached in NATO of dividing the costs for the use of common 
facilities proportionally according to the number of civilian and military circuits. 
The ministry stressed that the current Danish tariffs proposal would “cause 
trouble with NATO”, but it appears that the ministry stood alone on this 
position.322 The FTF eventually found it acceptable to agree to the regular terms 
and tariff “in order to have the defence’s facilities managed in the best way”.323 
In return, the defence authorities succeeded in having a reference to the 
‘societal duty’ of the telephone companies inscribed into the final agreement. 
In the preamble, the agreement stated that it had as its object to manage 
telecommunication facilities “in the manner most advantageous for society”. 324 
This was a reference to a discussion that had been carried on in the working 
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group, where the defence representatives had called for the telephone 
companies to prioritise military needs and begin incorporating military 
communications request into their long-term planning. In doing so, they 
referred to the a aforementioned obligation stemming from the concessions to 
deliver telecom services in the area in which the companies operated – 
‘forsyningspligten’ as it was called in Danish. The companies stressed that this 
duty referred to situations “where society [was] arranged in the normal way”, 
but since the defence increasingly “established itself in areas and in a 
concentration that differ[ed] from the societal normal”, telecom services in 
these areas should be regarded as “special demands”.325 With the agreement, 
however, the companies accepted that although the regular terms and tariffs 
also applied to the defence, defence authorities were to be regarded as a special 
kind of customer with special privileges. 
Another and related issue at stake was the question of ownership of the 
facilities. As described previously, the new facilities could in peacetime be used 
for civilian communications, but in the event of war, the capacity would 
gradually be confiscated for military purposes. As a result hereof, the question 
of ownership was tricky, and no agreements on ownership issues had been 
reached prior to the beginning of the construction.326 The viewpoint of the tele 
representatives was that they, on the one hand, wished to be able to predispose 
the entire communication networks within their area. On the other hand, 
however, they were not interested in owning facilities that did not correspond 
with commercial demands.327 The Ministry of Defence stressed that the 
defence was compelled to “express outwardly that the facilities paid for by the 
infrastructure programme belonged to the defence”.328 This was a reference to 
NATO standards, but when the working group asked the Ministry of Defence 
to look into the matter, the ministry found the NATO regulations to be quite 
vaguely defined.329 The matter was moreover complicated by the status of the 
telephone companies as private businesses, but a memorandum prepared for 
the working group in August 1956 concluded that since the state owned the 
majority of the stock in the companies, company-owned facilities could still be 
regarded as state property.330 In the end, therefore, the agreement was reached 
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that the telecommunication installations paid for by NATO’s infrastructure 
programme or by the Danish defence over time should be handed over to 
either the P&T or one of the telephone companies.331 In hindsight, this was an 
agreement with far-reaching influence, since it laid down the principle that 
facilities constructed by the defence would not remain a military asset but over 
time be integrated into the remaining civilian communications infrastructure.332  
Still, despite the agreement reached in 1956 that the work carried out for 
the Defence Telegraph Administration should follow the regular terms and 
tariffs of the companies, the Defence Telegraph Administration was by no 
means a regular customer or subscriber. This circumstance was for instance 
addressed at a meeting between tele representatives and the FTF in July 1958, 
which according to the minutes had been arranged in order to find common 
ground upon the long-standing financial dispute between the two parts. At the 
meeting, the two parties agreed that many aspects of the tele administration’s 
collaboration with the FTF “differs substantially from ordinary subscription 
conditions and obligations”, not least because “Denmark’s membership of 
NATO and this organisation’s shares in a number of the tasks that are assigned 
to the telephone companies have to be taken into consideration.”333 
The increased provision of military communications services and the 
collaboration with both the FTF and NATO also introduced new dimensions 
into the telecom work in other ways. For instance, the new tasks were 
accompanied with new working procedures and new considerations for security 
and secrecy. This was also stressed at the July 1958 meeting, from whose 
minutes the following passage appears: “The secret and confidential character 
of the tasks make demands on the handling of correspondence, issuing of 
orders, and other matters related to internal security.”334 
In terms of secrecy, the Defence Telegraph Administration and the tele 
administrations had made agreement regarding disclosure measures for 
information related to the defence installations in 1952.335 In a note sent to all 
the departments in KTAS in June 1954, the recently appointed director 
Christen Steenbuch strongly emphasised how the security measures which had 
been agreed upon between the FTF and the tele administrations had to be 
strictly observed. This meant, by example, that the bills sent to defence 
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authorities could not contain information about the specific circuits in question, 
but only refer to an identification number that each circuit had been given.336 
New security standards also applied to the technical operators. In 1955, for 
instance, a case was discussed in the Coordination Committee related to an 
incident where installation workers from KTAS had refused to comply with a 
military demand to carry identification when visiting military sites.337 This is an 
example of increased focus towards ‘inner security’ in all NATO member 
states in the mid-1950s, leading to requests for measures on a national level in 
the shape of access control and background surveys of personnel.338 As evident, 
this spilled over into an increased focus on daily security standards in the civil-
military cooperation on telecommunications. In chapter five and six, I shall 
further explore how the cooperation with defence authorities in Denmark and 
NATO introduced a new security agenda for the P&T and the telephone 
companies. 
 
3.3 Renegotiating the civil-military division of work  
As evident from the first sections of this chapter, the increased cooperation 
with defence authorities brought along by the NATO membership and the 
defence build-up affected Danish telecommunications planning during the 
1950s. By the end of the decade, many of the challenges and disputes that arose 
in this civil-military cooperation had been settled. At this point, however, the 
civil-military cooperation on communications and division of responsibility 
worked out through the 1950s was transformed. This was the result of two 
political decisions. The first was a decision to close down the Defence 
Telegraph Administration (FTF) that had played an important role in shaping 
civil-military communications since its establishment in 1952. The closure was 
part of a larger exercise of rationalising the Danish defence, but it was enabled 
– as I shall demonstrate – by the fact that many of the tasks conducted by the 
FTF could essentially be handled by the tele administrations. A second 
decision followed from this, namely the transfer of a number of security 
responsibilities to the tele sector. In this section, I examine the background of 
these organisational changes in the sector. 
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The closure of the Defence Telegraph Administration 
The Ministry of Defence took the decision to close down the Defence 
Telegraph Administration in 1961. This was done on the basis of a 
recommendation made by a rationalisation committee in 1959 and became 
effective as of July 1962. 
The background for the ‘rationalisation’ of the defence reached back to 
1953, when the new social democratic Minister of Defence, Rasmus Hansen, 
shortly upon taking office in the fall of 1953 established the Committee for 
Defence Rationalisation [Forsvarets Rationaliseringsudvalg].339 Following a 
period in which the defence expenditures had increased a great deal on a yearly 
basis, the political desire for lowering the defence costs was occasioned by more 
factors. This includes the circumstance that the new social-democratic 
government relied on the support of a more defence critical party, the Radical 
Left, and the arrival of a period of lower tensions in the Cold War conflict after 
the March 1953 death of Stalin and the July 1953 armistice in the Korean 
War.340 In the following years, the Committee for Defence Rationalisation 
carried out reviews of the administration of the Danish Defence Staff in order 
to identify possible decreases in personnel. 
In June 1957, the Ministry of Defence – in which Poul Hansen now 
served as minister – asked the rationalisation committee to conduct a review of 
the organisation of the Defence Telegraph Administration and consider 
whether some of the tasks performed by FTF could be transferred to other 
military or civilian agencies.341 Since its establishment in 1952, FTF had grown 
rapidly. In terms of numbers of employees, for instance, it grew from eight 
people in 1952 to 132 employees in 1955, thereupon falling to 113 by 
1957/1958.342 One of the initiators of the rationalisation process later explained 
that the impression was that “FTF had swollen up far too much”.343 
In reviewing possibilities for rationalising FTF, the rationalisation 
committee also called into question whether it was even necessary to maintain 
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FTF as an independent organisation. Considering this question, the 
commission revisited the arguments that had been put forward by the time FTF 
was established. Here, considerations for the NATO cooperation had played 
a vital role, but the committee observed that it would not pose a problem if the 
tele administrations themselves were in direct contact with military commands, 
national as well as international. Perhaps, it was argued, this would even be 
more suitable, since the tele administrations were best suited for evaluating 
appropriate technical solutions and cost estimations.344 Another argument that 
had been put forward when FTF was established was that of technical 
standardisation. The rationalisation committee noted, however, that the 
defence in effect did not even have an influence on the selection of technical 
devices, since the FTF was compelled to follow the technical directions 
proposed by the tele administrations.345 
This comment by the rationalisation committee reflects the development 
that the Danish telecom sector had undergone through the 1950s. In the 
negotiations around the concessions in the late 1940s, it had been used as an 
argument against the divided structure of the Danish telephone sector that it 
suffered from a low level of technical standardisation, and it was with this 
purpose in mind that the Coordination Committee was set up in 1948.346 By 
the late 1950s, upon major advances in automation and extensions of the long-
distance carrier frequency network, the sector appeared much more 
standardised. This also applied to defence communications installations, for 
which many very detailed matters were coordinated at meetings in the 
Coordination Committee. By example, a 1957 review by a working group 
established by the Coordination Committee on the possibilities for ‘error 
recoveries’ in the different parts of the Danish telecommunications network in 
case of destruction pointed out that it should be avoided that the defence chose 
technical solutions which were not compatible with those of the tele 
administrations, since this caused a need for further technical special 
knowledge and more reserved materiel.347  
The rationalisation committee concluded in April 1959 that given the 
close cooperation among the four civilian tele administrations and the technical 
expertise they possessed, the P&T and the telephone companies could be 
assigned the matter of coordinating the construction of communication 
installations for defence purposes. Recommending this, the rationalisation 
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committee emphasised that the need for maintaining a separate department for 
telecommunication activities within the defence would decrease in the future 
and that the monopoly on delivering permanent telecommunications through 
the public network in Denmark had the consequence that the competences of 
FTF were limited anyway.348 
The position of the telecom sector on this matter must also be taken into 
consideration. The P&T was first asked about their opinion of whether it would 
be possible to place the FTF as a special military section within the P&T in 
1957, but refrained from a standpoint before the Ministry of Defence had 
considered the matter and reached a conclusion.349 In 1959, when the P&T and 
the Telephone Control Board was drawn into the matter again, the General 
Directorate of the P&T wrote a memorandum outlining its “concerns” about 
closing down the FTF.350 When discussed at a meeting in the Telephone 
Control Board in September 1959, the director general KJ Jensen elaborated 
how the P&T was not interested in taking over a lot of work from the defence. 
Moreover, he made a reference to the Swedish telephone sector, in which the 
equivalent to the P&T, Televerket, had taken over the responsibility for tasks 
related to military telephony. Jensen outlined, however, that the Swedish case 
was very different, since Sweden had a unitary telephone system and was not a 
NATO member and therefore not in the same way as Denmark subject to 
international commitments and engaged in the planning of international 
exercises. JTAS director Draminsky echoed this concern and stressed that the 
work load in the future would not be smaller just because it was transferred to 
the tele administrations.351 
Against this background, the Ministry of Defence decided in the 
beginning of 1961 to go forward with the idea of a potential closure of the FTF 
– despite concerns from the tele sector. The ministry established a committee 
in order to examine the future organisation of military communications.352 This 
committee submitted a report in November 1961 suggesting that some of the 
coordinating tasks within the defence that FTF had been in charge of were 
transferred to the Chief of Defence, while other tasks were handed over to a 
new office within the P&T.353 A circumstance likely to have influenced this 
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decision was that at this point, the FTF Chief colonel Jessen retired. With the 
closure of the Defence Telegraph Administration, the tele sector gained new 
tasks and thereby entered a new role in terms of security governance. The new 
office in the P&T responsible for managing communication circuits for defence 
purposes was operational as of March 1962. I shall demonstrate in chapter five 
how this new role also increasingly came to involve the responsibility for 
wartime planning in the area of communications. 
On a different note, March 1962 was also the date by which the existing 
concessions granted to the telephone companies in the late 1940s would 
automatically be extended for another five years, if the Ministry of Public 
Works had not given notice of their termination by February 1961. 
Accordingly, the debate about how the Danish telecom sector was organised 
was resumed in the late 1950s and early 1960s.354 This caused FTF Chief Jessen 
in July 1960 to circulate a memorandum in which he proposed a number of 
changes to the concessions in order to spell out the obligations in terms of 
defence and preparedness communication tasks that applied to the telephone 
companies. This is noteworthy, since the question had been raised on different 
occasions through the 1950s, for instance in the negotiations on the payment 
agreement as outlined above. In Jessen’s proposal, he referred to the 
arrangement agreed on within NATO that extra circuits for defence purposes 
were to be prepared in peacetime and established by the outbreak of a crisis or 
war. Jessen outlined how the participation of the telephone companies in this 
process relied on the premise that the companies “were under a duty to satisfy 
the state’s estimated [communication] needs”. In the concessions, however, 
this duty was only vaguely defined and it was in the eyes of Jessen not 
accompanied with a necessary authority, for instance the authority to limit other 
subscribers from making calls in the network.355 
Jessen’s appeal appears to have gained a hearing in the Ministry of Public 
Works. At least, when the concessions were extended for another five years in 
the summer of 1961, one of the few changes made was the adding of a passage 
giving the ministry the authority to order the companies to take different 
measures in order to secure and maintain essential telecommunications.356 At 
this point, the political focus on preparedness issues in different sectors had 
generally increased since the Parliament in December 1959 had adopted a law 
on civil emergency planning. I shall explore this further in chapter five and six. 
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For now, the 1961 concessions serves as an example of how the Cold War 
adaptation that had taken place in the Danish telecom sector through the 1950s 
materialised in different ways and provided the sector with new tasks essential 
for the Danish state.  
The 1961 concessions came into being as part of a first step to transform 
of the sector significantly. In September 1960, the Minister of Public Works, 
Kai Lindberg, had establish a committee in order to examine the future 
organisational structure of the sector. The committee came back with two 
different recommendations, which caused the minister to establish a large 
commission to carry through a thorough examination of the sector with a 
particular focus on the prospect of gathering all the telecommunication services 
in one joint company of which the state owned the majority. It was in this 
context that the government decided to extent the concessions in order to give 
the commission time to work.357 Moreover, the minister decided in April 1962 
to reorganise the Coordination Committee and change its purpose into 
working more directly towards a unitary service.358 However, the work in the 
telephone commission resulted in a number of disputes, and the report of the 
commission was never published and its recommendations never carried 
through – mainly as a result of obstruction by the telephone companies. 
Instead, the work of the commission came to a halt in the late 1960s after which 
the telephone companies’ concessions were extended once again and the 
telephone commission finally dissolved in 1971.359 This ‘stalemate’ in the 
negotiations on public-private balances in the Danish telephone sector meant 
that the civil-military cooperation established through the 1950s and modified 
with the 1962 closure of the Defence Telegraph Administration continued in 
the shadow of many public debates on the future arrangement in the sector. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The aim of this chapter has been to examine how defence and security issues 
influenced the Danish telecom sector in the 1950s. The limited focus on this 
decade has allowed me to explore in detail from both a political, organisational, 
and technological point of view how the NATO membership and the new 
defence political circumstances affected the area of communications. Against 
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this background, I argue that the 1950s must be understood as a decade of 
Cold War adaptation for the Danish telecom sector. 
In response to the NATO membership, the military need for increased 
communications provided the tele administrations with new tasks in terms of 
constructing communication facilities in order to provide sufficient facilities for 
both international and national defence purposes. The dimension of the 
construction work for defence communication facilities was larger than for any 
other subscriber, for which reason the Danish defence became the largest 
individual customer of telecom services.360 This meant, on the one hand, that 
military authorities entered the scene as a new kind of stakeholder engaged in 
defining internal developments in the sector. This translated into new working 
procedures etc., but also in the introduction of new infrastructural agendas in 
the shape of the NATO infrastructure projects. On the other hand, it also 
meant that the tele administrations began thinking military communications 
into their long-term planning. This was a result of the political decision to try 
to seek civilian and military needs combined – reaffirmed in the 1957 
agreement made between FTF and the tele administrations. It is important to 
note how this, from a technological-economic point of view, was rendered 
possible by the circumstance that the construction of new communication 
facilities for the defence coincided with the major extensions of the civilian 
telecommunications network across Denmark taking place in the 1950s, 
including the transition to carrier frequency technique, which increased the 
capacity in the long line links. 
In this way, the Danish telecom sector gained political importance in a 
new way, which was moreover confirmed with the decision in the early 1960s 
to close down the Defence Telegraph Administration and transfer many of the 
tasks hereof to the P&T. The existing literature studying the Danish 
communications sector in the 1950s has shown how the sector by the end of 
decade was profoundly different from what it had been in the early post-war 
years. However, while these examinations have focused on inner-sector 
organisational and technological aspects, this chapter has demonstrated how 
the ‘Cold War adaptation’ is also an important key to understanding 
developments in the sector through the 1950s. This was not least due to the 
attempts of in particular the Ministry of Public Works to further a 
technopolitical agenda in which the new defence political circumstances were 
seen as an opportunity to also extend and develop civilian communications. In 
this way, the chapter also presents a new perspective to existing historiography 
on the political and military project of Denmark’s integration into NATO. 
Besides involving major changes in the military sector and a number of political 
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dilemmas as regards the balancing of alliance concerns with other security 
political concerns and wider societal economic concerns, this integration also 
brought along new tasks – and opportunities – to the communications sector.  
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[4] 
Networked and nuclear allies 
The technopolitics of telecommunications  
system-building in NATO, 1950s-1980s 
 
 
“While Napoleon’s dictum that an army marches on its 
stomach is still a true measure of the importance of Logistics 
– to use its modern name – in modern warfare, the 
importance of signals communications in maintaining 
command at all levels has never been greater than it is 
today.”361 (Brigadier Cole, SHAPE, 1956) 
 
In December 1954 NATO “went nuclear”.362 As the alliance adopted a new 
strategy which emphasised the immediate use of nuclear weapons in a future 
war, it began preparing for a nuclear war in both offensive and defensive 
manners. This exerted new demands upon the speed, reliability, and 
survivability of the alliance’s communication facilities. Thus, while 
telecommunications and the integration of national systems, as demonstrated 
in chapter two, was a key component in the rearming of Western Europe in 
NATO’s early years, telecommunications were now ascribed new 
technopolitical purposes.  
This chapter examines how telecommunications systems in the alliance 
developed in interaction with political developments from the 1950s through 
to the 1980s. Research into NATO cooperation in other areas of science and 
technology has shown how such projects also served the purpose of creating 
allied unity, providing legitimacy for NATO’s political project, or furthering 
American ‘soft power’ ambitions.363 Likewise, research on infrastructure and 
technological system-building has documented how such undertakings have 
been used to push political integration forward or to legitimise a particular 
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political project.364 NATO’s conduct in the area of telecommunications 
infrastructure and governance, however, is a largely unexplored field. This calls 
for an examination of how NATO’s telecommunications infrastructure 
developed in the interaction with political, military, and technological agendas 
– or, as captured with the concept of ‘technopolitics’, how communications 
infrastructure was designed or used strategically to enact specific political goals.  
Through the lens of technopolitics, this chapter traces the development 
of communications system-building in NATO, thereby following up on the first 
years of networking the alliance that I examined in chapter two. In doing so, I 
pay particular attention to the role of the ‘system-builders’, understood as 
different kinds of agents pushing for the construction and development of 
sociotechnical systems by using the power they possess, e.g. from controlling 
technological knowledge.365 
Thereby, I argue that the period can be divided into three overlapping 
phases in which political and technological agendas have interacted in different 
ways. The first phase is characterised by an increased attention to the 
vulnerability of existing communication systems caused by the new nuclear 
agenda introduced in 1954. The second phase is distinguished by two 
American initiatives to introduce communication alternatives in the form of 
new and highly modern systems in the mid-late 1950s and 1960s. I argue that 
this must be understood as efforts to pursue a specific technopolitical agenda, 
marking a break from the infrastructural agenda of the early 1950s that was, as 
outlined in chapter two, based on the use of civilian communications networks. 
Finally, a third phase is marked by a shift occurring in the late 1960s, where 
telecommunications began to be perceived as an important tool in crisis 
management and thereby a prerequisite for pursuing the strategy of ‘flexible 
response’ adopted by the allies at this point. Overall, by examining these three 
phases of technopolitics in the area of telecommunications, the chapter 
demonstrates how the telecommunications security agenda in NATO was 
continuously renegotiated in an interplay with different technopolitical 
dynamics.   
 
4.1 Nuclear war and communications security 
In this section, I explore how the 1954 adoption of the nuclear strategy marked 
a turning point for the alliance adding a new dimension, namely that of nuclear 
vulnerability, to the communications system-building that had taken place since 
                                               
364 See for instance Badenoch and Fickers, “Europe Materializing?”; Misa and Schot, 
“Introduction: Inventing Europe”; Marklund and Rüdiger, “Historicizing Infrastructure”, 
Trischler and Weinberger, “Engineering Europe”. 
365 Hecht and Edwards, “The Technopolitics of the Cold War”, p. 274. 
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the early 1950s.366 The new strategy was formally embraced when the North 
Atlantic Council on December 20 1954 approved the document MC 48 “as a 
basis for defence planning and preparations by the NATO military 
authorities”. MC 48, entitled “The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military 
Strength for the Next Few Years”, emphasised the immediate use of nuclear 
weapons for the defence of Europe in a future war: “Should war occur, the best 
defense against atomic attack lies in the ability of the Allied nations to reduce 
the threat at source by immediate and intensive atomic counter-attack.”367 
The fact that MC 48 was adopted for both offensive and defensive 
planning meant that the framework for the defence preparations previously 
carried out in NATO, both collectively and individually in the member states, 
changed considerably. As an example of how the nuclear agenda influenced 
the perception and management of telecommunications in NATO and the 
member states, the following section outlines how NATO’s civil emergency 
planning agencies called attention to how existing communication facilities, also 
those for strictly civilian uses, needed to be better protected.  
The planning for a defence of the civil population and the home front, 
including attempts to secure the communications infrastructure, had been a 
topic of NATO concern for some years prior to the nuclearisation. This was 
rooted in the expectation that a future war would play out on two fronts, namely 
the military and the home front.368 With the North Atlantic Treaty, the member 
states had committed themselves to “separately and jointly, by means of 
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, maintain and develop their 
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”369 The initiative to 
prepare for the civil society’s organisation in times of war initially came from 
Lord Ismay, who was elected as the alliance’s first Secretary General in March 
1952.370 In his attempts to raise awareness to civil preparedness, Ismay 
                                               
366 I have examined this in previous studies too, but given my aim in this dissertation to 
reach an understanding of the security governance that emerged out of this process, it is 
necessary in this section to outline the civil emergency planning in NATO prior to and 
in response to the nuclearisation, See: Jensen, “Connecting the Alliance”, p. 202f.; 
Jensen, Klartone efter atombomben, p. 18f., 27f. 
367 Final Communique, December 20 1954. C-M(54)123. NA. MC 48 was approved by 
the Military Committee in late November 1954,s see: Report by the Military Committee, 
November 22 1954. MC 48(Final). NA. The strategy was in line with the concept of 
‘massive retaliation’. As Trachtenberg has noted, what was special about the MC 48 
strategy was not that it relied on nuclear forces, but that it built on the assumption that 
there was one, and only one, way in which the Soviets could be prevented from 
overrunning Europe in the event of war, namely through the very rapid and massive use 
of nuclear weapons, both tactically and strategically. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 
p. 158. 
368 van Heuven, “Civil Emergency Planning in NATO”. 
369 “The North Atlantic Treaty”, April 4 1949, article 3. NA-E. 
370 The decision to establish such a position was taken at the aforementioned Lisbon 
meeting in February 1952. Ismay, NATO. The First Five years, p. 48. 
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emphasised that modern war was “a trial of strength and willpower” between 
nations and that, therefore, “[n]either the valour of our soldiers nor the 
excellence of their equipment can be of any avail if the home front cracks.”371 
Ismay’s address reflected the general concern for ‘fifth column’ activity and 
referred to experiences hereof in the Second World War, stressing that the 
danger of Soviet efforts in this area were immeasurably greater.372 As a result of 
Ismay’s efforts, a number of committees were established to work on different 
aspects of civil emergency planning.373 In the area of communications, these 
efforts led to the appointment of vital telecommunication installations as ‘key 
points’ which national governments were obliged to protect. These points were 
regarded as being of particular importance to a country’s war effort and to a 
country’s participation in the NATO war effort, and therefore also thought to 
be possible targets of enemy action, more precisely sabotage carried out by fifth 
columnists.374 
With the adoption of the new nuclear assumptions as a basis for war 
planning, the previous efforts to secure the communications infrastructure were 
deemed inadequate. Ismay found that when linking the task of civil 
preparedness with the MC 48 strategy, “entirely new aspects [had] to be 
considered”.375 In January1955, he proposed to the North Atlantic Council that 
the committees working on civil emergency planning should base their 
preparations on the assumption that the enemy “from the outset of hostilities” 
would launch nuclear attacks. Ismay listed a number of general locations which 
– besides allied atomic production and delivery capabilities – could be regarded 
as priority targets for the enemy. This included allied centres of government, 
industrial and communication centres, the major port complexes, and centres 
of population, and Ismay stressed how the destruction of such sites “would be 
likely to have the most serious effects on the war effort and particularly on 
                                               
371 Address by Ismay to the Council, June 5 1952. C-M(52)27. NA. 
372 For more on the fifth column initiatives initiated by Ismay’s address, see Laursen, 
Politiets Efterretningstjeneste 1945-1968, p. 138. 
373 In June 1952, the Council established the Working Group on Civil Organization in 
Time of War and before the end of 1952, further nine new committees working on civil 
emergency planning had been set up, in particular on issues related to supplies and 
logistics. These committees stressed the need for a higher degree of coordination 
between the member states, for instance as regards standardisation, interchangeability of 
equipment, and the development of common plans for communications. See: Interim 
report on civil organisation in time of war, July 4 1952. C-M(52)49. NA; Progress report 
on civil organisation in time of war, November 10 1952. C-M(52)101. NA; Report by 
Ismay to ministerial meeting of the NAC in Bonn, May 1957. NA.  
374 Report by the Committee on Civil Organization in Time of War, January 4 1955. C-
M(55)4. NA. 
375 General survey of civil emergency planning structure, December 21, 1955. AC/98-
D/1. NA. 
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civilian morale.”376 Ismay’s proposal was adopted by the Council in May 1955, 
and the members agreed that in order to mitigate effects of attacks on the 
appointed targets, it was essential to take a number of preparatory measures in 
use already in peacetime. These measures should be based on the assumption 
that the first thirty days of a war would be the most critical period, possibly with 
the heaviest attacks concentrated in the first three or four days. As the paper 
approved by the Council emphasised, the “ability to defeat the enemy is 
dependent on ability to survive and gain superiority in the initial phase [of a 
war]”.377 Thus, the shift towards nuclear planning brought along an increased 
focus on preparedness planning for the very early phases of a future war, i.e. 
the mobilisation phase. 
Moreover, while civil emergency planning had largely been perceived as 
a national responsibility in NATO’s first years, the nuclear agenda paved the 
way for a prioritisation and centralisation of the area of civil emergency 
planning. For this purpose, the Council agreed to set up a Senior Civil 
Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) in November 1955.378 The Council 
“attach[ed] the highest importance to the development of such planning in 
NATO countries” which was exemplified with the fact that each nation should 
be represented at the highest possible level and that the Secretary General 
would serve as chairman of the senior committee.379  
Communication was one of the issues that caught the attention of the new 
senior committee. In December 1955, the committee considered a note by 
Ismay on possible gaps in NATO’s emergency planning, according to whom: 
“It is evident that the need for communications in time of an 
emergency has been increased by the adoption of the new 
assumptions and it seems likely that such activities as civil 
defence and transport will have important requirements for 
communications.”380 
The committee thereupon agreed to make a review of the planning activities in 
the field of communications. In April 1956, the secretary of SCEPC noted that 
“there is no simple or quick solution to the problems involved”, but that, 
                                               
376 Note on further assumptions for civil emergency planning, January 19 1955. C-
M(55)8. NA. 
377 Note on the application of the new assumptions, May 27 1955. C-M(55)48(Final). 
NA. 
378 The decision was based on an American proposal calling for a reorganisation of the 
civil emergency planning structure with a view to the many committees set up in the 
beginning of the 1950s and a growing need of coordinating matters in between all of 
these committees. Note on US proposal, August 20 1955. C-M(55)75. NA. 
379 Note in the establishment of SCEPC, November 10 1955. C-M(55)100. NA. 
380 Note on possible gaps in NATO emergency planning, December 30 1955. AC/98-
D/7. NA. 
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broadly speaking, “the problem of communications facilities required can be 
divided into those for which nations are individually responsible within their 
own borders, and those required for international purposes and which cross 
national boundaries.” The latter group was perceived as a NATO responsibility 
and involved for instance international transmission of warnings of air attack or 
fallout and communication requirements for NATO’s civilian wartime 
agencies such as a planning group for transport in wartime.381 
Although the member states themselves were responsible for securing 
communication infrastructures within their own borders, SCEPC began to 
make examinations of national problems in this area and pass on a large 
number of recommendations and directives to the member states. The 
concern for national communications was first raised in an examination in 
March 1956 on the challenges of maintaining governmental control in the first 
phases of a future war. The examination found that a main problem in this 
regard was to maintain communications between the government, the central 
administrative services, and regional and local authorities, and it therefore 
called for the establishment of communications systems between the wartime 
seats of these branches of government.382 
In continuation hereof, SCEPC also began addressing problems of 
national public communications in wartime in a broader sense. A temporary 
working group established under SCEPC with the specific purpose of handling 
the wartime communication requirements of NATO’s civilian wartime 
agencies concluded in October 1956 that a further problem necessary to 
address was that of “the necessity of maintaining national communications in a 
thermonuclear war”. The working group recalled how the Senior Civil 
Emergency Planning Committee for general emergency planning had worked 
out a report pointing towards a number of potential national targets in case of 
nuclear or thermonuclear attacks in a future war. Among these were industrial 
and urban areas, and as the communications working group noted, these areas 
were in most cases also vital communication centres. The working group 
estimated that if these areas “are rendered ‘virtually useless’, the national 
communications systems may be seriously hampered”. This would not only 
have consequences for the maintenance of governmental control in a national 
territory, but also for inter-governmental and international communications. 
                                               
381 Note on communications problem, April 13 1956. AC/98-D/20. NA. NATO’s 
civilian wartime agencies was for instance the Planning Board for European Inland 
Surface Transport (PBEIST) responsible for wartime utilization of all inland civil and 
military transport in Europe. In order to ensure that such agencies in wartime would be 
located areas with sufficient communications, SCEPC initiated a collaboration with 
ELLA and a number of national PTTs with the purpose of avoiding “communications 
desserts”, see: Note on international wartime communications requirements, October 22 
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The working group therefore stressed the need for national PTTs to “review 
their plans in order to minimise the damage likely to occur due to the 
concentration of main terminations in probable target areas”.383 
The potential national targets that the working group referred to require 
a further comment. In order to provide “a uniform basis” for civil emergency 
planning, the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee issued a 
comprehensive document in May 1956, stressing that the planning for the 
opening phase of a war should be directed towards ensuring the survival of the 
populations and the maintenance of governmental and other controls.384 The 
document listed a number of cities and areas in Europe as expected targets, 
and in doing so, it ushered in a new agenda in the alliance’s 
telecommunications system-building. In the early years of networking outlined 
in chapter two, more of the communications infrastructure projects were 
constructed between cities, since this was also where commands etc. were 
placed. The pointing out of urban areas as potential targets can, by contrast, be 
understood as a new security standard which the member states were asked to 
base their national telecommunications planning upon. I shall go further into 
the outfall hereof in a national context in chapter five. 
Moreover, in order to follow the progress in the member states more 
closely, the SCEPC decided in January 1957 to introduce an annual review of 
the progress in the different areas of civil emergency planning.385 When this 
decision was approved at a meeting in the North Atlantic Council in March 
1957, the chairman of the council also noted that it had been “one of the wisest” 
decisions taken to establish SCEPC, “since the Committee had succeeded in 
bringing order into an area in which there had been considerable confusion in 
the past”. Moreover, the chairman stressed that “it was now up to Governments 
to implement the plans recommended by the Committee”.386 The introduction 
of the annual review gave cause to a closer and more standardised monitoring 
of each member state’s progress in the different areas of civil emergency 
planning. In the area of communications, SCEPC decided to establish a 
permanent Civil Communications Planning Committee (CCPC) in January 
1957 in response to the request made by the communications working group 
in October 1956. As one of its areas of responsibilities, the CCPC should 
“study overall requirements for communications required in time of war for 
civil purposes” and make recommendations for how gaps in communications 
                                               
383 Note on international wartime communications requirements, October 22 1956. 
AC/98-D/28. NA. 
384 Note on assumptions for civil emergency planning, May 2 1956. AC/98-D/14(Final). 
NA. 
385 Summary record of meeting in SCEPC, January 28 1957. AC/98-R/3. NA; 
Questionnaire for the 1957 Annual Progress Review, April 11 1957. AC/121-D/5. NA. 
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requirements in wartime could be closed.387 This meant that NATO now had 
both a civilian communications committee and a military communications 
agency, namely the European Long Lines Agency (ELLA) established in 1951. 
Both agencies referred to the European Military Communications 
Coordination Committee. 
Thus, with SCEPC and CCPC, a new kind of security governance 
emerged in the area of communications, operating in the cross field between 
the international NATO-level and the national level and between military and 
civilian fields of telecommunications. The establishment of SCEPC and CCPC 
meant that the member states were now presented with a framework upon 
which they could base their national planning. For instance, a report presented 
to the North Atlantic Council by SCEPC in March 1957 stressed that “Nations 
should ensure, so far as possible, that a communications network is available 
to meet the needs of the survival period, which must include all available 
methods.”388 The work carried out among the national delegations in SCEPC 
and CCPC came to provide the basis for a standardised and uniform planning 
of civil emergency issues in the area of telecommunications, a framework upon 
which the national planning could be based. 
In practice however, NATO’s civil emergency planning agencies did not 
have authority to do more than make recommendations and criticise when 
member states did not follow suit. In the end, civil emergency planning was a 
governmental responsibility, and – compared with the authority of military 
commands – the direct influence of NATO’s Secretary General on national 
policies was of a more limited character. This reflected the general power 
balance in NATO in these years where – to borrow a phrase from Lawrence 
Kaplan – “power seemed vested in the supreme commander”, for which 
reason military issues carried a heavier weight in NATO’s cooperation than 
other fields of a more political character.389 However, it appears that the 
Secretary General in the nuclear agenda found the impetus to raise further 
awareness of the civilian aspects of defence planning in the alliance. 
 
4.2 Communication alternatives beyond the horizon 
Another consequence of the nuclear agenda in the area of telecommunications 
was that the allies found themselves in need of other communication systems 
than the ones established in NATO’s early years. This resulted in the 
construction of two new and highly advanced systems, first the ACE High 
Forward Scatter System constructed in the late 1950s, and second a satellite 
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communications system introduced in the 1960s. In both cases, the initiative – 
technologically as well as financially – came from the United States. In this 
section, I argue that both systems can be understood as American attempts to 
pursue a specific technopolitical agenda in NATO, using its strong political 
position within the alliance and its technological superiority. The use of 
scientific and technological cooperation for implementing American foreign 
policy goals has also been recognised in previous research. Indeed, the United 
States became a major patron of science and technology among their allies 
during the Cold War, and thereby, as John Krige and others have argued, 
promoted a specific scientific agenda in a manoeuvre coined by Krige as 
‘consensual hegemony’.390 In a similar vein, historians of communications have 
shown how the United States furthered particular agendas in 
telecommunications in the first decades of the Cold War.391 I shall add a new 
perspective to these current understandings by looking into the American 
agendas in the area of telecommunications in NATO.  
 
Forward scatter communications – a ‘very fine’ system 
In response to the nuclearization, time became a ‘prime factor’ in NATO’s 
planning in the area of communications. As a 1957 memorandum from the 
Standing Group of the Military Committee highlighted, “[t]he success of 
planned operations will be affected greatly by the smooth and efficient running 
of communications in the early stages of alert or at the outbreak of war”.392 
Indeed, success in the initial phase appears to be paramount in the planning 
for a nuclear war.393 As a result, the NATO member states began developing 
advanced systems for early warnings and high-speed communication systems 
                                               
390 Krige, American Hegemony, pp. 4f., 253f. See also Oreskes and Krige, Science and 
technology in the global cold war; Krige, “NATO and the Strengthening of Western 
Science”; Turchetti, “Sword, Shield and Buoys”. In general, scientific cooperation 
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bonds. 
391 For US Cold War diplomacy in relation to the transatlantic submarine telephone 
cables, of which the first, TAT-1, was laid in 1956, see Ward, Information and Control, 
p. 218f. For satellite communications, see: ibid., p. 230f.; Slotten, “Satellite 
Communications, Globalization, and the Cold War”; Slotten, “The International 
Telecommunications Union, Space Radio Communications, and U.S. Cold War 
Diplomacy”. 
392 Note on requirements for Communications Electronics Personnel, October 4 1957. 
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Högselius et al., Europe's Infrastructure Transition, p. 211. 
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for command and control purposes.394 The communication system, the ACE 
High Forward Scatter System, relied on the use of a new ‘space’, the higher 
atmosphere, for transmission of radio signals. 
The construction of the ACE High Forward Scatter System marks a 
break from the policy adopted in the first years of the alliance’s existence of 
renting circuits from national PTTs rather than constructing isolated military 
systems. The ACE High network, adopted by the allies in 1956, connected the 
entire Allied Command Europe region, from northern Norway across Central 
Europe and the United Kingdom to the eastern parts of Turkey. Forward 
scatter communications involve using the tropospheric and ionospheric layer 
of the atmosphere for beaming high frequency radio signals over long 
distances.395 While such frequencies offer good cover to signals, they had 
previously only been used for communications over line-of-sight distances due 
to technical limitations.396 In the ACE High Forward Scatter network, the 
tropospheric scatter technique was used on shorter distance links and the 
ionospheric scatter technique on longer distance links. The system was strictly 
for military communications and only contained the most critical circuits, those 
circuits that “must be in being when a war starts and must remain in being as 
the war proceeds”, such as circuits for early warning and alert and those circuits 
needed to carry out the atomic strike plan.397 For other purposes, NATO’s 
commands would still need to rent circuits from the national PTTs. 
When the idea of constructing such a communications system was first 
presented in NATO, it went hand in hand with a problematisation of the 
existing communications infrastructure as constituting a profound weakness. 
The system was presented to NATO’s higher committees in December 1955, 
but prior to this, a study was made of the adequacy of the Allied Command 
Europe’s existing communications system in which the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Gruenther, concluded: “At the 
present time, our communications are a dangerously weak link.” Although 
much effort and money had been put into improving communications, the 
                                               
394 For the early warning system NADGE, see: Högselius et al., Europe's Infrastructure 
Transition, p. 211f.; Trischler and Weinberger, “Engineering Europe”, pp. 60ff.; Gough, 
Watching the Skies. 
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supreme commander was of the opinion that limitations had been imposed by 
both techniques and resources.398 
Against this background, the supreme commander and SHAPE’s 
American Chief Signal Officer questioned the security and suitability of the 
existing communication systems at a meeting in NATO’s Military Committee 
on December 12 and at a ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council on 
December 15 1955.399 More specifically, they problematised that the allies’ use 
of radio links and land line circuits were vulnerable to attack, sabotage, and 
interference. The signal officer underlined in his presentation that the fact that 
most land lines leased from PTTs had been laid also for civilian use meant that 
their design and location – for instance passing through urban and industrial 
areas – made them highly vulnerable to atomic attacks and enemy sabotage. 
Moreover, he stressed that since more of the leased land line circuits were not 
available in peacetime, their activation in case of a crisis would be both time-
consuming and dependent on the availability of civilian manpower. Regarding 
radio links, the signal officer accentuated the Russian capability of jamming the 
circuits in case of war. Some radio links were radio relay systems of which the 
reliability and security from jamming was higher, but these could only be used 
for short-range purposes and were excessive in cost and needed personnel. 
Furthermore, the signal officer explained how recent exercises had shown that 
time was a critical factor when implementing the plans made for wartime 
communications. The problem that it took days for circuits to become fully 
operational was according to the signal officer an indication “that we cannot 
place full reliance on such a method in the face of a possible surprise atomic 
attack.” In fact, he argued, the present system “is totally unsuitable to meet vital 
requirements in the face of a surprise atomic attack”.400  
A key to understanding the background for the problematisation of the 
existing telecommunication facilities made by the supreme commander and 
the signal officer at the December meetings is to look at a possible solution that 
they both called attention to. In his address to the Council, supreme 
commander Gruenther referred to “a very fine communication system […] 
called the ‘Scatter’ communication system” which had been established in the 
United States and Canada.401 The signal officer explained in more detail how 
the technique of beaming high radio frequencies against the higher atmosphere 
had been developed by the Bureau of Standards in the United States in 
cooperation with the Armed Forces since the Second World War and had now 
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“proven highly successful”.402 Gruenther concluded his address by 
recommending the NATO allies to adopt the forward scatter technique for the 
Allied Command Europe signal communications system. In doing so, he 
stressed that the forward scatter technique was advantageous in terms of 
reliability, for lowering the risk of jamming, and for lowering financial costs and 
manpower.403  
In terms of costs, the supreme commander suggested to finance the 
implementation of the system by some sort of international project. But at a 
Council meeting in February 1956 when the system was discussed again, the 
US Secretary of Defence, Charles Wilson, stated that his government “was 
anxious to see the projects started as soon as possible” and declared that if 
NATO was willing to adopt the new system in the parts of Europe within the 
allied command, the United States were prepared to finance the establishment 
of certain initial links in order to get the project quickly underway. These links 
were a tropospheric link in Norway connecting Bodø and Oslo and an 
ionospheric link from Paris via Naples to Izmir in Turkey.404 This offer was 
accepted by the NATO allies, and in July 1956, they agreed to make the 
additional links besides the US-sponsored ones part of the eight slice of the 
infrastructure programme.405 
The introduction of the forward scatter technique in NATO was 
therefore an American agenda. The development and implementation of the 
technique was one of many American advances in military research and 
development in the early Cold War years.406 In line with other examples of the 
United States becoming a ‘patron’ of science and technology among their allies, 
the forward scatter system is an example of how the United States used its 
powerful position in the alliance to promote a specific technological agenda. In 
this case, the aim was to build a system very different from that of ‘common 
infrastructure’, in which facilities were publicly owned by the European 
member states and operated by civilian technical personnel. This is illustrated 
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with the fact that the US forward scatter proposal was made on the condition 
that the system’s facilities should remain a SHAPE property and be operated 
by allied military personnel.407  
The viewpoint at SHAPE was that the new nuclear assumptions changed 
the premises for communications within the alliance. In particular, SHAPE 
found that the new assumptions necessitated that “the military authorities must 
have point-to-point communications under their own control.”408 This 
perspective was elaborated on by a SHAPE General in October 1956, when 
he gave a briefing to the Council on the importance of signal communications 
in the alliance. Here, the general referred to an investigation carried out by 
ELLA of the capability of the national PTTs to connect up the reserved circuits 
for wartime use in case of an emergency. The investigation called attention to 
a number of weak spots, for instance that circuits could not always be provided 
outside of normal office hours. This lead the general to the observation that  
“Bearing in mind that PTT circuit technicians are civilians 
and live at home with their families, the shock of an atomic 
attack by the enemy could well paralyse their efforts in 
initiating and implementing the immediate wartime 
switching of circuits.”409 
The general therefore concluded that there was “a very grave doubt” that the 
need for the most critical circuits in the event of a surprise attack would be met 
in time “to permit SACEUR to effectively accomplish his ‘D Day’ mission” – 
i.e. his counter attack.410 In other words, the opinion in the European supreme 
headquarters was that signal communication was such a vital task that it could 
not be left to civilian telecom authorities. The general underlined the need for 
a new kind of system in the shape of the ACE High network, which was now 
under construction. His statement illustrates how the forward scatter system 
was the result of a new kind of system-building within NATO, driven forward 
by the United States and the American generals taking up the leading posts in 
NATO’s European commands. With the forward scatter system, an additional 
‘layer’ was added onto the existing communications systems of Western 
Europe, thereby developing a method to avoid the disadvantages that the use 
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of the public PTT network and civilian technicians involved in the eyes of 
NATO’s military commands. 
In reality, however, the ambition of creating a completely isolated military 
system was not fulfilled with the ACE High system, as the system was 
interconnected with civilian PTT systems. Thus, the civilian PTT technical 
living at home with their families remained a piece in the puzzle. The reliance 
on PTT facilities had financial causes. In late 1964, the North Atlantic Council 
asked a working group to conduct a screening of the communications facilities 
for NATO military purposes in Allied Command Europe. More specifically, 
the working group was asked to “recommend measures whereby operational 
requirements could be met […] as economically as possible”. Against this 
backdrop, the working group reached the conclusion in 1966 that it should be 
an ambition to make “maximum possible use” of the civilian PTT facilities in 
Europe. In this regard, the working group noted that civilian facilities should 
only be avoided “when it was desirable for sound military or economic reasons” 
to do so.411  
 
Satellite communications – or, the ‘vitality’ of the alliance 
Another high-tech communications project carried out in NATO was a satellite 
system. Following the October 1957 Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite – 
marking the beginning of the Cold War ‘space race’, in which the Americans 
got off to a bad start with ‘Flopnik’, an unsuccessful American satellite launch 
in December 1957 – the United States devoted major efforts into space-related 
science and technology.412 
Documents from NATO’s communication agencies reveal that the topic 
of communications satellites began to appear among the allies in the early 
1960s.413 In 1964, the supreme commander in Europe asked the Standing 
Group of the Military Committee to obtain data on satellite communications 
from the NATO member states, in order to explore the possibilities of leasing 
satellite circuits in the national systems that were in the planning stage.414 By 
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1964, more of the NATO allies were planning on joining in on the satellite 
adventure, and all NATO nations besides Greece and Turkey had signed in to 
the Intelsat collaboration, a US-initiated commercial satellite consortium, 
which took its beginning that year.415 Moreover, British defence establishments 
had begun working closely together with the Americans on developing 
interoperable communications satellites to be launched by American rockets.416 
Therefore, the reasoning behind the supreme commander’s interest was, as the 
Standing Group explained in an address to the member states in September 
1964, that if there was a spare capacity in some of the planned national systems, 
NATO commanders could consider leasing circuits in these systems. Such 
satellite circuits could “improve or act as a back-up to existing communications” 
of the NATO commands and thereby help to “reduce the existing vulnerability 
and [..] make good the lack of multiplicity in existing communications”.417  
In general, the response to the Standing Group’s satellite initiative was 
“not very encouraging”, as a later note described. However, the Americans 
were persistent and continued in the following years to accentuate the 
advantages of taking in use satellite communications in NATO. In early 1965, 
the American ambassador to the North Atlantic Council brought up “the 
possibility of a cooperative NATO effort in the defense communication 
satellite field” to his colleagues in the Council.418 This suggestion was backed 
up by NATO’s Committee of Defence Research Directors, who agreed that in 
view of the current advances in satellite technology, “it would be fruitful to study 
anew the possible NATO use of satellite communications”.419 In June 1966, 
the United States brought the topic on the agenda again and suggested to the 
Council that a part of the United States Advanced Defence Communication 
Satellite Program might be made available for NATO purposes. This offer was 
followed up in late September, where the Deputy Director of the US Defense 
Communications Agency gave a briefing to the Council on the American 
satellite programme, and the US ambassador to the Council followed up on 
the briefing with a proposal for “a cooperative program of action leading to the 
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use of communication satellites as an integral part of an overall NATO 
communication system.”420 According to the US ambassador,  
“a satellite capability would add significantly to the flexibility, 
the reliability, and the survivability of a future 
communication system linking NATO military 
headquarters to the furthest tactical and strategic forces and 
to ships at sea – and providing command and control 
communications to and among our defensive forces.”421 
The American ambassador further concluded that it would be entirely feasible 
to introduce NATO quickly into the field of satellite communications, and at 
a relatively modest common cost, provided the allies moved quickly. 
Moreover, the American ambassador referred to the signal value of the satellite 
project:  
“I would remind the Council that such a move on our part 
on the frontiers of modern defense technology would be 
dramatic evidence of the vitality of this Alliance as we 
approach our twentieth birthday.”422 
The reference to NATO’s approaching twentieth anniversary is noteworthy. 
What was remarkable about this event was that by its birth in 1949, the North 
Atlantic Treaty was granted a ‘lifetime’ of twenty years to begin with. After 
twenty years, the member states were according to article thirteen of the treaty 
given the option of leaving the pact with one year’s notice.423 Therefore, in the 
mid-1960s when the anniversary was approaching, a debate on the purpose and 
future role of the alliance was raised among the allies. The debate played out 
in the period of détente that had emerged in the East-West relations upon 
which the legitimacy and raison d'être of the alliance was called into question. 
Moreover, the debate was further intensified with France’s decision in the 
spring of 1966 to leave the integrated military structure of NATO.424 
In the eyes of the ambassador, the anniversary invited for investments in 
modern technologies such as satellites. Since the late 1950s, science and 
technology cooperation had figured as a ‘third dimension’ of the alliance – 
additional to the military and political dimensions. This turn had its roots in 
the so-called ‘Three Wise Men’ exercise initiated in 1956. Here, the foreign 
ministers of Norway, Italy, and Canada were asked by the North Atlantic 
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Council to conduct a study of ways to improve the non-military cooperation 
within the alliance in order to develop “greater unity within the Atlantic 
Community”.425 One of the things that the report by the Three Wise Men 
called attention to was the need for increased cooperation on science and 
technology, leading to the decision by the North Atlantic Council in December 
1957 – in the wake of Sputnik – to establish a Science Committee.426 For the 
Americans, as John Krige has noted, this project involved promoting a positive 
image of the United States by “exporting the best it had to offer” and furthering 
the welding together of the NATO allies in a community based on a core set 
of values. In this regard, achievements in science and technology were 
articulated as the strength of the free world.427 
Previous historical research has documented how the United States used 
satellites as a tool of Cold War diplomacy. In his analyses of satellite 
communications as a tool of US soft power, Hugh Slotten shows how the 
Kennedy and later the Johnson administration worked for the establishment of 
a global satellite communications system. This took form with the 1962 
establishment of Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) and the 
1964 successor International Telecommunications Satellite Organization  
(INTELSAT). The American political efforts aimed at including the Third 
World in a ‘single world system’, instead of creating a system that only served 
profitable routes to for instance Europe.428 Accordingly, satellites were an 
important tool in the Cold War ‘battle of hearts and minds’.429 
Within NATO, however, the US strategy seems to be one of framing 
satellite communications as a response to urgent needs of the alliance. In his 
September 1966 address, as described above, the American Ambassador, 
called attention to the need to ‘move quickly’. This is likely a reference to the 
circumstance that NATO at this point was preparing a major relocation. This 
was caused by the French withdrawal, which had also led President De Gaulle 
to declare that NATO’s military headquarters should depart French territory 
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by April 1967. The plan was to relocate SHAPE to Camp Casteau south of 
Brussels in Belgium, and for this purpose, new communication facilities were 
needed. In this regard, the American ambassador to NATO underlined in his 
September 1966 address to the Council that what was particularly required was 
a North-South link connecting Casteau with Naples where the Commander-in-
Chief of the Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) was located.430 
For this purpose, the US ambassador found that a satellite communications 
system operating under military control would be the most adequate means for 
meeting the communication requirements. The ambassador emphasised that 
it would be achievable to have a North-South link for experimental purposes 
ready by about the time SACEUR moved into the new headquarters and that 
an operational satellite capability could be ready by early 1968. The offer from 
the United States implied that the Americans would make available their 
systems for preparations and test at US expense. NATO should then, at a 
common expense, obtain two satellites, including the connected ground 
terminals and associated equipment. Moreover, the Unites States offered to 
design their advanced operational system in a way that took NATO’s needs 
into consideration.431 
By posing this offer, the United States put immense pressure on their 
allies, as the Americans made it clear that NATO would have to move fast, if 
they wanted to join in on the satellite adventure, since the United States’ own 
programme could not be delayed. As all delegations expressed support of the 
US initiative, SHAPE declared that the headquarters was “highly interested in 
the introduction of communications satellites into the NATO inventory, both 
from the longterm point of view and to immediately improve our 
communications posture after relocation.”432 NATO’s first experiments with 
satellite communications in the years 1967-1969 made use of already orbiting 
US satellites, the Lincoln Experimental Satellites LES-5 and LES-6.433  
After testing mobile ground stations with these experimental satellites, 
NATO launched the next phase of its satellite programme, marked with the 
March 1970 launch of the first NATO communications satellite. The satellite 
was connected with twelve ground stations constructed by the other 
participating countries and thereby linked the NATO Headquarters in 
Brussels with national capitals and NATO commands on land and sea.434 A 
second satellite was launched in January 1971 followed by four more in 1976, 
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1977, 1978, and 1984, all of them constructed in the United States, but funded 
through NATO’s common infrastructure programme. It is noteworthy that the 
discourse around satellites changed by the time of the launch of the first 
satellite. A March 1970 press release made in connection with the launch 
emphasised that the “NATO satellite system will not only provide better 
military communications but will also improve the existing communication 
facilities for political consultation and crisis-management.”435 At this point, as I 
will explore in the next section, the NATO allies had agreed on a strategic shift 
to that of ‘flexible response’ and formally made the achievement of détente a 
NATO aim.436 As a result, increased attention was paid to the vital role of crisis 
management in critical situations.437 Satellite communications harmonised well 
with this agenda as an ideal means for long distance communications between 
different regions of NATO, not least for trans-Atlantic communications. 
 
4.3 Flexible communications for flexible responses 
With the adoption of the flexible response strategy and the increased focus on 
crisis management, a new technopolitical agenda emerged in the area of 
telecommunications by the end of the 1960s. Besides changing the discourse 
around satellites, this also paved the way for a new, integrated communications 
system, which I shall explore in this section. 
In the spring of 1967, NATO’s Defence Planning Committee began 
revising the overall strategic concept of the alliance. This resulted in the 
adoption of the ‘flexible response’ strategy approved by the North Atlantic 
Council in December 1967.438 The idea behind flexible response was that 
NATO’s use of weapons in a future war would be based on a flexible scale, 
beginning with conventional weapons and – if necessary, depending on the 
enemy’s response – escalation to small tactical nuclear weapons or, as a last 
resort, the H-bomb.439 An important background for the strategic shift was the 
introduction of intercontinental missiles replacing bomber aircrafts around 
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1960. This shift left the United States more vulnerable to attacks than before, 
and thereby challenged the premise for the strategy of massive retaliation. For 
the Americans, this created a need for having several options available when 
responding to an attack, also conventional weapons, thereby providing a better 
control of how a conflict would escalate. With these thoughts the Kennedy 
Administration introduced the strategy of ‘flexible response’ as a new American 
military doctrine in 1961.440 
The importance of telecommunications as a vital tool in crisis 
management was manifested in the early 1960s. In 1961, difficulties with 
communication between different agencies within the US government had 
contributed to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, and during the October 
1962 Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy had been unable to 
communicate “in timely fashion” with other foreign leaders. Shortly before, in 
August 1962, the US National Security Council established a subcommittee on 
communications called the Orrick Committee in order to prepare a national 
communications system, which came into being in august 1963. The system 
facilitated worldwide US military communications and provided a 24 hour 
“communication response capability” at key diplomatic posts around the 
world. Additionally, in March 1964, a Special Assistant to the President for 
Telecommunications was appointed.441 Moreover, directly triggered by the 
October 1962 crisis, the so-called ‘hot line’, a direct teletype link, opened 
between Washington and Moscow with the purpose of providing direct 
communications between the superpower leaders, not least in times of tension 
and crisis.442 
In NATO, the role of communications was also considered after the 
adoption of the new strategy in 1967. In December 1969, the Defence Planning 
Committee – a committee formed in 1963 as the ultimate authority on all 
questions related to NATO’s integrated military structure – adopted a plan for 
how to implement the new strategic concept of flexible response. In this 
document, it was emphasised that the “requirement for flexibility and 
timeliness in response to rapidly moving situations necessitates a modern 
military command, control, and communications system, largely oriented 
towards automation” and that it was essential to link national authorities, 
NATO political authorities, and NATO military authorities with “rapid, 
survivable, secure and reliable communications.”443 A later Danish note 
explains that the Defence Planning Committee in continuation hereof 
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suggested to implement a “full integration” of all NATO communications, 
which later materialised in the so-called NATO Integrated Communications 
System (NICS).444  
An event which is likely to have contributed to the recognition of a need 
for integrated and rapid communications was the August 1968 Warsaw Pact 
invasion of Czechoslovakia. Previous research has called attention to the 
inadequacy of NATO’s crisis communications on this occasion. Evanthis 
Hatzivassiliou has described how three NATO governments had been warned 
about the invasion by Soviet ambassadors in advance but failed to inform the 
NATO headquarters about it. Instead, NATO’s headquarters learned the news 
from a Prague radio broadcast. The reason for this was that the only wire 
service tele printer available at the headquarters’ situation centre had been out 
of order and the officer in charge had left his post for the night.445 This situation 
centre had been established after the relocation to Belgium following the 1966 
French withdrawal from NATO’s military command structure. The relocation 
paved the way for a common civil-military situation centre, which would 
“provide the council with the facilities and data needed for consultation and 
decision in time of tension or crisis”, and, moreover, “provide the Military 
Committee the facilities and data base required for analysis of the NATO 
military situation in order to provide military advice to the Council and strategic 
guidance to the Major NATO Commanders.”446 Thus, the focus on the role of 
communications in crisis management was acknowledged before the formal 
adoption of the flexible response strategy and the August 1968 events. 
Although it is difficult to estimate the importance of such single events for 
further developments in communications planning, the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia caused in particular the European NATO members to be 
alarmed by the speed with which the Soviets had operated. The concern in 
Western Europe was that a future Soviet operation would happen too quickly 
for NATO to have time to pass on warning and act on it.447 However, plans for 
improving communications in NATO’s Central European region were already 
on the table prior to August 1968.448 In any case, the August 1968 events 
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underlined how the flexible response strategy eventually rested on the existence 
of rapid internal communications among the NATO allies.449 
The available source material related to the Defence Planning 
Committee’s suggestion to establish an integrated communications system is 
still limited in scope, which poses a challenge for my aim of examining the 
technopolitical ambitions related to the system. While it is possible to outline 
the overall technical developments, the available material does not reveal much 
about the multilateral political negotiations related to the process.  
In overall terms, the idea behind the integrated communications system 
involved the combination of different means of communications for both 
civilian and military purposes. Upon initial studies carried out by SHAPE’s 
Technical Centre, the system was discussed and the final concept hereof 
eventually adopted in December 1970 at NATO’s ministerial session. As 
described in 1980 in an international technical journal, the national ministers 
of defence agreed that “all communications necessary to meet NATO’s 
requirements should be integrated into a single common user system to be 
called the NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS)”450 A press 
release from NATO’s Information Service explained how NICS would help 
improve consultation and control within the alliance in time of tension.451 More 
specifically, the idea behind NICS was to provide direct communications 
between NATO Headquarters and all the NATO capitals, as well as three 
major NATO Commanders, through a network incorporating fifty-seven 
stationary nodes, five active transportable nodes, seven stand-by transportable 
nodes, four gateways, eighteen telegraph automatic relay equipment (TARE), 
thirty-eight satellite earth stations, one SATCOM III satellite, along with the 
ACE-HIGH tropo-scatter network and rented circuits from national PTTs. 452 
The NICS project was finally approved by the Council in the spring of 1971, 
whereby the NICS Organisation (NICSO) responsible for the implementation 
of the system was established.453 NICS would be implemented in two stages, of 
which the first involved the incorporation of the ACE High forward scatter 
system and the elements of the satellite communications programmes into an 
integrated communications system. This stage involved five different 
programmes and was scheduled to be completed by 1983, whereas the second 
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stage was estimated to be completed in 1995 but never set in motion.454 It 
appears from a 1972 document from the Danish telephone company JTAS 
that on a national level, the plans involved the establishment of NICS switching 
centres in order to link up NATO’s military communications systems to the 
existing national PTT network.455 In this way, the NICS system provided 
multiple interconnections between various military and civilian 
communications systems and thereby added increased flexibility and 
redundancy into NATO’s communications.456 
From a technological point of view, the NICS system can be understood 
as an additional and integrative ‘grid’ on top of all existing and planned systems. 
A Danish report later outlined how the system “builds on a utilization of all 
existing and future transmission media”.457 Politically, the implementation of 
NICS reflects, on the one hand, the increased focus on crisis management 
brought along by the 1967 strategic shift towards flexible response. The focus 
on crisis management must also be understood in the wider context of détente. 
In contrast to the forward scatter system and the satellite projects, the available 
source material related to the integrated communications system does not 
suggest that this system was brought forward in the same way by American 
technopolitical ambitions. On a different note, recent historical research on 
transatlantic relations in the 1970s has outlined how the transatlantic power 
balance shifted in these years and how European actors with greater success 
began setting the agenda in NATO.458 It is likely that NICS must also be 
understood in the context of a shifting transatlantic power balance, but the 
source material does not allow me to explore the multilateral political 
negotiations, including the American-European power balance, in more detail. 
However, a 1974 document from the Defence Planning Committee calls 
attention to the importance of another factor, namely that the implementation 
of NICS happened in a period of economic crisis: 
“It is readily recognised that NATO and the NATO nations 
are all experiencing military budget problems. By 
integrating/interconnecting NATO and appropriate national 
military communications systems, it is possible that 
considerable funds could be saved from both NATO and 
national budgets. At the same time, NATO and NATO 
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nations could realize a more survivable, reliable and flexible 
communications system”.459 
Many aspects of the collaboration on communications in NATO’s later Cold 
War years are yet to be uncovered. Material from Danish archives suggest that 
NICS was the pivotal point for developments in internal communications 
systems in NATO for the rest of the Cold War period. Moreover, the 
collaboration in ALLA (which ELLA was renamed in 1965) and CCPC 
continued to be important forums for negotiating transnational 
communications aspects within NATO.  
 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has traced the developments in telecommunications system-
building within NATO in the period from the 1950s through to the 1980s with 
the aim of examining how communications within NATO interacted with 
political and military developments and were pushed forward by different 
actors with different agendas. In conclusion, I shall highlight three aspects 
hereof. 
First, the chapter has demonstrated how the adoption of the nuclear 
assumptions in 1954 became a decisive factor for the ongoing networking of 
the alliance. In chapter two, I explored the early years of infrastructural 
integration in NATO, where the construction of new links and the interlinking 
of existing communications systems took place within the framework of the 
common infrastructure programme. This construction of in particular cables 
and radio links through the common infrastructure programme continued, but 
as this chapter has explored, the nuclear assumptions added new dimensions 
to the telecommunications system-building. The nuclear agenda led to an 
increased awareness about the vulnerability and survivability of the existing 
communications networks in the member states. I have shown in this chapter 
how this awareness was connected with a political push for an increased focus 
on the mobilisation period of a future war. In the next chapters, I shall 
demonstrate how the nuclear agenda came to influence communications 
planning on a national level. Moreover, from a military strategic point of view, 
the nuclear assumptions exerted new demands on communications for 
command and control purposes, leading to the establishment of the forward 
scatter communications system.  
Second, the chapter has shed light on the role of the United States in 
furthering specific technopolitical agendas of telecommunications within 
NATO. Technopolitical agendas, in this connection, were both a matter of 
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enacting political goals through technology and technological goals through 
politics. Based on US initiatives, the NATO countries embarked on the 
projects of establishing the ACE High forward scatter and the satellite 
communications systems, two highly advanced and extremely expensive 
technological endeavours. The systems were partly financed through the 
common infrastructure programme – and, in a 1989 publication from NATO’s 
Infrastructure Committee, accentuated as two of the major accomplishments 
in the subcategory of communications in the infrastructure programmes.460 
However, it is difficult to imagine the making of the systems without the United 
States playing the role of the patron providing both capital and technological 
knowledge. This mirrors the picture presented in previous research by i.e. John 
Krige and Simone Turchetti of US patronage in NATO’s scientific 
cooperation.461 For the United States, besides having specific military objects, 
these systems also served the purpose of introducing US-developed 
technologies into Europe. Moreover, the new technologies of forward scatter 
and satellite communications constituted alternatives to the existing practice of 
using national communications systems owned and operated by the civilian 
PTTs in Western Europe.  
As a third and final point, I shall stress that American technopolitical 
agendas were only one of more factors in telecommunications system-building 
within NATO. Communications systems were established within the 
framework of the shifting strategic patterns of the alliance, but also within the 
scope of general political-economic state of affairs. In particular, the general 
problem of balancing defence expenditures with societal investments of 
another kind – serving security purposes in a broader sense – also pertained to 
the area of communications, not least given the very costly character 
communications technologies. Due to financial circumstances, the networks 
operated by the PTTs continued to be the backbone of much of NATO’s 
communications within allied Europe. This had the consequence that national 
communication authorities continued to play a key role in the security 
governance of telecommunications, including the planning for 
communications preparedness in case of a war. This shall be further explored 
in the next chapter. 
Besides adding a new dimension to the history of communications, the 
examinations in this chapter also provides new empirical knowledge to the 
extensive historiography on NATO during the Cold War, in which the area of 
communications has not yet received much scholarly attention. In doing so, the 
chapter opens the way for new research queries. One is the role of other actors 
in the networking of NATO than the ones I have focused on in this chapter. 
                                               
460 “NATO Common Infrastructure”, 1989. NA. 
461 See for instance Turchetti, “Sword, Shield and Buoys”; Krige, “NATO and the 
Strengthening of Western Science”. 
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For practical reasons, I have not been able to delve into the position of different 
member states on NATO’s communications policy. Research into other 
examples of technical system-building in NATO has revealed how the 
negotiations related to these systems involved immense rivalry among the 
member states.462 This was not least a consequence of the significant financial 
importance of such technological facilities carried, and it is very likely that 
similar examples can be discovered when delving deeper into the 
communications system-building in NATO. Moreover, along with other 
construction works in NATO, the communication projects came into being on 
the basis of a comprehensive bidding process, and it is therefore also necessary 
to investigate the role of private businesses in this process.  
  
                                               
462 See for instance Thies, Friendly Rivals; Gough, Watching the Skies; Högselius et al., 
Europe's Infrastructure Transition, p. 211f.; Trischler and Weinberger, “Engineering 
Europe”, pp. 60ff.; Gregory, Nuclear Command and Control in NATO. 
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[5] 
If war comes 
The governance of telecommunications security in Denmark, 
1950s-1980s 
 
 
 
On the morning of May 3rd 1956, EASTLANDIC forces began 
an all-out attack against the Allied Nations of WESTLANDIA. 
Unconfirmed reports had beforehand indicated that 
EASTLANDIC military forces were in the highest state of 
readiness seen in years, but no specific warnings of preparations 
for a war had been given. The morning attack, supported by atomic 
weapons, was primarily targeted against Central Europe, but also 
the United Kingdom and Southern Europe were stricken. 
Additionally, the Danish island Bornholm in the Baltic Sea was 
attacked by amphibious forces. At 0600 hours, a general alert was 
declared. After this, a number of incidents doing damage to the 
Danish telecommunications network occurred: The connection to 
Bornholm was interrupted; the landline cable to Northern 
Germany was cut by enemy forces; the submarine cable between 
Jutland and Zealand (Aarhus-Kalundborg) was damaged; and the 
submarine cable to the Netherlands was interrupted, first due to a 
damaged submerged repeater and later due to a bomb attack on 
the repeater station at the island of Rømø.463 
 
 
The above scenario played out in a 1956 NATO signal exercise, named 
‘SIGEX TWO’. With the prospect of an all-encompassing future war, the 
NATO allies carried out a number of signal exercises with the purpose of 
testing the management of telecommunications in Western Europe in wartime. 
Detailed plans were made as for how to deal with the scenarios to be expected 
in case of a war, such as increased needs for communication facilities for 
defence and emergency purposes and the occurrence of incidents doing 
damage to the communication networks. 
The signal exercises were one of many elements in the general 
preparedness planning in the area of telecommunications that began in 
                                               
463 AFNORTH Exercise instructions for SIGEX TWO, April 25 1956. ITTS, NALLA 
Denmark, Emneordnede Sager 1950-1985, 2. RA. 
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NATO’s member states in the 1950s. As evident from chapter four, the 
introduction of the nuclear agenda in NATO brought along a new awareness 
as for how the home front was protected against a nuclear attack and could be 
upheld in a future war. In this chapter, I delve into the planning for wartime in 
the area of telecommunications in Denmark, examining how the prospect of 
nuclear war and the accompanying total preparedness agenda translated into 
concrete undertakings. I do this by analysing different cases of war preparations 
in relation to telecommunications – cases which I have identified on the basis 
of thorough archival studies.464 In general, this involved two different problems: 
First, how could the existing telecommunications infrastructure be protected, 
even against the threat of a nuclear attack? And second, how were 
communications to be organised and distributed in case of a war? I understand  
the solution to both problems as a technopolitical one, since both technological 
possibilities and political priorities defined the scope of possible action. By 
studying the security governance related to these cases, i.e. the many different 
negotiations, decisions, and concrete preparations taken in peacetime with a 
view to wartime by the involved actors – military personnel, politicians, civil 
servants, as well as civilian, technical experts – I am able to identify the 
technological and political agendas that the different stakeholders sought to 
promote.  
In doing so, I show how the governing of telecommunications security in 
the Cold War period was increasingly transferred to the realms of civilian, 
technical experts. This development was, on the one hand, driven by a political 
push for establishing continuity between the solving of societal tasks in 
peacetime and wartime, in accordance with the so-called ‘sector responsibility 
principle’. On the other hand, the development was also caused by 
technological developments towards increased complexity in telecom 
networks, which to a larger extent defined the political scope of action. Put in 
another way, what should be secured was determined by what could be 
secured. The chapter thereby provides new perspectives to existing historical 
research on telecommunications security, which has tended to focus on 
measures to avoid for instance cable cutting or radio jamming or on the 
protection of dangerous content in the form of surveillance and censorship. I 
argue that such perspectives must be broadening to also cover measures taken 
to uphold communications critical for the society in crisis situations. Moreover, 
the chapter adds important knowledge to current historical understandings of 
the Danish Cold War total defence by demonstrating how ‘sector 
responsibility’ came into being in a specific societal sector.  
                                               
464 For this purpose, my point of departure has been the archives of NALLA Denmark, 
a central agency for communications preparedness planning. 
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The chapter is structured thematically rather than chronologically, but 
overall, the period from the early 1950s to the 1980s is under scrutiny. The 
chapter consists of four sections. In the first, I delve into the plans made for 
the organisation of telecommunications in wartime and more specifically the 
establishment and development of the aforementioned wartime agency for 
telecommunications, the National Long Lines Agency (NALLA). Second, in 
continuation hereof, I study the plans implemented for how to prioritise 
essential traffic in wartime and, eventually, also in peacetime. Third, I turn the 
focus towards the plans for physically securing the communications 
infrastructure, including the aforementioned 60 million kroner plan, and 
finally, in a fourth section, I study the particular problem of managing 
transnational communication links in wartime. Before turning my focus to 
wartime planning on telecommunications, however, I shall shortly look into 
how preparedness planning was dealt with politically in Denmark in the early 
Cold War years. 
 
Planning for the total war 
In chapter four, I outlined how awareness for ‘the home front’ emerged on the 
NATO agenda in the early 1950s. Considerations for how to prepare for the 
maintenance of the society in wartime were also made in Denmark at this point. 
In the first post-war years, preparedness planning was primarily a matter of 
planning for the protection of the civil population in wartime, which was not 
least based on the experience of the Second World War. A Danish report on 
civil defence issues from 1946 stressed how it was necessary “to meet the total 
War with a total Defence”.465 These concerns led to the April 1949 
establishment of the Civil Defence [Civilforsvaret].466  
However, within NATO, as outlined in chapter four, protecting the 
society involved more than a civil defence. Upon the 1952 initiative of Secretary 
General Lord Ismay, increased focus was paid to different aspects of civil 
organisation in wartime. In Denmark, these issues were initially discussed in 
the aforementioned Committee for Defence Economy, established by the 
government in 1950, which began studying different problems of logistic for 
the civil society in wartime. Such problems were later referred to as the 
‘economic preparedness’ and involved planning of for instance the electric 
                                               
465 Report from the Ministry of Interior’s Air Defence Committee, 1946. Quoted in ”Det 
danske totalforsvars historie”, p. 3. IM, SCB, Sekretariat for Civilt Beredskab, 1. RA. 
466 The Civil Defence was established in 1949 as a successor to the State Civil Air 
Defence [Statens Civile Luftværn], which had existed since the late 1930s. In this 
connection, it can be mentioned that a 1951 NATO review highlighted how Denmark 
had placed particular emphasis on civil defence measures and at an earlier stage than in 
most other countries initiated a thorough reorganisation of the civil defence. See: Report 
on the Status of Denmark’s Defence Efforts, September 15 1951. C7-D/9. NA. 
 
 
142 
supply in wartime. Moreover, a working group in the Prime Minister’s Office 
began in 1951 to consider plans for how to evacuate the government, the 
parliament, and the state administration in case of war.467 This also involved 
considerations for communications – an aspect already slightly touched upon 
by other historians. Henrik Stevnsborg, studying the Danish police during the 
Cold War, has described the establishment of a telephone cable from the 
police headquarters in Copenhagen to a telephone exchange in Roskilde west 
of Copenhagen in 1951, ensuring that the headquarters could communicate 
with the rest of the country even if telephone exchanges in Copenhagen were 
destroyed by sabotage or other enemy action.468 Bent Jensen has mentioned a 
“secret telephone circuit” between central members of government and senior 
officials that was established in the early 1950s, although it remains unclear 
what kind of network he refers to.469 
Beginning in 1955, Danish authorities began giving higher priority to civil 
emergency planning. This can be understood as directly occasioned by NATO. 
In continuation of the North Atlantic Council’s May 1955 decision of basing 
the alliance’s civil emergency planning on the ‘new  assumptions’, i.e. the 
nuclearisation, thereby paying increased attention to the initial, critical phase of 
a future war, Denmark was asked in May 1955 to embark upon the work of 
carrying out comprehensive emergency plans.470 Moreover, in response to the 
November 1955 establishment of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning 
Committee in NATO, the Danish government established a Government 
Committee for Civil Emergency Planning [Regeringsudvalget for Civilt 
Beredskab] the following year, in December 1956.471 The Government 
Committee was chaired by the prime and foreign minister, H.C. Hansen, 
indicating that civil preparedness was indeed a highly prioritized task for the 
government. 
                                               
467 ”Den centrale, generelle planlægning.”, p. 6f. IM, SCB, Sager vedr. det civile 
beredskab, 5. RA; ”Ministeriernes og styrelsernes administrative beredskab”, p. 2f. IM, 
SCB, Sager vedr. det civile beredskab, 7. RA. 
468 Stevnsborg, Magt, krig og centralisering, p. 256. 
469 Jensen, Ulve, Får og Vogtere 2, p. 249. Jensen refers to a file in the archives of the 
Danish Foreign Ministry (105.N.4), but this file concerns evacuation and refugee 
problems in a future war. There did exist an arrangement for the prioritisation of 
essential telephone traffic, which I shall get back in section 5.2. 
470 Ibid., p. 257. 
471 The member states were asked to send the heads of their national organs for civil 
emergency coordination to participate in SCEPC’s meetings. In Denmark, as an interim 
solution, the chairman of the Committee for Defence Economy was persuaded by the 
Foreign Ministry to represent Denmark, and in July 1956, the committee recommended 
the government to establishment a new, coordinating committee for civil emergency 
planning. See: Note on national coordination for civil emergency planning, January 24 
1956. AC/98-D/11. NA; Letter from IM, December 28 1955; Note about the 
government committee for civil emergency planning, December 2 1956. IM, SCB, Sager 
vedr. det civile beredskab, 5, Dokumentation. RA. 
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While the military aspects of preparedness planning were handled by the 
defence and the task of preparing the population for war or crisis lay with the 
Civil Defence, civil preparedness planning focused on preparing the civilian 
part of the public administration for war. The Government Committee for Civil 
Emergency Planning began reviewing the state of preparedness in different 
areas, for instance by appointing a ‘press committee’ to investigate how to carry 
out public information and press activities in times of a crisis or war.472 Prime 
Minister H.C. Hansen explained to the Parliament at a later occasion that one 
of the most urgent tasks in the committee had been to make plans for how to 
secure the public telecommunications network and make sure that a wartime 
relocated government and central administration were capable of 
communicating securely and reliably.473 Moreover, the Government 
Committee for Civil Emergency Planning worked on preparing a law to 
regulate responsibilities of preparedness planning in the Danish society, which 
was adopted by the Danish parliament in late 1959.  
In previous historical examinations, the development of a Danish civil 
preparedness apparatus in the 1950s has been studied as a token of the threat 
perceptions that existed in Danish politics at this point. Bent Jensen has argued 
that these preparedness initiatives show how seriously Danish authorities and 
politicians took the communist threat, but also how they failed to realise a 
substantial level of preparedness.474 Poul Villaume, by contrast, has touched 
upon the civil preparedness planning as part of Denmark’s integration into 
NATO and shown how Danish authorities, despite NATO’s nuclearisation, 
kept planning for a conventional war for some years.475 Against this backdrop, 
I take a different approach in this chapter by focusing on how the civil 
preparedness agenda translated into concrete undertakings in a specific societal 
sector.  
The 1959 law on civil emergency planning provided a framework for 
further developments in this area for the rest of the Cold War period. The law 
was presented to the parliament in March 1959 and adopted in December 
1959.476 It gave the ministries an authority to give orders to public institutions 
and private companies about taking preparedness measures within their field 
of operation. A section of the law stated that the planning of civil preparedness 
should be based on the principle that the authority in charge of a function in 
                                               
472 Jensen, Ulve, Får og Vogtere 2, p. 260f. 
473 FTT 1958-59, Forhandlinger III, col. 3541f. 
474 Jensen, Ulve, Får og Vogtere 2, p. 217, 274f. Bo Lidegaard has also shortly described 
these initiatives as an illustration of the “poisonous threat scenarios” that existed in the 
late 1950s. Lidegaard, I Kongens Navn, p. 579. 
475 Villaume, Allieret med Forbehold, pp. 525, 542. 
476 ”Lov nr. 342 af 23. december 1959 om civilt beredskab”, FTT 1959-60 C, col. 73. 
The law was supported by all parties in the parliament aside from the communist party. 
Kaarsted, De Danske Ministerier 1953-1972, p. 141. 
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peacetime should also be in charge hereof during a crisis or a war. This 
principle has later been referred to as the ‘sector responsibility principle’.477 
The law established a parliamentary committee to supervise the developments 
in civil preparedness planning and approve grants for concrete measures to be 
taken. From 1962, the responsibility of civil emergency planning, including the 
Secretariat for Civil Emergency Planning which has established to support the 
government committee in 1956, was transferred from the Prime Minister’s 
Office to the Minister of Interior. The civil preparedness planning – as part of 
the total defence – was further developed through the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s 
in interplay with a societal structure becoming increasingly complex, thereby 
necessitating, as Thomas Tram Pedersen has noted, a “holistic planning” in 
order to get different components of the society to interoperate.478 The few 
historical examinations that have been carried out of the Danish total defence 
have generally accentuated the broadening of security responsibilities as part 
hereof: From military to civilian spheres, from the state to the individual, and 
– articulated with a 1985 amendment to the law on civil preparedness – from 
central to local municipalities.479 
It was in the above described context that an increasingly advanced 
telecommunications preparedness governance evolved. In chapter three, I 
outlined how it became a topic for internal discussion in the telecom sector in 
the 1950s to what extent the tele administrations were obliged to establish 
circuits for defence purposes on certain conditions. In continuation hereof, 
other obligations in relation to security were also raised in the civil-military 
cooperation, both before and after the 1959 law. For instance, from the 
minutes of a meeting in the Defence Telegraph Administration in July 1958, 
in which representatives from the tele administrations participated, the 
following passage appears: 
The obligations that the telephone companies voluntarily 
have assumed as regards building, undertaking, and 
maintaining the telecommunications installations of the 
defence, and with the responsibility that these obligations are 
also valid under war circumstances, demand that the 
telephone companies in time consider, prepare, and test 
                                               
477 See Petersen and Jacobsen, “Totalforsvaret og det civile beredskab”, p. 218. 
478 Pedersen, “Det totale forsvar til den totale krig”, p. 18. 
479 For organisational aspects, see: ibid.; Petersen and Jacobsen, “Totalforsvaret og det 
civile beredskab”; Stevnsborg, Magt, krig og centralisering, p. 241ff. As for the individual 
aspect, Casper Sylvest has in a recent study stressed how Danish civil defence initiatives 
implied a transfer of security responsibility from the state to the individual: Sylvest, 
“Atomfrygten og Civilforsvaret”. For similar Swedish perspectives, linking civil defence 
initiatives to welfare state developments, see Cronqvist, “Survival in the Welfare 
Cocoon”; Cronqvist, “Utrymning i folkhemmet”. 
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their organisations and estimate their preparedness with a 
view to an eventual wartime defence of Denmark. […] The 
previous consideration that the telephone companies were 
wholly and fully civilian institutions with purely civilian 
purposes cannot be maintained. We are forced to admit that 
an eventual war is not a matter that is alone of concern to the 
actual defence organisations. It is an unpleasant idea and it 
can be difficult to admit or accept the impact that follows 
from a new problem in the daily dispositions and in the long-
term planning, especially because it not alone pertains to the 
installations directly brought about for the defense, but also 
because it will be important for the telephone companies’ 
civilian telephone facilities, buildings etc. well in advance to 
seek the greatest possible efficiency [of these facilities] 
during an eventual war.” 480 
The minutes do not reveal to what extent this statement was a personal remark 
by one of the participants or a consensus of opinion among the participants. It 
appears likely that the statement came from the Defence Telegraph 
Administration, most probably from its chief colonel Jessen, and it is also the 
Defence Telegraph Administration and not the tele administrations that has 
conducted the minutes. Anyhow, the statement calls attention to the central 
issue related to preparedness planning in the area of telecommunications, 
namely that of negotiating the responsibility between the military and civilian 
stakeholders. It reveals, moreover, that the issues addressed by the government 
with the 1959 law on civil emergency planning were already discussed in the 
tele sector prior to this. This must be understood as a consequence of the 
development that I outlined in chapter three, namely the civil-military 
collaboration on the establishment of communications infrastructure for 
defence purposes in Denmark. The solution with common installations meant 
that both the challenge of protecting the telecommunications infrastructure and 
that of organising communications in wartime raised the problem of 
responsibility, as the tasks fell in between the usual civilian and military division 
of work. Moreover, as I show in this chapter, the discussion at the July 1958 
meeting in the Defence Telegraph Administration also arose from different 
initiatives related to telecommunications security in NATO. 
 
                                               
480 Minutes of meeting in FTF, July 11 1958. 974A-1-31. EA. 
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5.1 Wartime communications 
The first – and for my purpose the most comprehensive – problem that I shall 
examine is that of how communications should be managed in case of a war. 
This problem was discussed in the civil-military collaboration through the 
entire Cold War era. In wartime, the many circuits that had been prepared for 
military use would have to be coupled in, which would lessen the capacity in 
the networks for civilian purposes. The solving of this issue involved concerns 
for defence politics and civil preparedness politics as well as for technological 
and organisational developments in the area of telecommunications. In this 
section, I first show how the problem was negotiated between civil-military tele 
representatives through the 1950s, both in response to internal negotiations 
and to NATO initiatives. Further to this, I show how the problem of wartime 
prioritisation required political importance from the 1960s onwards, resulting 
in concrete political decisions on the military-civilian division of work in 1961-
62 and 1975, and discuss the technopolitical dynamics hereof.  
 
Priority to whom? 
When examining the military-civilian discussions on how telecommunications 
should be managed in wartime, it appears that the central concern was that of 
network capacity. The question of how the capacity in the telecom networks 
should be allocated between civilian and military needs in case of a war was 
part of the negotiations between the defence and the telecom sector on 
establishing communications for defence purposes from the very beginning in 
1950. In the following years, however, focus shifted towards more practical 
aspects of civil-military cooperation in wartime, as the holding of a number of 
exercises provided opportunities for rehearsing different procedures for how 
to manage wartime communications. 
I have previously examined how the problem of network capacity was 
raised by the tele representatives in the early 1950s.481 For instance, the director 
general of the P&T, KJ. Jensen, brought the matter up at a meeting in the 
Telephone Control Board in April 1950, arguing that in case of mobilisation 
the military would have a priority right to use the telephone network, but that 
“one should not forget that also civilian institutions needed their share, if 
everything should not break down”. Jensen therefore found it necessary well in 
advance of such a situation to make clear plans for how to allocate 
telecommunication facilities.482 Within the next couple of years, as shown in 
chapter three, plans for extending the circuits needed for military purposes 
were being prepared. At this point, the expectation in the sector was that when 
                                               
481 Jensen, Klartone efter atombomben, p. 46f. 
482 Minutes of TTS meeting, April 27 1950. TM, TTS, Tilsynets Mødereferater. RA. 
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these plans had been carried through, capacity would be sufficient. Until this 
was the case, however, the defence authorities stressed the need for a “priority 
right of the defence for telephone calls ordered through the civilian circuits” 
and referred to guidelines agreed on in NATO for military use of both 
international and domestic communication networks.483 As outlined previously 
in this dissertation, similar issues were discussed in NATO at this point, leading 
to the establishment of the European Long Lines Agency (ELLA) in the 
summer of 1951. The tele administrations were however of the opinion that a 
priority arrangement would have major consequences for the civilian telephone 
traffic, and the directors of the three telephone companies agreed at a meeting 
in April 1953 that “a priority right shall only be given if the ministry [i.e. the 
Ministry of Public Works] comes with a demand hereof”.484  
The ministry did not issue such a demand. Instead, the problem of 
wartime distribution of network capacity was tested in practice in a number of 
NATO exercises carried through in the 1950s.485 The first of the 
aforementioned signal exercises, SIGEX ONE, was held in Denmark in May 
1954. It was planned by the Defence Telegraph Administration with the 
purpose of training the different authorities involved in wartime 
telecommunications management in the methods of work. This involved the 
establishment of a Danish NALLA.486 NALLA – the National Long Lines 
Agency – was, as briefly described in chapter two, a national equivalent to the 
aforementioned European Long Lines Agency (ELLA) established by SHAPE 
in 1951. By 1954, ELLA had been assigned the task of operating in wartime 
too, but given the fact that the networks NATO’s commands and agencies 
would need in wartime were national, the authority – and technical and 
personnel capacity – to couple in circuits and make dispositions over the 
network was also national. Consequently, ELLA’s work relied fully on the 
                                               
483 Minutes of TTS meeting, March 1 1951. TM, TTS, Tilsynets Mødereferater. RA; 
Minutes of SU meeting, June 26 1952. TM, TTS, Bilag til samarbejdsudvalgets møder. 
RA. 
484 Minutes of meeting in De Samvirkende Telefonselskaber, April 24 1953. Unfiled. 
EA. The same message was repeated at meetings in the Coordination Committee, see 
for example: Minutes of SU meeting, August 28 1952, September 24 1953, October 29 
1953, and September 30 1954. TM, TTS, Bilag til samarbejdsudvalgets møder. RA. 
485 NATO began holding signal exercises in the early 1950s, first as military exercises 
training forces from the alliance commands in wartime signal matters, later with 
participation of PTTs. See for instance mentioning of signal exercises for Allied 
Command Europe forces in 1952 and 1953: Note on Periodic report by the Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe no. 18, SG 120/18, July 23 1952. NA; Note on Periodic 
report by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe no. 19, SG 120/19, August 26 1952. 
NA; Note on Periodic report by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe no. 31, SG 
120/31, August 18 1953. NA. 
486 AFNORTH final report on exercise SIGEX ONE, August 2 1954. ITTS, NALLA 
Denmark, Emneordnede Sager 1950-1985, 2. RA. 
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cooperation with the national agencies in charge of the networks.487 It is likely 
in this connection that defence authorities in the member states began paying 
increased focus to their own wartime arrangements for communications. It 
appears from a 1957 briefing by ELLA that there existed “national 
organizations, which may be either military, civil, or ‘mixed’” in all of the 
countries within ELLA’s operating area that would manage circuits 
requirements in wartime.488  
Thus, the establishment of a Danish NALLA was part of a broader 
manoeuvre in NATO. The Danish NALLA as of 1954 consisted of military 
representatives from NATO commands, military representatives from 
Denmark, and a civilian representative from the P&T.489 Furthermore, in 
connection with NALLA, a special long lines office was established during the 
exercise with personnel from the tele administrations. A report worked out by 
the tele administrations after SIGEX ONE in May 1954 outlined how the 
collaboration had functioned: When the tele administrations identified damage 
in their networks, they informed the FTF about it, whereupon FTF submitted 
the incident to NALLA, which decided upon the priorities for rerouting the 
traffic. The decision by NALLA was then communicated to the four tele 
administrations through the FTF. The tele representatives concluded that this 
was “a rather slow procedure”. Moreover, the tele administrations highlighted 
the fact that FTF during the exercise frequently had to consult the present tele 
representatives, “as the FTF-personnel does not possess – and probably cannot 
be expected to possess – the detailed knowledge, which is necessary in forming 
an opinion of the various matters.” Instead, the tele representatives had been 
able to answer all the inquiries at once, based on their “expert knowledge, 
acquired during a number of years, of matters relating to long distance lines”.490 
                                               
487 Note on Communications in Time of Emergency, June 4 1953. C-M(53)77. NA; 
Report on terms of reference for NATO communications agencies, May 10 1954. 
Enclosure to SG-28-2(Revised)(Final). NA. 
488 Summary of the ELLA briefing to the Committee, April 2 1957. AC/121-WP/1. NA. 
The available NATO material does not offer further insight into these national 
organisations, and further investigation hereof would require examinations in national 
archives. As I mentioned in chapter two, a document from the archives of the British 
Ministry of Defence reveals that the UK also established a NALLA in 1954, see: 
Memorandum on the United Kingdom National Long Lines Agency, November 28 
1958, COS(58)265. DEFE 5/86. National Archives, UK. 
489 More specifically, the representatives were from: AFNORTH (the Allied Forces 
Northern Europe), AIRNORTH (the Allied Air Forces Northern Europe), COD 
DENMARK (the Chief of Defence), COMLANDDENMARK (the Commander 
Landforces Denmark), FO DENMARK (The Flag Officer Denmark), Air Commander 
DENMARK along with the FTF and the P&T. See: AFNORTH final report on exercise 
SIGEX ONE, August 2 1954. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Emneordnede Sager 1950-
1985, 2. RA; Minutes of SU meeting, January 14 1954. TM, TTS, Bilag til 
samarbejdsudvalgets møder. RA. 
490 Report on the exercise SIGEX ONE from the tele administration’s representatives, 
May 12 1954. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Emneordnede Sager 1950-1985, 2. RA. 
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In fact, in most cases the tele representatives had been able to reroute the 
circuits affected at once, rendering unnecessary a priority decision by 
NALLA.491 
In 1955, after the first signal exercise had been held the year before, the 
Inter-ministerial Signal Committee (IMSK) stressed in a letter to the Ministry 
of Defence that it was of crucial importance that further exercises were held. 
IMSK had discussed the problems related to wartime communications with 
civil and military representatives and found that “a number of the problems 
unlikely could be settled with discussions and theoretical examinations alone, 
but should be clarified and worked through in practice”. The IMSK chairman 
stressed that the functions to be carried out by NALLA in wartime were 
complicated but of “crucial and direct importance for the country’s defence 
effort during war”.492 However, as the Inter-ministerial Signal Committee called 
attention to, the handling of telecommunications also raised a problem of 
principal matter. During wartime, the military needs for long line 
communications would be of such a considerable dimension that large parts of 
the long line facilities used for civilian purposes would have to be taken out of 
civilian operation and interconnected with the military network. Yet, as the 
IMSK chairman – the director general of the P&T – stressed, it was also 
necessary to maintain “the for the country most necessary civilian tele traffic”.493 
The problem of prioritising between military and civilian communication 
needs in times of crisis gained new relevance in the following exercises, where 
representatives from “other civilian authorities of war importance” also began 
to participate – but problem remained unresolved.494  
Yet, on a more practical level, the participation in the exercises by both 
military and civilian tele authorities brought along a number of experiences, as 
different constellations for military-civilian cooperation and the transition from 
peacetime to emergency circumstances were tested and evaluated. While 
SIGEX ONE was a Danish exercise only, the following exercises were part of 
wider NATO exercises and followed an exercise framework worked out by 
SHAPE. SIGEX TWO, for instance, which took place in all European 
NATO-countries in May 1956 began with the simulated attack by 
“EASTLANDIC forces” described in the beginning of this chapter. The 
                                               
491 AFNORTH final report on exercise SIGEX ONE, August 2 1954. ITTS, NALLA 
Denmark, Emneordnede Sager 1950-1985, 2. RA. 
492 Letter from IMSK to FM, June 9 1955. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Emneordnede 
Sager 1950-1985, 2. RA. 
493 The IMSK therefore approached other central ministries and asked them to consider 
their wartime needs for communication facilities. See: Letter from IMSK to different 
ministries etc., October 26 1955. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Emneordnede Sager 1950-
1985, 2. RA. 
494 ”Teleberedskabet og Databeredskabet”, p. 1. IM, SCB, Sager vedr. det civile 
beredskab, 7. RA. 
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structure of the Danish telecom sector with the P&T and the three private 
companies meant that the knowledge about and administration of long lines 
were on several hands, which posed a challenge for effective wartime decisions. 
This challenge was also practical in character, as the telephone companies each 
had comprehensive card index systems filing their long lines and local circuits, 
for which reason the potential relocation to a wartime facility required a good 
deal of preparation.495 Following SIGEX THREE held in November 1957, the 
Coordination Committee under the Telephone Control Board established a 
working group in order to find an arrangement for the wartime collaboration 
between the P&T, the telephone companies, and the FTF. The working group 
suggested that a wartime section of the long lines office under the P&T 
[fjernledningskontoret], also representing the companies, should be set up in 
connection with NALLA and, moreover, that an additional arrangement 
should be established in Jutland in the shape of an ‘alternative’ NALLA, 
ALTNALLA, with representatives from the P&T and JTAS.496 The latter 
reflected the threat scenario that Copenhagen and the Eastern parts of 
Denmark would be attacked or occupied in case of a war, after which the 
alternative NALLA would take over the responsibility of the entire network.497 
A representative from the FTF later explained to colleagues in other NATO 
countries that FTF for this purpose  
“maintains duplicate records of all circuit requirements, and 
we have it so arranged that at any given time we have identical 
documentation here [in Copenhagen] and in Jutland. I need 
not mention why this is done.”498 
                                               
495 See: Minutes of SU meetings, March 31 and April 28 1956. TM, TTS, Bilag til 
samarbejdsudvalgets møder. RA; Plan for Exercise SIGEX THREE (Danish Part of 
Exercise), November 6 1957.TM, TTS, Forsvarets Rationaliseringsudvalg 1956-1961, 1. 
RA. 
496 Report on guidelines for cooperation between the tele administrations and NALLA, 
February 1959. TTS, Udvalget til Reorganisering af Forsvarets 
Telekommunikationstjeneste 1956-1961. RA. 
497 An alternative NALLA, also called a Regional Long Lines Agency (RELLA), was 
tested for the first time in the SIGEX TWO exercise. For a discussion hereof on the 
Coordination Committee, see: Minutes of SU meeting, March 3 1955. TM, TTS, Bilag 
til samarbejdsudvalgets møder. RA. As the DIIS examination of Denmark during the 
Cold War revealed, the expectation in NATO’s war scenarios at this point was that 
Denmark would be attacked from two fronts: a land attack on Jutland and a 
simultaneously air born attack on Eastern Denmark, primarily Zealand and Bornholm. 
However, the expectation was that Warsaw Pact resources for the Jutland attack were 
scarce and that the enemy would focus on conquering control over the Danish straits 
providing access to the Baltic Sea. DIIS, Danmark under Den Kolde Krig, I, p. 571ff. 
498 Lecture given by FTF, June 30 1960. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Emneordnede Sager 
1950-1985, 2. RA. 
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Moreover, at the initiative of the Coordination Committee, the working group 
was asked to work out very detailed instructions for how the collaboration in 
the long lines wartime office should proceed. In its report, submitted in 
February 1959, the working group went so far as to draw sketches of how the 
relocation office should be furnished and to make lists down to the slightest 
detail over the equipment and office supplies needed. Indeed, the latter is quite 
telling for how preparedness planning in the hands of the civilian tele 
administrations materialized in the greatest level of detail:  
 
“ 
3 double writing desks 
2 teleprinter desks for each 4 machines c. 5 x 0.9 m, height c. 65 cm 
1 regular table c. 1 x 2 m 
4 typewriter desks c. 0.4 x 0.5 m 
6 table lamps 
1 bookshelf c. 5.5 x 0.25 x 2 m 
1 closet c. 1.5 x 0.5 x 2 m 
1 bookshelf c. 2 x 0.5 x 2 m 
1 bookshelf c. 1.75 x 0.5 x 0.75 m 
10 chairs, hereof 4 with wheels 
5 typewriters 
5 desk pads 
5 pen trays 
5 blotters 
5 rulers 
5 bottles of office glue 
8 trays or baskets for documents 
and a suitable stock of: 
paper in different formats  penholders 
carbon paper   pens 
envelopes   clips 
glue stripes   rubbers 
coloured pencils  blotting paper 
regular pencils  letter files 
pencil sharpeners  perforators 
ink   charteques 
    wastepaper baskets 
“499 
 
                                               
499 Enclosure no. 4, Report on guidelines for cooperation between the tele 
administrations and NALLA, February 1959. TTS, Udvalget til Reorganisering af 
Forsvarets Telekommunikationstjeneste 1956-1961. RA. 
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Thus, the involvement of the tele administrations in the exercise planning 
meant that the planning took a very practical form. These detailed preparations 
are significant, since neither the physical location nor the authority of NALLA 
had been settled at this point. One of the unsettled issues, which I shall get back 
to later in this chapter, was related to the question of how – and by the order 
of whom – a reduction of the regular civilian traffic in wartime should take 
place.500 Another uncertain matter, which I shall address in chapter six, was 
what would happen to the civilian communications network, when all of the 
extra military circuits prepared for wartime were coupled in and taken in use. 
The working group established in order to find an arrangement for the wartime 
collaboration between the tele administrations and NALLA was specifically 
asked not to address these issues.501 
 
Civil-military responsibilities 
By the end of the 1950s, different practical matters related to the management 
of wartime communications had been tested. The problem of how to organise 
the collaboration between the military and civilian tele authorities in wartime 
now became a topic for political discussion, in Denmark as well as in other 
NATO countries. In June 1960, Denmark hosted a conference for Heads of 
NALLAs in Copenhagen. The FTF Chief, colonel Jessen, explained in an 
opening speech that the location of Denmark was chosen “as it is thought that 
development in the set-up of NALLA in this country is far advanced.” Jessen 
therefore had as his ambition to: 
“make it clear why the various countries should establish 
thorough control of the communications network, so that 
when quick resolutions have to be made, it will always be 
possible for the tele network to give maximum satisfaction in 
any given situation, even in spite of destructions during 
war.”502 
On this occasion, another representative from the FTF, Mr. Pedersen, gave a 
lecture on how the Danish NALLA was organised. Pedersen referred to the 
“policy that no job which can be performed by a civil organisation in war and 
peace should be performed by a military one”.503 This was a reference to the 
                                               
500 See for instance: Note from the P&T on information to CCPC, April 22 1961. UM, 
Lukket Arkiv, 107.L.9. RA. 
501 Minutes of SU meeting, September 25 1958. TM, TTS, Bilag til samarbejdsudvalgets 
møder. RA. 
502 Opening speech by Colonel Jessen, June 30 1960. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, 
Emneordnede Sager 1950-1985, 2. RA. 
503 Lecture given by FTF, June 30 1960. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Emneordnede Sager 
1950-1985, 2. RA. 
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principle laid out with the 1959 law on civil emergency planning. Pedersen went 
on to describe the organisation of the Danish NALLA and stressed: “This 
means that our NALLA is not a military body; it is military and civilian 
combined.”504 By contrast, some of the NALLAs in other NATO countries 
were military organs, although these also drew upon the expertise of civilian 
tele technicians. This was for instance the case in Norway, where military 
communications were run by military authorities without civilian involvement, 
but where personnel from Telegrafverket also participated in NALLA 
exercises.505 In his opening speech, Jessen had stressed that the advantage of 
the Danish organisation rested in the necessity “at any time during a war to be 
in absolute control of the distribution of all available telecommunications in 
order to solve any problem paramount at any moment”. He moreover 
emphasised the need for “coordinated decisions for a mutual effort” without 
which the NATO countries’ defence efforts would “disintegrate”, while 
responsible authorities such as governments, civil authorities, the military 
forces, commercial organisations etc. would “loose every opportunity to 
maintain a regular NATO community”.506 
It is important to note that the NALLAs were national organs and that it 
was up to each country how such an organ should be organised.507 It appears, 
however, that the Danish Defence Telegraph Administration used the occasion 
of the meeting in Copenhagen to promote the Danish arrangement. In his 
opening speech, Jessen stated:  
“The telecommunications of a country and inside NATO 
form, according to the Danish view by and large, an 
indivisible unit and the right to utilise it must, in certain 
circumstances, be allotted according to the merit of each 
individual case.”508 
                                               
504 Ibid. 
505 Draft for a report concerning an examination of the Defence Telegraph 
Administration, August 1958. TTS, Forsvarets Rationaliseringsudvalg 1956-1961. RA. 
506 Opening speech by Colonel Jessen, June 30 1960. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, 
Emneordnede Sager 1950-1985, 2. RA. 
507 In an examination of the Danish police’s participation in the total defence, Henrik 
Stevnsborg has interpreted the 1961 establishment of NALLA as a transfer of the 
administration of secure telephone systems in Denmark to be placed within the ambit of 
NATO, see: Stevnsborg, Magt, krig og centralisering, p. 257. It is necessary to note, 
however, that NALLA was under the responsibility of the Danish Ministry of Defence, 
and that in case of disagreement in the NALLA committee (in which NATO commands 
were represented), the chairman (in practice the chief of the Defence Telegraph 
Administration) had the final saying. Documents from NATO also stress that the 
NALLAs were to remain as national organisations. See for instance: Note by the CCPC 
secretary, June 10 1959. AC/121-D/45. NA. 
508 Opening speech by Colonel Jessen, June 30 1960. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, 
Emneordnede Sager 1950-1985, 2. RA. 
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Moreover, Jessen recalled that Denmark within NATO “has consistently 
emphasised” that the problem of satisfying the needs for wartime 
communications could be solved “only by placing the available 
telecommunications at the disposal of both civil and military authorities”.509 It 
appears, thus, that Jessen at this occasion attempted to further an agenda of 
civil-military cooperation on telecommunications. This is not least noteworthy 
given the increased focus on communications for solely military purposes in 
NATO at this point, as outlined in chapter four.  
At this point, the system of the Danish NALLA as outlined by Jessen and 
Pedersen was not directly based on a governmental decision. Instead, it had 
been negotiated between the FTF and the civilian tele administrations based 
on experiences from the first three signal exercises, after which a proposal was 
forwarded to the Ministry of Defence. This resulted in a circular issued by the 
Ministry of Defence in July 1961 stating the terms of references for NALLA 
and ALTNALLA. NALLA would be established by the declaration of 
reinforced alert with the task of “ensuring the fastest possible handling of the 
tele traffic of both the military and civil defence in the common network driven 
by the tele administrations”. This involved receiving and coordinating requests 
for circuits from civilian and military authorities and deciding how to meet 
these needs, if necessary by ordering a general reduction of the regular public 
traffic.510 These decisions rested with the NALLA committee consisting of 
representatives from CINCNORTH (the Commander in chief of the Allied 
Forces Northern Europe), the Danish Chief of Defence, the Civil Defence, a 
representative from “other civilian authorities”, as well as an appointed adviser 
from the tele administrations.511 In case of disagreement in the NALLA 
committee, the chairman – the FTF Chief appointed by the Minister of 
Defence – was granted the last authority. In the aforementioned address given 
by Pedersen, he explained the reason for this: 
“A conflict will always be based on the fact that some circuits 
are very urgently needed, and that their number exceeds the 
capabilities. It will, therefore, always be better to have some 
of these circuits established rather than none, which would 
be the result if agreement could not be obtained.”512 
                                               
509 Ibid. 
510 Circular on NALLA, Ministry of Defence, July 1961. 974A-2. EA. 
511 In addition, NALLA also had a subcommittee and a secretariat. The subcommittee 
was an executive organ consisting of liaison officers and civilian personnel from the 
different authorities represented in the committee, while the secretariat served the 
chairman.  
512 Lecture given by FTF, June 30 1960. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Emneordnede Sager 
1950-1985, 2. RA. 
 
 
155 
The formal establishment of NALLA in 1961 meant that the issue of authority 
as for the reduction of civilian traffic was settled, as NALLA was now given the 
authority to implement the destruction of civilian telecommunications in 
wartime. A further important thing to note about the formal establishment of 
NALLA is that it also involved that the Danish P&T would take over complete 
control of the Danish long lines, i.e. also the lines that in peacetime were 
controlled by the telephone companies. In wartime, thus, all Danish 
telecommunications would be managed from the wartime location of the 
P&T’s long lines office, whether placed in the Eastern or Western part of the 
country, as the P&T was “granted the full authority to control the whole system 
and issue orders to stations normally in the hands of the Telephone 
Companies.”513 
In peacetime – and in between exercises – a secretariat in Defence 
Telegraph Administration took care of day-to-day NALLA businesses. 
However, as outlined in chapter three, the organisation – and future existence 
– of the Defence Telegraph Administration was up for discussion at this point. 
In November 1961, a committee established by the Ministry of Defence 
proposed that the responsibility of NALLA secretariat should be transferred to 
the P&T, while a signal department in the defence should only maintain the 
responsibility of some remains hereof, namely the military aspects of the 
engineering work and the control of defence spending on communications.514 
This proposal was met by the government and became effective as of July 1962. 
This meant that while the responsibility of NALLA overall served under the 
Ministry of Defence, the practical matters hereof were handled by the P&T. 
This involved receiving notifications on all the circuits needed for defence or 
civil defence purposes in wartime, as the member states according to ELLA 
procedures were obliged to ensure that such circuits were provided the most 
secure routing possible and to make plans for alternative routes for these 
circuits in case of destruction to the network. These circuits – which were for 
instance needed by the police forces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Civil 
Defence, or the civil administration – were either referred to as ‘NALLA 
circuits’, or, in the ELLA terminology, as ‘vital circuits’. The idea was that the 
vital circuits of these authorities should be prioritised over the ‘common-user’ 
network, i.e. the regular subscribers.515 
However, through the 1960s, the location of NALLA placed under the 
Ministry of Defence was questioned. This was occasioned by both 
                                               
513 Ibid. 
514 Report from the committee for reorganisation of the defence telecommunications 
service, November 9 1961. TM, TTS, Udvalget til Reorganisering af Forsvarets 
Telekommunikationstjeneste 1956-1961. RA. 
515 ”Teleberedskabet og Databeredskabet”. IM, SCB, Sager vedr. det civile beredskab, 7. 
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technological and political developments. Technologically, the automation and 
large extension of the telecommunications networks that had taken place since 
the 1950s resulted in an increased complexity. After the P&T took over the 
assignments from the former FTF in 1962, including the peacetime secretariat 
functions of NALLA, this office gained increased expertise also in military 
circuit matters. Within NATO, Denmark accentuated the need for letting as 
much as possible of wartime cooperation on telecommunications be handled 
by the national P&Ts. In 1964, for instance, the Danish representative in CCPC 
stressed that instead of involving NATO, it was “a natural PTT task” to enter 
bilateral agreements on establishing tele type networks for crisis situations 
between the different national long lines agencies.516 On the basis of exercises, 
the NALLA committee also experienced that its basis for decision-making in 
wartime increasingly rested on close technical consultations. NALLA therefore 
found it desirable to integrate the expertise of the P&T long line office closer 
into the NALLA wartime procedures.517 
Politically, concerns for both defence politics and civil preparedness 
played a role. Similar to the developments in the 1950s described in chapter 
three leading to the closure of the Defence Telegraph Administration, a 
‘rationalisation’ exercise of the Danish defence was initiated in the late 1960s. 
This was part of a broader effort to reorganise the Danish defence, culminating 
in 1969 with the passing of a new law on the defence organisation calling for 
the joining of the Defence Staff with the different commands within the Danish 
defence in a common command, the Defence Command Denmark 
[Forsvarskommandoen].518 In relation with the rationalisation exercise, the 
Ministry of Defence initiated a ”special rationalisation examination” of the 
signal department of the Danish defence and a further examination of how 
NALLA should be organised in the future in response to the structural changes 
of the defence.519 The latter was carried out by a working group consisting of 
representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Staff, the P&T, and 
                                               
516 Danish minutes of CCPC meeting April 1964, May 1 1964. UM, Lukket Arkiv, 
107.L.9. RA. 
517 During a November 1967 exercise named BABY BOUNCER, NALLA tested a new 
working procedure in which the P&T and the NALLA secretariat was essentially 
integrated. See: Letter from NALLA chairman to the tele administrations, January 31 
1969; Extract from minutes of meeting in working group on NALLA, May 26 1971 
ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Journalsager, 1, 10. RA. 
518 The purpose of the reorganisation was to rationalise the defence, but the idea also 
rooted in a political wish for a closer cooperation between the different commands and a 
relocation of defence sections from Copenhagen. The process was first initiated by the 
prime minister Jens Otto Krag in 1967, and carried out by the government led by 
Hilmar Baunsgaard from 1968 in which the conservative Erik Ninn-Hansen served as 
defence minister. Heurlin, “Forsvarskommandoen”, p. 268f. 
519 Letter from FM to SCB etc., December 12 1967. IM, SCB, Sager vedr. det civile 
beredskab, 7; Letter from FM to IM etc., January 21, 1969. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, 
Journalsager, 1, 10. RA. 
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the Secretariat for Civil Emergency Planning. It appears from a report 
submitted in August 1971 that the members of the working group disagree 
strongly on NALLA’s future affiliation: The civilian representatives favoured a 
proposal to transfer the responsibility of NALLA to the Ministry of Public 
Works, while the defence representatives argued that NALLA should continue 
to resort under the Ministry of Defence.520 From a military point of view, the 
Defence Command found it “very necessary” that NALLA remained under 
the Ministry of Defence, as this solution would best provide for the defence 
interests given the fact that military communications were mainly provided 
through the networks owned by the tele administrations.521 
However, the Secretariat for Civil Emergency Planning also played an 
important role in this process. The need for transferring NALLA to the 
Ministry of Public Works had at first been raised in the negotiations by the 
representative from the Secretariat for Civil Emergency Planning. This was 
done with reference to the 1959 law on civil emergency planning and the 
aforementioned ‘sector responsibility principle’. Stressing this principle, the 
Secretariat for Civil Emergency Planning questioned the current organisation, 
arguing that the Ministry of Defence was actually solving tasks that came within 
the sphere of the Ministry of Public Works.522 As it had been the case in the 
late 1950s, the P&T was at first not keen on taking over the responsibility of 
NALLA. However, upon the proposal from the Secretariat for Civil 
Emergency Planning, the P&T agreed that this could help integrate peacetime 
tasks of NALLA with other telecommunication matters.523 The government 
became involved in the dispute in 1972. In February that year, the Minister of 
Public works, the social democrat Jens Kampmann, argued in a letter to his 
colleague in the Ministry of Defence, social democrat Kjeld Olesen, that the 
NALLA responsibility should be transferred to his ministry. He referred to the 
aim expressed in the law of civil emergency planning that the specific ministers 
should be in charge of organising the preparedness measures within their own 
operating area.524  
                                               
520 Letter from FM to NALLA chairman etc., September 9 1971. ITTS, NALLA 
Denmark, Indgående skrivelser, 3. RA. 
521 Letter from FKO to FM, November 19 1970, letter from FM to FKO, November 27 
1970, Letter from FKO to FM, December 10 1971, ITTS, NALLA Denmark, 
Indgående skrivelser, 3. RA. 
522 ”Teleberedskabet og Databeredskabet”, p. 2. IM, SCB, Sager vedr. det civile 
beredskab, 7. RA. According to the memoirs of Per Heikel Vinther, who was part of the 
negotiations himself, the Secretariat for Civil Emergency Planning stood very firm on the 
principle of sector responsibility. 
523 Letter from FM to NALLA chairman etc., September 9 1971. ITTS, NALLA 
Denmark, Indgående skrivelser, 3; ”Teleberedskabet og Databeredskabet” p. 2. IM, 
SCB, Sager vedr. det civile beredskab, 7. 
524 Letter from MOA to FM, February 8 1972. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Journalsager, 
1, 10. RA. 
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Upon these discussions, the Ministry of Defence asked the Inter-
Ministerial Signal Committee (IMSK) to review the issue. IMSK was in the 
beginning of the 1970s composed in such a way that representatives appointed 
by the Minister of Defence constituted a minority.525 IMSK decided to 
recommend to the government that NALLA was transferred to the Ministry of 
Public Works, a recommendation eventually accepted by the Ministry of 
Defence.526 The recommendation was met by the Prime Minister’s Office in 
July 1975 and became effective as of August 1 1975.527 When presenting the 
proposal to the Prime Minister’s Office, IMSK highlighted that placing 
NALLA under the Ministry of Public Works would best facilitate the transition 
from peacetime to wartime.528  
It is noteworthy that in the above described process, no references to 
NATO or to particular alliance obligations were made. Both the political and 
sector-specific considerations, civilian as well as military, took their point of 
departure in the Danish context, and the proposal by IMSK outlined how the 
framework set up in ALLA enabled different organisational arrangements on 
a national level.529 The 1975 reorganisation of NALLA involved two important 
changes. First, the responsibility of NALLA was transferred from the Ministry 
of Defence to the Ministry of Public Works, more specifically to the General 
Directorate of the P&T. As a result, the P&T now took over the chairmanship 
of the NALLA committee – and thereby obtained the final saying in case of 
disagreement in the committee. Second, the peacetime activities of NALLA 
were strengthened in the way that a ‘core’ of the NALLA secretariat would also 
be working on a daily basis. In this way, the planning for a wartime activation 
of NALLA was prepared on an ongoing basis. This arrangement was thought 
to allow for “both the peacetime and wartime functions and in particular the 
transitional phase”, and thereby ensure continuity between the management of 
Danish telecommunications networks in peace and in war.530 
                                               
525 Four representatives were appointed by the Minister of Public Works, three by the 
Minister of Defence, and on by the Secretariat of Civil Emergency Planning. See: Letter 
from FM to different authorities, May 15 1973. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Indgående 
skrivelser, 4. RA. 
526 Report by the working group on NALLA set up by IMSK, January 3 1974. ITTS, 
NALLA Denmark, Journalsager, 1, 10. RA. 
527 Letter from FM to NALLA chairman etc., July 23 1975. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, 
Indgående skrivelser, 4. RA. 
528 The letter to the Prime Minister’s Office was summarised in: Letter from FM to 
MOA etc., June 23 1975. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Indgående skrivelser, 4. RA. 
529 Report by the working group on NALLA set up by IMSK, January 3 1974. ITTS, 
NALLA Denmark, Journalsager, 1, 10. RA. 
530 In addition, NALLA’s subcommittee and committee were merged in order to 
simplify the wartime procedures. Letter from FM to MOA etc., June 23 1975. ITTS, 
NALLA Denmark, Journalsager, 1, 10. RA. 
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From 1975 until the end of the Cold War period, NALLA was under 
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Works and placed in the General 
Directorate of the P&T. In this period, NALLA’s peacetime work mainly 
revolved around the organisation of circuits into larger groups, as the significant 
increase in the total number of circuits to be managed by NALLA rendered 
impossible the previous individual circuit management.531 The NALLA 
secretariat also worked out a forehand priority arrangement for these groups of 
circuits needed for the total defence. This meant that more decisions as regards 
the prioritisation of circuits in case of network damages were made already in 
peacetime, thereby reducing the number of priority decisions necessary to 
make in wartime.532 
It is important to note that this development did not mean that all 
communications were in civilian hands. Military communications remained in 
military hands, and in the 1970s and 1980s, the Danish defence authorities 
developed an advanced, integrated system for internal communications, 
Forsvarets Integrerede Kommunikations System (FIKS). Moreover, the 
Danish Defend Command was the responsible authority for the planning and 
implementation of the Danish part of the NATO Integrated Communications 
System (NICS) project.533 In wartime, all the users – i.e. the total defence 
authorities using the circuits - were represented in the NALLA committee in 
which they negotiated order of priorities in case of damage on networks and 
lessened capacity.534 
To sum up, the development as regards the responsibility for wartime 
planning in the area of telecommunications went from resting mainly with 
military authorities in the 1950 over a period in the 1960s when more 
responsibility was transferred to the telecom sector to the decision in 1975 to 
                                               
531 In general, however, the share of NALLA circuits in the entire Danish 
communications network had decreased significantly, as civilian communications has 
grown in large numbers. See: Summary of meeting September 26 1977, the NALLA 
secretariat. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Journalsager, 1, 10. RA. See also: Note on a draft 
for the organisation of certain working processes, April 21 1977. ITTS, NALLA 
Denmark, Journalsager, 2, 12. RA; Note on the gathering of total defence important 
circuits in special groups, enclosure no. 2 to summary of meeting September 26 1977, 
the NALLA secretariat. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Journalsager, 1, 10. RA. 
532 ”Teleberedskabet og Databeredskabet”, p. 2f. IM, SCB, Sager vedr. det civile 
beredskab, 7. RA. 
533 By 1977, the Danish participation in NICS involved one SATCOM earth station, two 
ACE High stations, and one secure voice central with i.a. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Defence command as subscribers. Moreover, plans were made for two access 
switches and one telegraph automatic relay equipment. Note by FKO on NICS, June 
1977. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Journalsager, 9, 46C. RA. For more on Danish defence 
communications systems in the Cold War, see Christensen, Fra morsenøgle til datanet.  
534 Orientation of P&T station leaders, enclosure no. 1 to summary of of meeting 
September 26 1977, the NALLA secretariat. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Journalsager, 1, 
10. RA. 
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of ascribing the main responsibility hereof to the P&T. The area of 
communications thus echoes the political will expressed in the 1950 law on 
civil emergency planning that the authority in charge of an area in peacetime 
should also be responsible hereof in wartime.  
 
5.2 Prioritising essential traffic 
One of the security measures that could be taken in use in case of a war or a 
crisis was an arrangement worked out in the telephone sector to prioritise the 
most ‘essential’ traffic over less essential traffic. As I showed in the last section, 
the question of how essential traffic – and what kind of traffic that was in fact 
essential – was discussed among civilian and military representatives in the 
cooperation on communications in the early 1950s. In this section, I examine 
the concrete technical and political steps taken in order to implement a priority 
arrangement. 
The authority of the state to limit the regular telephone and telegram 
traffic was settled by the Ministry of Public Works.535 During the Second World 
War, a measure for limiting traffic in the Danish telephone network was 
implemented in the shape of a ban for making telephone calls during air strike 
warnings and immediately after such warnings. This was done in order to make 
sure that the most essential traffic could be upheld in critical situations.536 After 
the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Signal Committee (IMSK) in 1953, 
the committee took up the issue of the priority system and revisited the Second 
World War arrangement. In June 1954, IMSK arranged for a list to be 
prepared of subscribers that should be ascribed the possibility of making 
telephone calls during air strike warnings [flyvervarsel].537 In case of an air strike 
warning, a number of local urban exchange centrals in the most exposed areas, 
e.g. in the largest cities, had established emergency centrals in basements or 
other secure locations from where the operational personnel could continue 
their work – in case the exchange central kept working.538 
 
The making of the preference system 
From 1954 to 1957 – in the same period where the Defence Telegraph 
Administration with help from the tele administrations began practicing 
                                               
535 It appears from a 1979 background note from NALLA that the ministry issued the 
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536 Note by IMSK, August 31 1957. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Journalsager, 18, 94. RA. 
537 Letter to different ministries from IMSK, December 23 1957. ITTS, NALLA 
Denmark, Journalsager, 18, 94. RA. 
538 Note from the chief telegraph inspector, November 29 1956. ITTS, NALLA 
Denmark, Journalsager, 18, 94. RA. 
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wartime communications management in the signal exercises – IMSK 
considered how a future priority arrangement could be established. In 
September 1957, the director general of the P&T and chairman in IMSK, KJ 
Jensen, informed the Coordination Committee that this was “a burning and 
crucial question, one of the most important in IMSK” and emphasised how it 
was deplorable that an arrangement was still – twelve years after the last war – 
not worked out.539 At this point, however, in 1957, two things had changed.  
On the one hand, the need for such an arrangement had been 
broadened. As an August 1957 note by IMSK outlined:  
“The measures that must be taken will not alone come into 
play during air strike warning, as it can be anticipated that in 
the period before an eventual outbreak of a war and during 
a war or in a period without actual fighting very likely will 
occur situations putting such a large pressure on the 
telephone facilities that a limitation of the access to the use 
[hereof] will be necessary in order to carry through the 
essential and defence necessary traffic.”540 
Although no direct references were made to NATO’s call for increased focus 
on the mobilisation period or to the work in the Danish government’s 
committee established in December 1956 to work with civil emergency 
planning, it seems very likely that the broadened focus in IMSK was connected 
with these developments.  
On the other hand, the broadened focus also appears to have been 
brought about by technological developments. The automation process meant 
that local telephone exchanges, which hitherto had not been planned to be in 
operation during air strike warnings, now could continue the operation that did 
not require personnel in such situations. It was necessary, however, to construct 
a system making sure that too many calls would not be made at the same time. 
For this purpose, IMSK agreed on the estimation that the technical 
circumstances allowed 5% of the total number of subscribers at a local 
exchange to be given such a possibility. Thus, the subscribers would have to be 
divided into two categories: A privileged group with full possibilities for making 
calls and another group with the rest of the subscribers which, when 
necessitated by the circumstances, could be cut off from making calls. These 
subscribers, however, could still receive calls from prioritized callers.541  
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The 5% was only an estimation. It had been worked out on the basis of 
the aforementioned 50% figure rule in NATO and by calculating which 
consequences the expected lessening of capacity – and further lessening caused 
by damages – would have for the network. The defence representatives in 
IMSK and the Coordination Committee noted that the tele administrations 
were essentially the only ones who could figure out how such a solution would 
actually work, both as regards the technical installations and the administration 
hereof.542 The 5% arrangement was referred to as the “blockade system” 
[“blokeringsordningen”] and involved that, upon an order to implement it, all 
regular subscribers were shut out from making telephone calls, while all the 
prioritized users maintained the possibility to do so. Both the defence and the 
tele representatives however called into question the status of the remaining 
95% of the subscribers. Colonel Jessen noted that out of consideration for “the 
psychological defence”, there also had to exist an opportunity for regular 
subscribers to get through in critical situations – “even if they would have to put 
up with queuing”. Steenbuch, now the director of the telephone company 
KTAS, added that it could also be perceived as an encroachment of the rights 
of the regular subscribers if they were completely shut off from communicating 
in ‘preparedness situations’.543 
While the question of when the blockade system could be implemented 
continued to be a matter of discussion in IMSK, the tele administrations, who 
were put in charge of managing the system, began collecting information from 
relevant ministries on which total defence authorities that needed to be 
included in the five per cent – for instance the vital parts of the press corps.544 
Moreover, as the lists of prioritised users at certain exchange centrals began 
approaching the estimated maximum of five per cent, the Government 
Committee on Civil Emergency Planning issued a circular in October 1958 
setting the rules for how to choose the secure telephones.545 The IMSK and the 
Government Committee on Civil Emergency Planning asked the tele 
administrations to go forward with the implementation of the system – but also 
to explore other technical possibilities for implementing a priority system.546 
Accordingly, a working group with technical experts from the tele 
administrations began looking into the technical possibilities for making a 
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different type of arrangement, which instead of cutting off non-prioritised traffic 
would make a preference to the prioritised traffic.547 Again, it was the technical 
development towards automation that made such an arrangement possible, a 
system established already in peacetime to give prioritised subscribers a 
‘preference’ in the telephone network – i.e. a dial tone ahead of other users – 
thereby rendering less necessary the need for cutting all other subscriber’s 
access in case of a crisis.548 
Upon the establishment of the Civil Communications Planning 
Committee in NATO, the need for developing national priority systems was 
also discussed among the NATO allies. In a 1959 reply to CCPC, the 
Government Committee for Civil Emergency Planning described the state of 
the Danish plans: 
 “At most exchanges the number of telephone subscribers 
with vital functions is between 5 and 10% of the total number 
of subscribers, and it is therefore endeavoured to carry out 
arrangements to make it possible to confine the access to the 
network of the other 90 – 95% of the subscribers. In this 
connection either blocking arrangements may be topical so 
that the blocked subscribers are debarred from calling 
themselves, however, so that the possibility of calling them is 
preserved, or priority calls from the subscribers with vital 
functions are accompanied by a special signal which, if the 
called number is engaged causes non-priority connections to 
be broken off so that the priority call can be established. 
Provisional lists of subscribers with vital functions have 
already been prepared, but as the implementing of the 
arrangements will necessitate rather considerable 
investments, the work must be presumed to be extended 
over a rather great number of years.”549  
The technical measures that needed to be taken for implementing this 
‘preference system’ were negotiated between the tele administrations, the 
IMSK, and the Secretariat for Civil Emergency Planning in the early 1960s. 
They became part of the ’60 million kroner’ plan, which I shall explore further 
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in the next section. The tele administrations moreover agreed that the public 
telephone boxes should be part of the preference system, so that they would 
also be available for public telephone traffic in case of a crisis.550 The preference 
system – also referred to as the ‘A system’ – was implemented in different stages 
through the 1960s. In practice, the blockade system – referred to as the ‘B 
system’ – was also maintained, so that the cutting off of all non-prioritised traffic 
in wartime remained a possibility.551 As I outlined in the last section, the 
NALLA committee was ascribed the authority to implement the blockade 
system in wartime. The preference system, by contrast, was a permanent system 
also functional in peacetime. In this way, the prioritised callers would always be 
given priority, also under normal circumstances. This opened for the 
possibility, as a 1969 note made by KTAS summarised, for “a possible 
postponement of the moment for the implementation of the more the drastic 
blockade”.552  
In this way, the development as regards this specific security measure in 
the telephone network of prioritising the most essential traffic went in the 
direction of having more measures implemented already in peacetime. A 
further example hereof is the extension of the possibility to implement the 
blockade system in peacetime too – i.e. in situations where NALLA was not 
activated. In a 1968 note from IMSK, it figures that the committee had  
“noticed that during disasters in peacetime it can be of 
importance for the different civilian helplines that similar 
measures are taken for limiting the telephone traffic in order 
to ensure that the authorities participating in the rescue work 
– that are already appointed part of the 5% prioritised 
subscribers – have the best possible access to making 
telephone calls.”553 
In the following years, IMSK discussed the question of in which situations a 
blocking of non-prioritised subscribers could be implemented. Eventually, in 
1973, the committee agreed with the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of 
Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Public Works and a number 
of other authorities such as the telephone companies that local chief constables 
in the police should be given the authority to request the telephone 
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administrations to implement the blockade system in local areas in 
peacetime.554 
In the 1980s, the matter was taken up again as a preparedness planning 
group under the Telephone Control Board proposed that tele administrations 
themselves should be given the authority to impose the limitation on traffic 
instead of the local chief constables who had “no knowledge about the traffic 
situation in the telephone network”.555 This idea was taken up by the National 
Board on Telecommunications [Statens Teleråd] – the successor of the 
Telephone Control Board – who suggested to the other involved authorities 
that the tele administrations should be given the authority to impose a limitation 
on traffic when they identified overloading of their networks, e.g. in case of 
severe accidents, natural disasters, or other extraordinary crisis situations in 
peacetime.556 Upon negotiations with the other authorities, the National Board 
on Telecommunications however reached the conclusion that the authority to 
impose traffic restrictions should remain with the police authorities, on the 
basis of an assessment of the traffic situation made by the tele administrations.557  
Overall, the two arrangements for prioritising essential traffic and limiting 
non-essential traffic were referred to as the ‘securing system’ 
[sikringsordningen]. They remained in existence throughout the Cold War 
period – and beyond. The emergence and development of this system reflects 
a shift in focus through the Cold War period. Once established, the initiatives 
launched in the 1950s in order to plan for the maintenance of the society in 
wartime and linked with the initiatives in NATO to promote national civil 
emergency planning were broadened to include more scenarios than what had 
been the case from the outset. As more responsibility was transferred to civilian 
spheres, such security measures came to mark a continuity between peacetime 
and wartime. From both a political and a technical point of view, the ‘securing 
system’ also became a way of building more security measures into peacetime 
communications and pre-empt scenarios of breakdown and traffic overload. In 
this way, wartime planning evolved to be a broader discipline, also aiming at 
different potential peacetime disasters or emergencies.  
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5.3 Nuclear-proof communications facilities? 
I now turn my focus to another central issue in the civil-military cooperation 
on telecommunications security, namely that of physical protection of the 
communication facilities. The challenge of protecting the communication 
facilities in Denmark had both a peacetime and a wartime dimension. In 
wartime, the protection of vital communications facilities was part of the overall 
plans for the protection of the aforementioned ‘key points’ – sites of particular 
strategic importance that should be defended by branches of the Home Guard 
in case of an emergency.558 Moreover, the vital role played by 
telecommunications in case of a crisis the tele administrations were allowed to 
have at their disposal the personnel which were otherwise obliged to join the 
military services in case of mobilisation.559 
In this section, I shall concentrate on the steps taken in peacetime to 
improve the material security of Danish telecommunications, including the 
aforementioned 60 million kroner plan, with the aim of examining the 
technological and political visions behind these measures. The course of events 
in this case is similar to that of the previous sections, since the problem of 
physical security was first raised in the telecom sector in the early 1950s, 
whereupon initiatives in NATO towards the end of the decade necessitated 
political decision-making in Denmark. I look into these developments in the 
first part of this section and then move on to the further implementation of 
security measures from 1960 onwards.  
 
Identifying vulnerability 
The question of how the communications facilities could be physically 
protected was brought up by both civilian and military representatives, when 
the plans for extending military communications facilities building on top of 
the existing civilian network were drafted from 1950 onwards. I have shown in 
a previous examination how these concerns about the vulnerability of the 
telecom installations all referred to bombing or sabotage.560 The 1952 
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establishment of the Defence Telegraph Administration (FTF) gave this 
administration the responsibility of ensuring that the communication facilities 
to be used for defence purposes were “designed in the most appropriate way” 
and “replaceable in case of destructions”.561 It remained a topic for discussion 
for some years how the communication facilities, the existing ones as well as 
the new ones being constructed, would best be protected against future enemy 
attacks.562  
It was for instance brought up in the fall of 1955 with the case from 
Slagelse with which I began the introduction to this dissertation. This appears 
to be the first time the prospect of an atomic attack was brought into the 
discussion. As recalled, the plans for a new building for the exchange central in 
Slagelse was problematised by colonel Jessen at a meeting in the Coordination 
Committee in October 1955. On that occasion, the KTAS director responded 
that when proposing new buildings and installations, the telephone company 
considered its own interests only and argued that if the defence authorities 
wanted better security measures to be taken, they could offer to pay for the 
extra costs. However, Jessen strongly disagreed that the costs for implementing 
such security measures should be held by the defence, arguing that under the 
existing circumstances, the entire society should get ready to solve “these 
problems” if it had to survive an attack-related crisis.563 Moreover, Jessen called 
attention to an article he had written in the Danish technical journal Ingeniøren. 
In the article, Jessen referred to what he perceived as a duty resting on the 
concessionary company “under all conditions to ensure the carrying through 
of the traffic without blockades”. He argued that the companies already when 
projecting new facilities had to make considerations for how best to “anticipate 
the situations that could occur during war conditions”.564  
Besides disagreeing on the responsibility for taking security measures, the 
civilian and military stakeholders moreover had very different perceptions of 
security. This is evident when taking a closer look at Jessen’s article in 
Ingeniøren, from which it appears how  Jessen, who also served as Denmark’s 
member in the European Long Lines Agency (ELLA), was influenced by the 
strong focus on the nuclear threat in NATO. As outlined in chapter four, the 
adoption of the nuclear strategy in NATO in late 1954 brought about a change 
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in the fundamental view upon which the preparedness planning was based, 
articulated in the May 1955 decision by the North Atlantic Council that the 
committees working on civil emergency planning should “proceed henceforth 
on the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used” in a future war. The 
document approved by the Council moreover stated that “[e]very country will 
have to interpret the agreed assumptions to fit its own particular circumstances 
and take preparatory measures accordingly”.565 This decision was based on a 
proposal by Ismay in which he outlined potential priority targets for a future 
enemy attack, including, among others, centres of government, communication 
centres directly supporting the war effort, centres of population.566 Jessen 
outlined in his article how it from a military point of view was wrong that long 
line cables for telecommunications were routed through cities, since war 
experiences had generally shown how enemies made large efforts to destroy 
the opponent’s cities. In order to stress his point about the problem of cities, 
Jessen made a historical reference to the autobahns build in Nazi Germany, 
which had exactly been constructed in the way that they bypassed urban areas 
in order to secure their maintenance even after air attacks on German cities.567 
The further course of the process of securing communication facilities in 
Denmark serves as an example of how the NATO membership came to serve 
as a catalyst for developments in Danish telecommunications.568 The 
aforementioned list of potential targets worked out by NATO’s Senior Civil 
Emergency Planning Committee in May 1956 included “cities or areas which 
are regarded as possible hydrogen bomb targets”. In Denmark, the list pointed 
towards Copenhagen as a possible target, while the whole country except the 
Northern tip of Jutland was expected to be affected by fallout. A later 
corrigendum from February 1957 also added Aarhus to the list of potential 
targets.569 Upon the establishment of the Civil Communications Planning 
Committee in early 1957, the member states were asked in April 1957 to report 
on their plans for overcoming potential shortages in communications expected 
to occur in wartime due to reductions of network capacity, taking their point of 
view in the expected targets, which in most cases were also the location of vital 
communication nodes.570 This request was part of the new kind of security 
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governance introduced in NATO’s civilian preparedness agencies in 1957 with 
the exercise of introducing annual progress reports. 
Whereas the civilian tele administrations had not taken particular notice 
of the nuclear threat when brought up in the case of Slagelse, they were now 
compelled to think along those lines. In May 1957, the P&T was asked by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide a reply to the April 1957 request by the 
CCPC.571 In June, the P&T sent a reply to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
in July an updated reply in which an attack on Aarhus was also taken into 
consideration.572 Two things appear from reply: The expectation towards 
damages on the Danish communication networks in case of an enemy attack 
and a status of the steps already taken and plans prepared in order to overcome 
this. As regard destruction, the expectation was that upon an attack on a city 
with nuclear weapons, repeater stations, telephone exchanges, and tele printer 
exchanges in the city in question were assumed to be so badly damaged that 
they would be unusable. This meant that if Copenhagen were to be attacked, 
the telephone, telegram, and telex traffic between areas east and west of the 
Great Belt would be interrupted, the capacity of traffic in the Eastern Denmark 
reduced, and as for the transnational connections, most telephone, all telex, 
and an essential part of the telegram traffic would be interrupted. If Aarhus was 
attacked, a total interruption of the telephone, telegram, and telex traffic from 
the area north and west of Aarhus to the rest of the country as well as of the 
majority of the traffic to Norway were expected to occur.573 As regards the 
necessary steps to be taken to overcome this, the P&T estimated that in order 
to re-establish the network, the national as well as transnational connections, it 
would be necessary to acquire more repeater stations and establish possibilities 
for terminating the central cable along a western-eastern line in the country 
(Copenhagen-Odense-Kolding-Esbjerg) somewhere on Zealand outside of 
Copenhagen. Moreover, it would be necessary to establish a ring cable around 
Aarhus and to upgrade a number of automated centrals so that they could take 
over transit traffic from centrals in Copenhagen and Aarhus.574 
The ring cable solution is noteworthy, since a similar proposal had been 
brought up a few years before, in June 1952, when the defence authorities and 
civilian tele administrations first began discussing the problem of vulnerability. 
In this context, a working group with representatives from the civilian 
administrations found that establishing ring cables around the larger Danish 
cities would be an unfit and too costly solution. Against this, liaison Jessen 
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argued that this point of view was “at odds with the understanding in NATO”.575 
Thus, the idea of bypassing large urban areas was not a product of the nuclear 
security agenda. Instead, it appears that the support for implementing such 
measures changed. In the reply sent to NATO in the summer of 1957, the 
Danish P&T estimated that completing the suggested work would amount to a 
cost around 7 million Danish kroner. The document noted that the Danish 
government had discussed how to implement the measures, but not yet 
reached a solution. In particular, a challenge was posed by the fact that the 
security measures would not only affect the installations of the Danish P&T but 
also, to a large extent, installations which were common to the P&T and the 
telephone companies as well as installations which were the sole property of 
the telephone companies.576 
The Danish reply was, along with replies from other member states, 
included in an August 1957 report made by the CCPC. In general, the main 
problem of telecommunications security at this point seems to be that of 
bypassing cities. The nuclear threat, in other words, was translated into a 
concrete challenge related to how the national infrastructure was constructed. 
A comparison of the national replies however shows that the interpretation of 
the nuclear threat differed. For instance, whereas the reply from Belgium 
stressed that “there is no long-line communications network whkch [sic!] could 
not be paralysed by thermonuclear and atomic attack on the major 
communications centres” in Belgium, the French reply stated that 
“[u]nderground long distance cables, at a depth of 80 cm. alongside roads, are 
impervious to blast”, but only vulnerable to a direct zero point hit by an atomic 
or thermonuclear bomb.577 In noticing this difference, one must keep in mind 
that the French and Belgian cases differed in terms of for instance urban density 
and network redundancy. However, the August 1957 CCPC report reveals how 
the perception of the nuclear threat was shaped in a national context, for 
instance on the basis of exercises in which NATO had provided the overall 
framework, e.g. how heavy an atomic bomb to explode at a specific target, but 
where the consequences hereof were calculated by national personnel. 
Moreover, a comparison of the national replies also reveals that the 
national plans for overcoming this challenge differed according to geopolitical 
circumstances and to how national telecom sectors were organised. In France, 
for instance, large investments had been made in the communications 
infrastructure as part of the early stages of the common infrastructure 
programme in WUDO and NATO, and the French reply therefore stressed 
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how these extensions of the national network has overall made French 
telecommunications less vulnerable to destruction.578 In the Federal Republic 
of Germany, by contrast, a NATO member since 1955 and accordingly not 
part of the early stages of the common infrastructure programme, the 
Deutsches Bundespost was fully responsible for the maintenance of 
telecommunication services both in peacetime and wartime. The expectation 
by Deutsches Bundespost was that thermonuclear or nuclear attacks on towns 
or other expected target areas “would widely paralyse telecommunications 
services both within the Federal Republic of Germany and with other 
countries”, since most communication links either terminated or transited 
potential target areas. Similar to Denmark, Germany therefore had plans of 
constructing cables bypassing cities, auxiliary facilities, and emergency 
exchanges, but the provision of the necessary funds had been brought to a 
close.579 
In the United States, telecommunications were in private hands, and the 
long-distance telephone network in the country was operated by the American 
Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T). A July 1957 report outlining the 
state of national civil communications planning in the United States stresses 
how the law required “common carriers to furnish service in the public 
interest,” for which reason the plans for overcoming shortages in 
communications facilities in case of wartime destruction rested mainly with 
AT&T. The report to NATO outlined how AT&T had “embarked upon a 
project of constructing trunk routes across the country, by-passing critical target 
cities and other important centers.” These plans, scheduled to cost 
approximately $100 million were being financed by AT&T alone without 
government assistance.580 The case of AT&T’s preparedness measures 
supports a point made by David Reynolds of a ‘contract’ between AT&T and 
the government that the company in return for being granted monopoly-like 
privileges by the state served national security interests.581 However, it also 
appears from the report that AT&T’s project had not only been undertaken to 
assure the integrity of the national network in war, but also “to take care of the 
rapid growth and dispersion in telecommunications in the present high level 
                                               
578 Replies for 1957 annual review, Annex XII (France), August 9 1957. AC/121-D/9. 
NA.  
579 Replies for 1957 annual review, Annex IV (Germany), August 9 1957. AC/121-D/9. 
NA. 
580 Report by the United States on National Civil Communications Planning, July 1 1957. 
AC/121-D/7. NA. 
581 Reynolds has argued that AT&T’s “effective monopoly” in the light of the general 
anti-trust atmosphere in the United States must be understood as “the result of the 
Pentagon’s need for a single organisation […] that was at the beck and call of the US 
government.” See: ”Reynolds, “Science, technology, and the Cold War”, p. 390.  
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economy.”582 As such, the preparedness measures were also an important 
supply to AT&T’s network – a supply that was needed in any case.  
In Denmark, the American plans served as inspiration for the FTF Chief 
Jessen. In a second article published in Ingeniøren, now in November 1957, 
Jessen referred the preparedness planning that had been carried out by AT&T 
and emphasised the “eagerness” with which the private company had 
embarked upon the task of securing national communications in the United 
States. In the eyes of Jessen, AT&T’s efforts should served as a prime example 
for other private actors in telecommunications.583 Moreover, he included a 
translation he had done himself of an article written by the Director of 
Operations in AT&T’s Long Lines Department, James E. Dingman. In the 
article, which had been published in an American journal a few months before, 
the following passage appears:  
“The nuclear family of weapons, with their awesome 
potential for destruction and devastation, has introduced 
scores of new problems to the overall job of maintaining 
communications. They have, in fact, brought a new 
dimension to the task of planning and constructing 
communication plants. The Bell System has an answer [..] 
We have launched – and have half completed – the 
construction of new facilities that will enable us to maintain 
communications across the length and breadth of the 
country in the face even of severe, large scale attacks with 
nuclear weapons.”584 
An interesting point in relation to Dingman’s statement is that only a few years 
after, AT&T’s telephone network in the United States was accentuated as a 
particular vulnerable spot in terms of a nuclear strike on the United States. This 
was one of the factors leading Paul Baran, a researcher at the US think tank 
RAND, to propose a new way or organising communications networks as 
distributed instead of centralised.585 
                                               
582 Report by the United States on National Civil Communications Planning, July 1 1957. 
AC/121-D/7. NA. 
583 Jessen, “Nogle betragtninger vedrørende fremføringsveje for permanente 
telekommunikationer”. 
584 Dingman, “Communications in the Nuclear Age”, p. 7f. Dingman’s article was 
brought in a June 1957 edition of the journal SIGNAL published by the Armed Forces 
Communications Association. The Bell System was the system of companies to which 
AT&T belonged. For Jessen’s Danish translation, see: Jessen, “Nogle betragtninger 
vedrørende fremføringsveje for permanente telekommunikationer”.  
585 Ryan, A History of the Internet, p. 13f. For Baran’s memorandum, first published in 
1962, see: On Distributed Communications Memorandum MR-34-20-PR (1964). 
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Clearly, for a private business like AT&T, there were interests at stake in 
relation to these preparedness investments, both as regards the state and the 
customers. In chapter six, I shall return to the discussion about the 
responsibility – and self-interest – of private actors to participate in national 
security planning. As for now, the point about bringing these different national 
approaches into the picture is to show how, when translated into a national 
context, different aspects of NATO’s common recommendations could be 
articulated nationally and used as a catalyst for change in the sectors. When 
returning the attention to Denmark, it appears that the particular focus in 
SCEPC and CCPC on the vulnerability of larger cities – in the Danish case 
Copenhagen and Aarhus – came to serve as a catalyst for further development. 
Prior to this, as outlined above, the problem had been raised on few occasions 
in the tele sector, but the sector’s awareness had generally revolved around 
more ‘comprehensible’ problems than that of the nuclear threat. In the fall of 
1956, the Coordination Committee had established two working groups to 
study problems related to physical security, one with the purpose of working 
out guidelines for new buildings, one to study the possibilities for ‘error 
recoveries’ in the case of destruction of parts of the telecommunications 
networks in wartime.586  
The request from NATO’s civil communication agency became a motive 
force for new initiatives. Upon the reply sent to CCPC in the summer of 1957, 
the P&T was asked by the Government Committee for Civil Emergency 
Planning in February 1958 to elaborate on the plans, after which the 
government committee discussed the issue again and, in October 1958, 
informed the P&T that the finance committee of the Parliament had approved 
the allocation of an amount of 7.9 million kroner to carry into effect the 
proposed security measures for bypassing Copenhagen and Aarhus, which 
involved the construction of a number of spare plants.587 In continuation 
                                               
586 Minutes of SU meetings, September 25 1956, November 29 1956, and May 23 1957. 
TM, TTS, Bilag til samarbejdsudvalgets møder. RA; Report from the committee on 
error recovery, May 1957. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Emneordnede Sager 1950-1985, 1. 
RA. The working group on physical guidelines planned to visit to Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and Belgium in order to learn about experiences from these countries.  
587 Note on the securing of telecommunications facilities, February 20 1958. 930A-6. EA; 
Letter from the Government Committee for Civil Emergency Planning, October 13 
1958. 930A-6. EA; Reply by RUCB to Information Request No. 97, no date 1959. UM, 
Lukket Arkiv, 107.L.9. RA. It appears from the report by Per Heikel Vinther that the 
government committee first discussed the security of telecommunication facilities at a 
meeting in January 1958 and then again in April and August 1958 – although Vinther’s 
different reports are not completely consistent. See: ”Den centrale, generelle 
planlægning.”, p. 17f. IM, SCB, Sager vedr. det civile beredskab, 5. RA; 
”Teleberedskabet og Databeredskabet”, p. 1f. IM, SCB, Sager vedr. det civile 
beredskab, 7. RA. A further examination of the government’s position on the plans for 
securing the telecommunications infrastructures would require studies of the records of 
the Government Committee for Civil Emergency Planning. These records are subject to 
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hereof, representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the defence, the Civil 
Defence, and the P&T were invited to a meeting at the end of October in the 
Ministry of Interior hosted by the ministry’s permanent secretary, Zeuthen, 
who was also heading the Secretariat for Civil Emergency Planning. Here, the 
P&T was asked to begin the implementation of the 7.9 million kroner plan – 
aside from the proposed ring cable around Aarhus, which was no longer found 
urgent after a project involving the construction of radio links as part of 
NATO’s infrastructure programme had also come into the picture.588 The fact 
that the planned security measures had been occasioned by NATO was 
stressed at a meeting in the Telephone Control Board in February 1959 at 
which the chairman referred to “facilities that at the instance of NATO  are 
presupposed established for the use of telephone traffic in case of 
Copenhagen’s or Aarhus’ destruction.”589 
 
The ‘60 million kroner plan’ 
However, the political awareness about the problems of telecommunications 
security at this point was not limited to the 7.9 million kroner plan. Proposals 
for similar construction works such as a ring cable around Copenhagen were 
discussed at the October 1958 meeting, where Zeuthen also referred to a “wish 
list” of future projects made by the Inter-Ministerial Signal Committee.590 In 
November 1958, the Coordination Committee was asked by the IMSK to 
decide upon an order of priority of the different elements included on the ‘wish 
list’. In total, the implementation of these measures were estimated to amount 
to a cost of 60 million kroner, the procurement of which was negotiated in the 
government and in IMSK. Both the tele administrations and Jessen agreed that 
all of the listed measures were necessary, and Jessen noted that in fact ”no 
prioritisation should be made”, but recognized, however, that “the conditions 
forced this through”.591 
Besides the spare plants to secure the telephone and the telex traffic upon 
the destruction of Copenhagen and Aarhus, the ‘wish list’ contained measures 
                                               
a 60 years non-disclosure rule and will therefore likely become available for researchers 
before long. 
588 Minutes from meeting October 30 1958. IM, SCB, Sager vedr. det civile beredskab, 
7, Dokumentation. RA. 
589 Minutes of TTS meeting, February 5 1959. TM, TTS, Tilsynets Mødereferater. RA. 
590 Minutes from meeting October 30 1958. IM, SCB, Sager vedr. det civile beredskab, 
7, Dokumentation. RA. Further examination of IMSK’s records could give insights into 
how IMSK had worked with the topic of physical security prior to the 1957 request from 
CCPC. It appears that IMSK already had discussed a number of concrete projects 
desirable to be undertaken at this point. Unfortunately, however, as mentioned in a 
footnote in chapter three, I have not been able to identify IMSK records besides those 
documents also placed in the records of other authorities. 
591 Minutes of SU meeting, November 27 1958. TM, TTS, Bilag til samarbejdsudvalgets 
møder. RA. 
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needed for blocking non-vital telephone traffic; mobile units to replace 
destroyed repeater stations and cable stretches; spare plants for the supply of 
current in order to secure the operation of telephone exchanges and networks; 
physical protection of repeater stations, telephone exchanges and radio 
installations; and magneto emergency switchboards to replace destroyed 
automatic telephone exchanges. In a 1959 reply to a request from NATO, the 
Government Committee for Civil Emergency Planning emphasised how these 
different security measures had been worked out “with a view to the total 
defence”. Moreover, the government committee informed NATO that it at that 
point “not [was] possible to estimate what further credits will be devoted during 
1959 and the following years”.592 
In the beginning of 1961, the government granted a loan to the telephone 
companies of 25 million kroner in order to carry the first stage of the needed 
measures through.593 The fact that the amount was provided as a loan and not 
a grant like the 7.9 million kroner plan mentioned above appears to be in line 
with the principles laid out in the law on civil emergency planning, but the 
available source material does not allow me to explore the political reasoning 
behind this decision in more detail.594 The plan was later referred to as “an 
order to the tele administrations”.595 Moreover, a later letter from the Ministry 
of Interior to the Ministry of Public Works described how the amount of the 
loan could be raised when necessary.596 In September 1961, the Coordination 
Committee of the Telephone Control Board made a schedule for how the 
different elements should be implemented. By request of the Secretariat for 
Civil Emergency Planning, the technical measures related to implementation 
of the priority system were brought forward.597 The plan continued to be 
referred to as the ‘60 million kroner plan’ and was implemented by the tele 
administrations through the 1960s. A special committee on preparedness 
issues established by the Telephone Control Board followed the 
implementation of the plan and drew up a “telecommunications preparedness 
plan” [Teleberedskabsplanen], which was upgraded and updated on an 
                                               
592 Reply by RUCB to Information Request No. 97, no date 1959. UM, Lukket Arkiv, 
107.L.9. RA. 
593 Transcript of letter to the telephone companies, May 4 1961, and Minutes of SU 
meeting, July 3 1961. TM, TTS, Bilag til samarbejdsudvalgets møder; Letter from IM to 
MOA, April 14 1967. TTS, Rådighedskredsløb. RA. 
594 Source material from the Government Committee on Civil Emergency Planning and 
its secretariat will probably be able to shed more light on this in the future.  
595 Status report from the special committee on preparedness issues, March 1 1967.  
TTS, SU, Dokumenter 1962-1982, 9. RA. 
596 Letter from IM to MOA, April 14 1967. TTS, Rådighedskredsløb. RA.  
597 Letter from SCB, July 6 1962. TM, TTS, SU Sager, 5, 9. RA. 
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continual basis.598 When the special committee reported on the status of the 
plan in 1967, it stressed that besides the preparedness measures included in 
the 60 million kroner plan, the political decision behind the plan also ascribed 
the tele administrations with the responsibility of “including considerations for 
preparedness issues in all planning”, i.e. also the future facilities that the tele 
administrations planned to construct.599 Therefore, besides overseeing the 
implementation of the 60 million kroner plan, the special committee also 
began studying protective measures in a broader perspective. This involved a 
“duty to follow the development abroad”, for which reason the committee 
began corresponding with P&Ts in other countries on security standards for 
telecommunications facilities.600 
When studying the issues discussed in the special committee on 
preparedness issues through the 1960s and 1970s, it appears that the focus 
shifted away from the nuclear threat scenarios that had been dominant in the 
1950s and early 1960s. This can, on the one hand, be understood in the light 
of the period of détente that emerged in the East-West relations in the 1960s 
and in the increased transfer of Cold War tensions to areas outside of Europe, 
beginning with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.601 On the other hand, it also 
appears to be a deliberate choice taken by the tele administrations. When 
future preparedness initiatives were discussed at a meeting in the Coordination 
Committee in September 1963, the members agreed that further physical 
measures should principally be of such a character that they had a value in 
peacetime too. This could for instance be the acquisition of more reserve 
power supplies, which could also be taken in use in case of power failures. In 
justifying this decision, the chairman of the Coordination Committee argued 
that although “the importance of the tele network is large in particular in the 
initial phases of a war”, it was necessary also to address the question of 
necessary preparedness measures “in the light of what had been done in other 
areas, and that was not much.” The chairman stressed that a functional 
telephone network would be of no importance “if everything else was 
destroyed”.602 This statement is an indication that the tele administrations at this 
point, in 1963 – after the closure of the Defence Telegraph Administration and 
the transfer of NALLA’s peacetime tasks to the P&T – had gained increased 
freedom in terms of defining the scope and content of preparedness measures 
within their area of operation. Measures for which they also had to pay 
                                               
598 See for instance: Minutes of SO meeting, September 12 1973. TM, TTS, 
Mødereferater. RA. The special committee on preparedness issues was first named 
‘Beskyttelsesgruppen’ and from 1963 ‘Beredskabsgruppen’. 
599 Status report from the special committee on preparedness issues, March 1 1967.  
TTS, SU, Dokumenter 1962-1982, 9. RA. 
600 Letter to the technical committee, May 13 1963. TM, TTS, SU Sager, 5, 9. RA. 
601 Villaume, “Den Kolde Krigs Historie”, p. 34f. 
602 Minutes of SO meeting, September 19 1963. TM, TTS, Mødereferater. RA. 
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themselves. In this way, the purpose of preparedness initiatives was increasingly 
broadened with the consequence that the “daily operational reliability” of the 
telecommunications infrastructure in Denmark improved in general.603 
 
5.4 Border-crossing links 
A fourth and last case that I shall delve into is the special concerns that revolved 
around border-crossing links. The problem of the international connections 
linking Denmark up with other NATO allies as well as neutral states and 
Warsaw pact member states found expression in different ways, but I shall 
concentrate on one specific case in the following, namely the telex network. 
Historically, as different studies of telecommunications history have 
shown, the transnational junctions have posed great troubles for nation states, 
not least in times of crisis. This has caused governments to introduce special 
security measures, usually in the shape of some kind of censorship.604 For 
NATO, the challenge of transnational junctions in wartime seems to have been 
twofold. On the one hand, it rested in the desire to uphold international 
communications across the entire territory of the alliance. As evident from 
chapter four, the effective functioning of the alliance in wartime, e.g. the nuclear 
command and control apparatus, relied on effective communications. For this 
purpose, the great majority of infrastructure construction that was embarked 
upon by the allies had to do with transnational links. Moreover, the effective 
coordination of international communications in wartime was the primary 
focus of ELLA. When studying the material from the signal exercises carried 
out through the entire Cold War period, it also appears that the interruption 
of transnational links was regarded as a crucial thing to practice by the exercise 
planners. This was for instance the case in the 1956 SIGEX TWO that I 
referred to in the beginning of this chapter. 
On the other hand, there was also the problem of external 
communications. A growing amount of telecommunications links connected 
NATO countries with neutral and enemy countries. In peacetime, these links 
were not problematic, but if a crisis broke out, a potential problem was 
constituted by the fact that the technological and political borders did not align. 
This issue was of particular relevance for the telex networks of reasons that I 
shall now elaborate on. Essentially, it was a national decision how to deal with 
the networks in wartime, and the introduction of special regulations rested on 
bilateral negotiations.  
 
                                               
603 This point was for instance underlined by a head of delegation in the Civil Defence 
Board in an article published in 1980: Andersen, “Teleberedskab”, p. 22. 
604 See for instance Jackson et al., “Understanding Infrastructure”, p. 4f.; Marklund 
“Trawling the Wires”. 
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The problem of transnational telex links in wartime 
The term ‘telex’ is abbreviated from ‘tele printer exchange‘, and refers to a 
network of connected tele printers providing instantaneous 
telecommunications in the form of direct text-written messages between a 
sender and a receiver. Tele printer services gained ground in the United States 
and North-Western Europe in the interwar period and soon became an 
important means of transnational communications, not least in the years after 
the Second World War, where the international connectivity improved 
markedly.605 In contrast to earlier forms of telegraphy, telex machines did not 
require specialist skills to operate. The telex service was a subscriber service 
and primarily used by businesses, news agencies, and governmental authorities. 
Being cheaper than long-distance telephony, the telex network fulfilled a 
requirement for communicating over long distances by quick transmissions. 
Furthermore, written communications were in many situations perceived as 
more authoritative – and highly desirable for cross-border communications in 
Europe due to the language differences.606 Telex services therefore constituted 
the most important means for transnational communications in Western 
Europe for most of the Cold War period.607 An important post-war 
development was the introduction of the international standard of ‘gentex’ – 
general telex. The gentex system was a permanently connected network made 
up of telegraph offices, switching centres, and telegraph channels, 
interconnecting the offices to switching centres and the switching centres to 
each other.608 
                                               
605 The first network of tele printer machines was a private news network installed in the 
UK around 1920. In the US, the teletypewriter exchange service (TWX) was introduced 
by AT&T in 1931. Germany installed the first public automatic tele printer network in 
1932 and began international telex operation with the Netherlands and Switzerland in 
1934 and a few years after with Belgium, Denmark, and the UK. After being interrupted 
during the war, international telex services were resumed, extended, and automated in 
the early post-war years. See: Lous, “Telegraf 1920-74”, p. 236f.; Blüdnikow, Post og 
Tele under samme tag, p. 51f.; Huurdeman, The Worldwide History of 
Telecommunications, pp. 142, 300, 510f. 
606 For instance, a 1963 brochure from the Danish P&T demonstrates how the telex 
services were promoted with a reference to the international connectivity they provided. 
Moreover, the brochure claimed that telex ”combines the speed of the telephone with 
the authority of the written word” and that misunderstandings were avoided, since both 
sender and receiver had a copy of the same text “spelled out in black and white”. 
Brochure on Telex, P&T, 1963. Unfiled. EA. 
607 By the late 1950s, Denmark’s international telex traffic to other European countries 
exceeded international telephony. See for instance, Johansen, Fra monopol til 
konkurrence, p. 63; Blüdnikow, Post og Tele under samme tag, p. 51f. 
608 The term “gentex” was adopted at a CCIT assembly in December 1956, and the 
assembly agreed upon the operational rules and principles for the service as well as 
standards for signals for fully automatic switching. ITU, “CCITT 50 Years 1956-2006”, 
p. 9.  
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In NATO, upon the establishment of the Civil Communicaitons 
Planning Committee, one of the challenges that caught the attention of this 
committee was the telex and gentex networks within NATO’s territory. Due to 
the vital role that the systems played for communications between national 
authorities and for transnational communications, the maintenance of the telex 
network in a crisis situation was desirable but also a challenge with regards to 
both security policy considerations and the technological design of the 
networks. The telex issue was raised for the first time in 1958, when CCPC 
asked the member states to give their view on whether it would be desirable to 
maintain telex communications in case of a crisis of war. The Danish reply was 
affirmative:  
“As a considerable part of the telex subscribers are public 
institutions, i.e. the military defence, the civil defence and 
the police, and larger industry and business companies, the 
Danish authorities consider it important for the effectiveness 
of the total defence that both the national and the 
international telex service be continued in wartime.”609 
Similar replies came from other countries, which caused the CCPC at different 
occasions in the following years to recommend that it was “necessary” or 
“essential” to maintain the telex and gentex services in wartime. In doing so, 
CCPC referred to the fast nature of these communication means and the 
“economic method” they provided for meeting wartime communication needs 
of e.g. national governmental authorities.610 It appears from minutes from a 
1964 CCPC meeting that it was in particular the smaller European countries in 
NATO that stressed the need for upholding telex communications in wartime. 
This was done with reference to the need for transnational communications 
between PTTs and NALLAs in which these countries besides their own 
language also had to correspond in English and French.611 
However, maintaining international telex and gentex traffic among the 
NATO allies in wartime also posed problems. One problem rested in the 
infrastructural layout of the telex system that had built up in Europe since the 
interwar period, as the system connected capitals and larger cities – i.e. 
potential target areas according to the framework adopted by the Senior Civil 
Emergency Planning Committee.612 In Denmark, the telex network, which was 
                                               
609 Danish reply to AC/121-N/15, December 18 1959. AC/121-D/67. NA. 
610 1960 yearly review of civil emergency planning, September 30 1960. AC/98-D/104; 
1965 Progress Report by CCPC, November 4 1965. AC/121-D/130; Report by SCPEC, 
October 1 1968. C-M(68)46. NA. 
611 Danish minutes of CCPC meeting April 1964, May 1 1964. UM, Lukket Arkiv, 
107.L.9. RA. 
612 Note by the secretary, July 24 1961. AC/121-D/71(Rev1). NA.  
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fully automatic, was operated by the P&T and build up around Copenhagen as 
the main nodal point, for which reason almost all domestic traffic and all 
transnational traffic transited centrals in Copenhagen. Accordingly, 
considerations for the vulnerability of telex communications were part of the 
general considerations for communications and potential target areas made in 
the late 1950s. In 1959, Denmark reported to the CCPC about plans for 
making extensions of the telex exchanges in smaller towns and preparing a 
redistribution to these exchanges of the subscribers normally connected to the 
telex exchanges in the areas pointed out as potential bombing targets, 
Copenhagen and Aarhus. Furthermore, in order to uphold international telex 
communications, one of these smaller telex exchanges was expected to be 
supplied with equipment for connection of international circuits on a manual 
basis.613  These security measures were part of the 7.9 and 60 million kroner 
plans presented in the previous section. 
By way of comparison, a report by the CCPC chairman from September 
1959 indicates that other allies, e.g. Italy and Norway, had similar plans for 
meeting international requirements by means of switching central locations.614 
By contrast, some allies found it unlikely that the system could be protected 
and maintained in wartime. The UK, for instance, reported to the CCPC in 
1967 that since all the country’s telex switching centres and most of the 
subscribers were located in the larger cities, British authorities did not plan on 
relying on the telex system for essential communications in wartime, and no 
arrangements for maintaining the system were contemplated in the UK.615 
A further concern in Denmark was the expected increase in traffic likely 
to occur in times of crisis. The Danish network was at this point fully automatic 
and consisted of users that could be divided into three groups: Telegraph 
stations (providing the public telegram traffic over the telex network); the 
police, defence, and civil defence; and finally private telex subscribers. A note 
made by the Inter-Ministerial Signal Committee in 1959 outlined how in 
particular the security authorities would use telex traffic to a greater extent 
“under special circumstances”. Moreover, the fact that the regular telephone 
traffic would perhaps be limited in such a situation would also cause a decrease 
in the regular public telegram traffic.616 An extension of the capacity for both 
domestic and international telex traffic was therefore considered.617 
                                               
613 Second Danish reply to AC/121-N/5, May 26 1959. AC/121-D/49. NA; Note by the 
P&T on reply to AC/121-N/5 and AC/121-R/2, April 21 1959. UM, Lukket Arkiv, 
107.L.9. RA. 
614 Report by CCPC, September 22 1959. AC/98-D/88. NA. 
615 Note by the Technical Adviser, July 26 1967. AC/121-N/155. NA. 
616 Note by IMSK, June 25 1959. ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Journalsager, 18, 94. RA. 
617 Memorandum by the P&T on a possible extension of the telex network, June 1959. 
ITTS, NALLA Denmark, Journalsager, 18, 94. RA. 
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 The extension of the international telex capacity was however dependent 
on a second problem, namely on what conditions telex communications could 
take place in wartime. As noted, the international telex networks linked NATO 
allies up with both neutral and enemy countries. By example, in 1959 the 
Danish telex traffic to other countries amounted to around 500 calls in the 
“main traffic hour”, of which 250 were automated calls to Germany, 150 were 
manual calls to other NATO countries, 20 were automated calls to non-NATO 
countries and 80 manual calls to non-NATO countries.618 A matter of concern 
for both alliance-internal and alliance-external telex communications in 
wartime was that of censorship. Previous research has shown how it prior to 
the Cold War had been a customary practice for states to introduce censorship 
on transnational communications in wartime.619  
In 1958, CCPC therefore asked the national delegations for their view 
on this matter. Denmark informed the CCPC that the country had not yet 
opened up for bilateral negotiations on the maintenance or suspension of the 
international telex service “under special conditions”, since rules for censorship 
and proper safeguards against abuses yet remained to be settled by the 
government.620 The Danish delegation added that whether or not international 
intra-NATO connections could be upheld in a crisis situation depended on a 
decision as to what extent – if any – the telex traffic in wartime should be under 
control.621 As for communications security, in other words, the government had 
not yet adapted to the new security political circumstances. The same appears 
to be the case for the other NATO allies.622 
In CCPC, the delegations therefore agreed to undertake a study of the 
issue. The problem was that traffic would be considerably delayed – and the 
network therefore of limited value – if the member states did not implement a 
censorship agreement. In 1964, an agreement was reached on a common 
guidance on censorship in wartime that all nations had to apply with.623 
According to this, the ambition was that NATO’s continental European 
territory (i.e. not including the US, the UK, Canada and Iceland) from the point 
of view of censorship should be regarded as a monolithic bloc within which 
communications would not be censored.624 However, the common policy on 
this area was only vaguely defined. As the 1965 progress report of the CCPC 
summarized, “traffic between gentex offices in member countries will not be 
                                               
618 Ibid. 
619 See for instance Marklund “Trawling the Wires”. 
620 Danish reply to AC/121-N/5, December 18 1958. AC/121-D/35. NA. 
621 Danish reply to AC/121-N/15, December 18 1959. AC/121-D/67. NA. 
622 Report by CCPC for 1963, September 11 1963. AC/98-D/173. NA.  
623 1964 Progress report by CCPC, October 12 1964. AC/98-D/192. NA.  
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subject to censorship unless a specific country so decides.”625 In other words, 
the ability to control communications remained in the hands of the nation state. 
Finally, there was also the problem of neutral and enemy countries. In 
case of emergency, communications with enemy countries would have to be 
suspended, the CCPC concluded in 1965. But then what about 
communications with or transiting through neutral countries? The general 
opinion of the CCPC was that in case of war, relations with neutral countries 
should be maintained and done so at least with the same traffic handling 
capacity as in peacetime. This was due to the fact that a bigger traffic load was 
expected in case of a crisis, a traffic load that could not easily be replaced by 
another system. In the particular case of the gentex service, CCPC found it 
necessary to retain the gentex links with neutral countries “for staff and 
operational reasons”. 626 
However, the links to neutral countries was also problematized in several 
ways. First of all, there existed international cable circuits between NATO 
member countries which passed through a non-NATO country. This involved 
the risk of inter-allied communications being monitored by non-aligned. CCPC 
concluded that such communications within the alliance should be banned and 
that these routes would have to be re-routed wholly within the NATO area. On 
the contrary, there were also examples of traffic between neutral countries that 
transited through NATO’s continental European area. This traffic, it was 
decided by CCPC in 1965, should be maintained and monitored. Second, the 
fact that most telex traffic to neutral countries was automated was also 
articulated as problematic. Automatic services did not hold in them the ‘control 
level’ of a human operator, and this lack of control-element raised security 
concerns. By 1968, Western European telex traffic was largely handled by fully-
automatic operation, and the general opinion of CCPC was that this mode of 
operation should as far as possible be retained in an emergency and in wartime. 
Yet, as it was argued, the problem was that telex traffic between allies and 
neutral states in a crisis situation would have to be monitored in its entirely in 
order to prevent unauthorised information from leaving the continental 
NATO area. Therefore, automated traffic would have to be discontinued. 
Another problem with neutral countries was the lack of control in further 
interconnections. For instance, it was problematized that Austria offered 
automatic transit to East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary.627 
Again, it is important to note that the settling of this issue was eventually 
up to national governments. From the available source material from CCPC 
and other NATO communication agencies, it does not appear to be the case 
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that the NATO allies reached an agreement on the censorship issue. This is 
however a topic that needs further exploration – also on a national level.  
In Denmark, a new and extended telex network was implemented in the 
early 1970s. In contrast to the previous network, the new one would have two 
equally large transit and international centrals placed in Copenhagen and 
Kolding, thereby building more flexibility and, thus, security into the network. 
A 1968 note by the P&T outlined how, with this design, “the greatest possible 
considerations [had been made] in order to be able to carry through telex traffic 
without important inconvenience under special circumstances”.628 Moreover, 
the new network design allowed for the grouping of the subscribers into 
different classes that could be separated from each other in the way that 
subscribers not belonging to the same class could not communicate. This 
opened up the possibility for establishing closed, classified networks, e.g. for 
defence purposes. As for the question of censorship, the 1968 note made by 
the P&T contains a number of handwritten notes that appear to have been 
added in 1969. According to these, the amount of transnational telex traffic 
between Denmark and other NATO-countries as well as non-allies had at this 
point, i.e. in the late 1960s, grown significantly, for which reason it was no 
longer practically possible to impose a general censorship on telex traffic. 
Instead, other measures for limiting the telex traffic would have to be taken in 
use in wartime if deemed necessary.629 
 
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have delved into different aspects of preparations for wartime 
in Danish telecommunications through the Cold War period. The purpose of 
doing so has been to examine how the prospect of nuclear war and the total 
preparedness agenda translated into concrete undertakings in the telecom 
sector. 
My examinations of the different cases reveal a general trend, namely that 
in the early 1950s, many problems related to wartime security were raised in 
the civil-military cooperation on telecommunications established in response 
to the increased military demands for communications facilities caused by the 
NATO membership. Next, from the mid-late 1950s, when the NATO allies 
began working more focussed on civil emergency planning, a number of 
initiatives and issues found their way from NATO’s agencies to the Danish 
context: The establishment of a National Long Lines Agency, the participation 
in exercises, the need for prioritising the use of communication networks in 
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wartime, the protection of communication nodes in potential target areas, and 
the problem of maintaining international telex networks. These initiatives were 
rarely articulated directly as requests from NATO, but ‘channelled’ through 
mediators such as the Defence Telegraph Administration, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and the government committee or the secretariat for civil 
emergency planning – after 1957 often with reference to agendas in the Civil 
Communications Planning Committee. However, as shown in this chapter, 
most of these problems related to wartime communications management were 
already discussed in the civil-military cooperation in Denmark. This mirrors a 
point brought forward in existing research on other areas of NATO 
cooperation, namely that demands and decisions made in NATO’s 
committees were, in reality, a systematisation and an institutionalisation of 
already existing practices in the member states.630  
Beginning in the 1960s, a gradual transfer of security responsibilities to 
the telecommunications sector is evident. This can be understood as a 
continuation of a phenomenon that I examined in chapter three, namely the 
political practice established through the 1950s, whether articulated or not, that 
the military needs for communications should primarily be met by establishing 
common facilities and, with the closure of the Defence Telegraph 
Administration, that the P&T was the best suited agency for managing many of 
the defence and security aspects of communications. This line was further 
pursued with the decision to transfer the responsibility of NALLA to the P&T, 
first, in 1962, as the peacetime host of the NALLA secretariat and from 1975 
as the responsible authority, thereby establishing continuity between peacetime 
and wartime responsibilities. This transfer fitted with the sector responsibility 
principle defined in the 1959 law on civil emergency planning, and it appears 
from my examinations that the Secretariat for Civil Emergency Planning acted 
as an important motive force in this regard. The chapter thereby adds 
important knowledge to existing research on the Danish total defence, in which 
the practical implementation of the sector responsibility principle in different 
areas of the total defence still constitutes a lacuna. As my examinations reveal, 
the scope and content of this principle came into being in an interplay between 
the involved actors. 
The development described above involved two aspects that need to be 
accentuated. One is the role on the technical expert, a role that has also been 
studied in previous historical research. In their examination of the 
technopolitics of the Cold War, Gabrielle Hecht and Paul Edwards note how 
the Cold War competition in scientific and technological areas helped to 
entrench and increase the participation of experts in governance.631 This 
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phenomenon is mainly connected with the first decades of the Cold War, after 
which technological expertise began to spread more widely outside of the realm 
of the state. My examinations of security governance in the area of 
telecommunications in Denmark have shown that the technical expert gained 
importance through the Cold War period. A turning point in 
telecommunications governance was the automation, which was carried 
through in different stages in Denmark up to the 1970s. The automation, along 
with the immense extension of communications in the same period, meant that 
securing the communications facilities became an increasingly complex task. 
When perceived through the lens of technopolitics, this meant that the scope 
of possible action in terms of security was increasingly defined by technological 
possibilities more than political priorities.  
The second and last aspect that I wish to highlight is the general 
broadening of the object of security governance. Research into the history of 
critical infrastructures has touched upon how the functioning of systems critical 
for society gained importance through the Cold War period and became 
increasingly ‘detached’ from defence and civil defence planning to become a 
security problem in its own right.632 This is a topic that still requires further 
exploration. My examinations of the case of telecommunications in Denmark 
have revealed that while the initiatives launched in the 1950s and early 1960s 
focused on securing the communications facilities against the nuclear threat, 
communications vulnerabilities were approached much more broadly in the 
later Cold War years. This can be understood both as a response to the period 
of détente that emerged in the East-West relations in the 1960s and as a 
consequence of the transfer of security responsibilities to civilian actors and the 
increased focus on continuity between peacetime and wartime planning. 
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[6] 
Public-private balances in communications security 
 
On 28 November 1974, the Danish Supreme Court 
delivered a judgment in a case between the telephone 
company KTAS and the Ministry of Public Works. The 
Supreme Court ruled invalid an order given by the ministry 
to KTAS in 1967 with reference to the 1959 law on civil 
emergency planning to establish so-called ‘disposal circuits’ 
on specified conditions – circuits that should be made 
available exclusively to military and civil emergency 
communications in times of crisis.633 
 
In this chapter, I turn my attention towards a particular challenge embedded in 
the security governance of telecommunications in Denmark: the public-private 
division of responsibility in preparedness planning. As the 1974 Supreme 
Court ruling indicates, the obligations stemming from the 1959 law on civil 
emergency planning became a topic for discussion within the sector. The 1959 
law gave – as described in chapter five – Danish ministries the authority to give 
orders to public institutions and private companies about taking measures to 
secure capital goods and establish a specified minimum of supplies and means 
of production.  The question was, however, what ‘securing capital goods’ and 
‘minimum of supplies’ meant in respect to telecommunications? 
Given the particular hybrid structure with both public and private 
management in the Danish telephone sector, the ‘private’ telephone companies 
KTAS and JTAS – in which the state owned the majority of the shares – played 
a key role in telecommunications preparedness planning and the Danish total 
defence. In chapter three and five, I have mainly treated these two companies 
as part of the ‘tele administrations’ along with the P&T and the FkT, given the 
circumstance that in the relations with the military, these four administrations 
often formed a unified group. Now, however, I shall examine how the 
participation of these ‘private’ actors in the preparedness planning was 
perceived by the companies themselves and from a political point of view. The 
chapter shows how the involvement of the telephone companies in 
preparedness planning was not straightforward, since national security agendas 
did not necessarily align with business interests.  
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The chapter is structured around the circuits case leading to the 1974 
Supreme Court ruling, in which the limits of the 1959 law on civil emergency 
planning were tested. By delving into this case, I examine what kind of 
manoeuvring room the Cold War preparedness agenda left behind for the 
‘private’ actors in the telecommunications sector. The participation of different 
societal sectors in Cold War preparedness is generally an underexplored topic 
in historical research, not least when it comes to the role played by private 
businesses. An important exception in this regard is a study of a Swedish 
company producing rayon by the Swedish historian Magnus Linnarsson, 
demonstrating how the Swedish state kept the company ‘alive’ due to its 
wartime importance despite its poor economic performances.634 Linnarson’s 
work points towards the general tendency that when planning for a total 
defence during the Cold War, states had to rely on the capacity of private 
businesses in order to plan for the maintenance of all societal sectors in case of 
war. In continuation hereof, I suggest in this chapter that we understand the 
relationship between the state and private actors in Cold War preparedness 
planning as mutual. On the one hand, the state apparatus depended on the 
expertise of sector-specific businesses. On the other hand, these businesses 
were also interested in goodwill from the state and the public in general.  
As an epilogue, I conclude the chapter by briefly looking into how the 
liberalisation of the Danish telecom sector initiated towards the end of the Cold 
War period challenged existing practices of preparedness planning in the area 
of telecommunications. 
 
6.1 The ‘circuit controversy’ 
The heart of the matter of the controversy around disposal circuits leading to 
the Supreme Court case was that the telephone companies had no interest in 
unused circuits reserved for emergency situations lessening the capacity in the 
network for paying customers. At the same time, however, as they relied on 
concession granted privileges, keeping good relations with the state and 
providing good service also in terms of security was vital for the telephone 
companies. In this section, I delve into the controversy on the disposal circuits 
with the aim of examining the dilemma that the telephone companies faced as 
they had to balance between their subscribers and the market, on the one hand, 
and the security of the state on the other. I do this by studying the course of 
events leading up to the 1974 Supreme Court case as follows: First, I examine 
the technopolitical backgrounds for the construction of this particular kind of 
circuits. Second, I examine the political negotiations on the issue and, third, 
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the position taken by the telephone companies. Finally, as a fourth step, I 
follow up on the Supreme Court case and the aftermath. 
 
Reserved versus disposal circuits 
As described in chapter three, the new circuits needed for defence purposes in 
the 1950s were established as so-called ‘reserved’ circuits. This referred to a 
system where new special permanent lines – ‘tails’ – were established from the 
military enterprises to the nearest local telephone exchanges and paid for by 
the defence authorities. In between the exchanges (i.e. the ‘interurban’ 
connections), the already established circuits were used – circuits which under 
normal circumstances were used for regular phone traffic. In case they were 
needed, whether for an exercise or in the case of emergency, the reserved 
circuits could be taken manually out of the normal operation by the personnel 
operating the exchange central and connected to the ‘tails’. In this way, a 
network was established – using parts of the common network – for military or 
emergency purposes only.635  
This arrangement came about since the defence authorities wished to 
cover their communication needs in the cheapest possible way and since the 
increased military requests for facilities brought along with the NATO 
membership were difficult to meet for the Danish telecom sector. Accordingly 
– and in line with NATO standards – a large number of reserved circuits were 
established for the defence and the Civil Defence during the 1950s. However, 
within the telephone administrations, the system of reserved circuits began to 
be questioned: Besides causing a lot of extra work for the personnel at the 
telephone exchanges, the question was raised of what would actually happen to 
the normal telephone traffic if all the reserved circuits were coupled (i.e. 
connected) in a critical situation. At a meeting in the Coordination Committee 
in June 1954 where the matter was discussed, the director of JTAS, Paul 
Draminsky, predicted that if the telephone companies had to hand over fifty 
per cent of the circuits after the declaration of alert, as the aforementioned 
figure rule adopted in NATO prescribed, they would face a situation that they 
could not control.636 
The plans for coupling in reserved circuits in wartime were also 
considered in NATO’s communication agencies. Following the adoption of 
the nuclear strategy and the increased focus on the vulnerability of the existing 
communications systems, as analysed in chapter four, SHAPE recognised that 
is was necessary to “review our need for certain of our circuits and put them in 
                                               
635 Note on guidelines for reserved circuits, January 12 1953. TTS, Rådighedskredsløb. 
RA. 
636 Minutes of SU meeting, May 24 1954. TM, TTS, Bilag til samarbejdsudvalgets 
møder. RA. 
 
 
190 
a more realistic priority as far as the PTTs were concerned.”637 In May 1955, 
upon a request from SHAPE, ELLA presented a new set of categories 
according to which the circuits required for the Allied Command Europe could 
be organised. The categories consisted of circuits to be implemented in 
peacetime; circuits to be implemented automatically after the declaration of an 
alert; circuits to be implemented at the request of the command concerned 
after the declaration of alert; and circuits required for forces build up and 
system reinforcement, i.e. circuits primarily furnished for infrastructure 
planning and not related to operations in an early phase of a war.638 In each 
category, the circuits were organised in a certain order of priority after which 
they would be put into operation when the circuits in the category were to be 
implemented. For instance, the circuits to be implemented automatically after 
the declaration of alert should either be provided immediately, or within the 
first 24, 48, 72, or 96 hours of the alert.639 In this way, ELLA drew up a priority 
plan for all the PTT circuits which would somehow play a part in a future war. 
In Denmark, the telecom sector began integrating these different 
categories into their work. The coupling in of the different reserved circuits in 
wartime was tested in the aforementioned signal exercises, of which the first 
was held in 1954. In the exercises, the tele administrations established the 
reserved circuits by the declaration of alert and reported to the defence 
authorities when the circuits were ready for use.640 In connection with the 
exercises, however, the representatives from the telephone administrations 
began questioning the arrangement with the reserved circuits. Moreover, 
through the 1950s, a new challenge emerged as more and more telephone 
exchanges were automated. From a technical point of view, automation made 
it harder to carry through a gradual limitation of the traffic in critical situations 
and necessitated the shutting down of access for larger groups of subscribers.641 
Additionally, automation meant that fewer personnel would be available at the 
exchanges to monitor how the network would react in the event of an alert.642 
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In order to deal with this, the Coordination Committee decided in April 
1959 to set up a working party to examine which strain on the common network 
a coupling to the reserved circuits would cause.643 The committee submitted a 
report in August 1960 with a very clear conclusion: Coupling of the reserved 
circuits would cause a traffic chaos and potential breakdown, not least on the 
automated exchange centrals. In order to prevent this, the report concluded, 
the majority of the reserved circuits had to be removed.644 When the report was 
discussed in the Coordination Committee, liaison officer Jessen declared that 
the issue was a concern for the telephone administrations and not for the 
defence. From a military perspective the arrangement with the reserved circuits 
was exactly what was needed. Jessen added that they had to keep in mind that 
“Denmark had made a commitment to provide reserved circuits free of charge 
for NATO.”645 By contrast, the telephone companies were of the opinion that 
the national handling should not be adapted to the NATO procedures if it was 
unsuitable.646 Instead, in October 1961, they proposed an alternative model 
with so-called ‘disposal circuits’ [rådighedskredsløb] where all of the circuits 
needed for military and civil defence and preparedness use were established 
permanently in peacetime – the ‘tails’ as well as the interurban connections. In 
that way, the security authorities had isolated networks reserved for them, and 
it would be certain that the capacity was enough to cover civil as well as military 
needs. A prioritisation of military versus civil traffic needs would then only be 
necessary in case of damages on the network.647  
The telephone companies internally agreed to abolish the reserved 
circuits and replace them by disposal circuits, as the construction situation 
gradually enabled it. This meant that the users of the circuits – military 
authorities, civil emergency agencies etc. – now had to pay regular tariffs for the 
establishment and subscription of the circuits.648 In this way, the telephone 
companies used the technical expertise that they possessed to pursue a specific 
technopolitical agenda. In the spring of 1962, the tele administrations began to 
refuse constructing these circuits and instead suggested them established as 
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disposal circuits.649 As this led to criticism from defence and civil defence 
authorities, the Coordination Committee asked its subcommittee dealing with 
tariff questions to examine the matter. The tariff committee compared the costs 
of the proposed disposal circuits with other rented circuits and concluded that 
using the same calculations would cause a dramatic increase of the defence 
expenses: 2.2 million kroner yearly in addition to the 4.3 million that defence 
authorities already spent on permanent and reserved circuits. The committee 
also noted that since the wish for making the reserved circuits permanent had 
come from the telephone administrations themselves, it would probably be 
necessary to give the defence authorities a discount on the disposal circuits.650 
In response to the report from the Committee on Tariffs, which was 
finished in August 1962, the Coordination Committee noted that the question 
would have to be taken up with the Minister of Public Works.651 In this regard, 
the telephone company FkT stressed that when the findings were to be 
presented to the Minister of Public Works, one should add that “it would be 
found unfair if such a large discount was given […] that the telephone 
administrations did not have all their expenses covered whereby the subscribers 
would come to pay donations to emergency measures.” The P&T was of 
another opinion and replied that profit on telephone circuits should be made 
on income from telephone conversations, not on arrangements like disposal 
circuits that did not carry telephone traffic under normal circumstances. The 
telephone companies and the P&T however reached the agreement that for 
circuits and establishments that did not run traffic, the telephone 
administrations should at least have their expenses covered – for which reason 
the tariff for disposal circuits should be based on the normal tariffs with a 
discount of no more than twenty per cent.652  
 
The governmental perspective 
After 1962, the Danish government became involved in the controversy on 
preparedness circuits. The suggested arrangement of disposal circuits involved 
a number of divisive issues to be settled, issues that split the telephone 
administrations internally and caused disagreement within the government. I 
shall now examine the two central aspects of the dispute, namely the financing 
of the disposal circuits and the legal basis for ordering the telephone companies 
to establish the circuits on specified terms. Hereby, it is possible to gain insight 
into how the government and its administration (i.e., in this case, the ministries 
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of defence, interior and public works) positioned themselves in the discussion 
about national security and business interests in relation to preparedness 
planning. 
Preparedness circuits: The financial perspective 
The proposal from the Committee on Tariffs triggered a long-term 
correspondence between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Public 
Works. Referring to the fact that the Ministry of Interior, including the Civil 
Defence and the Secretariat for Civil Emergency Planning agreed with them, 
the Ministry of Defence rejected the proposed tariffs as being way too high in 
proportion to the actual expenses. The telephone administrations later 
suggested a discount of fifty per cent, but the Ministry of Defence referred to 
the fact that NATO rented international circuits at a fixed payment of no more 
than five per cent of the normal tariffs. Accordingly, the Ministry of Defence 
and its allies expressed their willingness to pay five per cent of the normal rates 
as a kind of administrative charge.653 
In September 1965, the issue was taken up at a meeting held in the 
Ministry of Public Works. At this point, the ministry had since 1955 been 
served by the social democrat minister Kai Lindberg. At the meeting, the 
ministry’s permanent secretary, Palle Christensen, declared that the ministry 
supported the tariff proposal made by the telephone companies.654 However, 
representatives from the other ministries disagreed, and no settlement was 
reached. The issue was later considered in the government’s finance 
committee, where Kai Lindberg as Minister of Public Works was bound to 
accept the five per cent tariff.655 At the same time, however, the Minister of 
Interior, social democrat Hans Hækkerup, accepted as a general principle that 
the companies should have their expenses for the circuits covered. The 
Ministry of Public Works was therefore asked to request a financial account 
from the telephone companies documenting their actual expenses for 
establishing the disposal circuits.656  
Following a long correspondence between the ministries about how to 
add up the expenses, a settlement was still not reached by the fall of 1966, when 
Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag reshuffled his social democratic government.657 
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Svend Horn was appointed new Minister of Public Works and shortly after 
received a letter from Hans Hækkerup, who had continued as Minister of 
Interior. Hækkerup wanted the two ministries to come to a settlement in the 
tariff question, emphasizing the fact that the issue had been raised only because 
of the automation of the telecommunications technology and not due to wishes 
from military and emergency authorities. Hækkerup outlined how these 
authorities had nevertheless acknowledged that the arrangement with disposal 
circuits would have certain advantages from a security point of view, for which 
reason they had offered to pay five per cent of the normal tariffs for the circuits. 
Hækkerup emphasised how he found this to be an appropriate solution.658 
Despite opposition within the Ministry of Public Works and a persistent effort 
from the telephone companies to document that the five per cent tariff would 
not cover their expenses, the Ministry of Interior stood firm on the five per 
cent tariff and succeeded in convincing the Ministry of Public Works to force 
this tariff through.659 As a result, the Ministry of Public Works informed the 
telephone companies in June 1967 that they were obliged to establish the 
circuits in question at the five per cent tariff.660 
Since the two parts – the telephone companies represented by the 
Ministry of Public Works and the preparedness authorities represented by the 
Ministry of Interior – were not able to reach a settlement on how to assess the 
actual expenses related to preparedness circuits, the issue of the tariffs was 
ultimately a balancing between two different stands: One criticizing the fact that 
preparedness planning would eventually happen at the telephone subscribers’ 
expense, and another arguing that this was not an area in which the telephone 
companies should be able to make profit. Both stands shared the argument 
that preparedness planning was a common concern for the whole society. In 
the end, the Ministry of Public Works was overruled by the Ministry of 
Interior. In order to understand how this happened and on which basis the five 
per cent principle was forced through, it is necessary to have a closer look at 
the legal framework in the area of preparedness.  
Preparedness circuits: The legal perspective 
When the secretariat of the Coordination Committee sent the report on tariffs 
to the telephone administrations in August 1962, they attached a note pointing 
out that the telephone administrations were “required to contribute to covering 
the national preparedness agencies’ need of telecom circuits”.661 The obligation 
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was highlighted with a reference to the concessions assigned to the telephone 
companies. The concession given in 1948 stated that the telephone companies 
were obliged to “contribute to the state’s telecommunication services of every 
kind and provide the, for that purpose, necessary facilities” on “conditions 
specified by the minister”.662 This was stated again in the concessions given in 
1961 along with the addition that the Minister of Public Works  
”with a view to extraordinary conditions [can] give the 
concessionary orders on securing and maintaining the 
essential telecommunications traffic, if necessary by limiting 
the common public access to conversations through the 
network.”663  
Along with the concessions, the aforementioned law on civil emergency 
planning passed in December 1959 gave the different ministries the authority 
to take the necessary measures concerning civil emergency planning within 
their area of responsibility. At a meeting held in the Ministry of Public Works 
in September 1965, Toft-Nielsen from the Secretariat for Civil Emergency 
Planning participated. According to Toft-Nielsen, a paragraph in the law on 
civil emergency planning could be taken in use to solve the issue.664 It appears 
from a later correspondence between the stakeholders that the preparedness 
authorities were of the opinion that the situation with the preparedness circuits 
was equal to the scenario described in paragraph five of the law on civil 
emergency planning. This paragraph stated that a minister could order public 
and private institutions and companies to take necessary measures in order to 
secure capital goods and stocks and establish a specified minimum of supplies 
and means of production. The paragraph also stated that if the companies in 
question could include the expenses of these measures in their commodity 
prices, they could not get compensation from the state, as they were not placed 
at a disadvantage from a competitive standpoint.665 
Initially, the Ministry of Public Works did not approve of making use of 
the law.666 A few years before, in 1962, the secretariat of the Coordination 
Committee of the Telephone Control Board under the Ministry of Public 
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Works had found that the 1959 law did not give the state authority to stipulate 
particular price terms when ordering preparedness measurements to be 
taken.667 The telephone companies maintained that it was doubtful that the 
paragraph could be used in their case, referring to the fact that they were 
concessionary companies. They argued that their concessions contained an 
exhaustive specification of all the rules they were subject to. As mentioned in 
chapter three, the concessions had been renewed in 1961. At this point, the 
law on civil emergency was already passed, and the only addition regarding 
preparedness in the new concessions stated that the companies were obliged to 
maintain essential traffic in exceptional circumstances, if necessary by limiting 
the common public access. Consequently, the companies did not find that the 
concessions entitled the state to regulate the prices for the services provided by 
the telephone companies, even in the case of emergency situations.668 
Nonetheless, the Ministry of Interior remained firm on the idea of using 
the law. In a letter written in December 1966, the Minister of Interior, Hans 
Hækkerup, informed the new Minister of Public Works, Svend Horn, that 
there was now “in principle” agreement on paragraph five of the law being 
applicable to the circuit issue, since the disposal circuits were to be understood 
as a “capacity expansion.”669 In January 1967, Horn replied that his ministry 
accepted that the paragraph was usable, but only in the sense of ordering the 
companies to provide an overcapacity in their networks – not in the sense of 
ordering circuits for preparedness purposes only. This was not to be 
understood as a capacity expansion, but instead as confiscation, Horn argued.670  
The issue was then discussed in the Government Committee on Civil 
Emergency Planning, in which it was decided to present the case to the Legal 
Advisor to the Danish Government. The Legal Advisor supported the view of 
the Government Committee on Civil Emergency Planning underlining the fact 
that even though the formulation of paragraph five did not include 
telecommunication facilities, the task of securing the communications 
apparatus was explicitly mentioned in the objects clause of the law.671 On this 
basis, the government went through with the order, which was – as mentioned 
above - announced to the telephone administrations in a memorandum from 
the Ministry of Public Works dated June 19 1967.672 Clearly, the position of 
the Ministry of Public Works was overruled by the Ministry of Interior and the 
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Government Committee on Civil Emergency Planning. This was later 
commemorated in a note by the Ministry of Public Works outlining how the 
government committee had “ordered” the minister to draw up the order to the 
telephone companies – despite the fact that the minister had “maintained that 
such an order would be illegal”.673 This is supported by later descriptions in 
Danish newspapers of a “reluctant” minister.674 
It remains unclear which strategic considerations took place within the 
Government Committee on Civil Emergency Planning, but the fact that the 
government committee entered the stage, side-lining the Ministry of Public 
Works, indicates that the circuits were perceived as an important security 
matter. As my examinations in chapter five of the transfer of the responsibility 
of NALLA to the P&T revealed, it appears to have been a strategy for the 
government committee and secretariat responsible for civil emergency 
planning to ensure that the aim of the 1959 law was realised to the greatest 
possible extent. However, since the telecommunications sector was within the 
responsibility area of the Ministry of Public Works, the order had to be issued 
by this ministry. Whereas the Ministry of Public Works had previously formed 
a united front against the defence authorities along with the telephone 
companies and acted on behalf of them in political negotiations, the ministry 
was now forced to reverse its stance towards the telephone companies. 
However, the formulation of the order appears a bit premature – at least, in a 
legal sense, the order was not very clearly formulated and, as it turned out, did 
not stand up in court. One can speculate whether this – to a certain extent at 
least – was deliberate, since the department of the ministry did not support the 
reason for the order.  
Interestingly, the question of uniting or nationalising the telephone sector 
never came up in the discussions about the preparedness circuits, although the 
shifting social democratic governments through to 1968 supported uniting the 
private telephone companies and P&T’s telephone services in one company 
owned by the state.675 Given the picture painted in previous research that 
Western governments, due to security agendas, in general tightened their 
control over the communications sectors in these years, one would assume that 
the task of preparedness could have been used as an argument in favour of a 
nationalised, unified telephone sector.676 By all accounts, the legal and financial 
aspects of preparedness planning would be more straightforward with a public 
corporation in charge of all national telecommunications. However, the pattern 
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seems to be that the discussion about the layout of the telephone sector and 
the discussions about preparedness took place in very different spheres, the 
latter in well-informed circles and behind closed doors.  
Summing up, the disposal circuits were a divisive issue within the Danish 
governments in office through the 1960s. It appears clear that the Government 
Committee on Civil Emergency Planning and its head of secretariat Toft-
Nielsen were in a strong position when it came to preparedness policy and 
exercise hereof and played a key role in both the disposal issue and the 
reorganisation of NALLA that went on in the same period. Accordingly, 
allowing for commercial interests of private businesses like the telephone 
companies – even though the state owned a majority of the companies’ shares 
– was not an option. Toft-Nielsen’s standpoint on the importance of civil 
emergency planning is evident from a seventeen page long memorandum that 
he sent to the department of the Ministry of Interior in October 1967: 
“It is not only a question of facing the consequences of the 
fact that the civilian population to a much greater extent than 
previously can be exposed to the consequences of the war 
through reduced possibilities of supplies, transport etc. and 
that the population can be directly exposed to war incidents. 
We are dealing with the necessity of the civilian society to a 
much larger extent to be prepared to provide support to the 
military defence. In the smaller countries in particular, the 
defence can no longer be self-sufficient to the same extent as 
previously. The defence must base its planning on extensive 
help from the civil society.”677 
 
Although the Danish preparedness policies towards the private sector is rather 
unexplored, there is no indication that any other area turned out to be so 
difficult to manage as the area of telecommunications.678 This raises the 
question of whether it was the vital and complex nature of the 
telecommunications infrastructure or the hybrid structure of the sector between 
public monopoly and private service that complicated the cooperation on 
preparedness planning. In order to examine this, I shall now change the 
perspective to that of the telephone companies.  
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The position of the telephone companies 
What remains to be clarified is how the telephone companies situated 
themselves in the discussion between state security and business interests. An 
insight into this can be gained through an examination of the response of the 
telephone companies after receiving the 1967 ministerial order focusing on the 
considerations and actions leading to the point where KTAS took legal actions 
against the Ministry of Public Works. As evident from above, the government 
did not bring the issue of the concessions and the plans for uniting the 
telephone sector into the discussions on preparedness circuits. However, the 
fact that the telephone companies relied on concession granted privileges raises 
the question of whether they were concerned about keeping good relations with 
the state.  
When the telephone companies were handed over the order in the 
summer of 1967, it was received with reservations. The first step of the 
companies was to ask a legal expert, Professor and Doctor of Law Poul 
Andersen, to examine the case, in particular the question of whether the law 
on civil emergency planning actually gave the ministry the authority to make 
such an order.679 Without reservations, Professor Andersen concluded that the 
law did not give authority to lay down a specified payment for the use of the 
companies’ circuits.680 In response to Professor Andersen’s statement, KTAS 
requested to the Ministry of Public Works that the matter should be brought 
up for discussion once again. The smaller company FkT agreed to the position 
taken by KTAS, whereas JTAS, by contrast, decided to follow the order given 
by the ministry and began managing the circuits as prescribed.681 
However, resuming talks with the ministry was a tricky task. The ministry 
did not respond to the request from KTAS before January 1971. In the 
meantime, KTAS’s Director Rosbæk informed his fellow colleagues in the 
other companies that the matter had been discussed in KTAS’ board, which 
had shown a willingness to carry on with the case.682 KTAS therefore initiated 
a public campaign. For instance, in the television news in the beginning of 
January 1971, KTAS director Rosbæk gave the government an ultimatum by 
demanding that the state before the next Tuesday agreed to pay for the disposal 
circuits. If not, the company would take legal action against the ministry.683 
When the ministry responded that it stood firm on its former decision, director 
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Rosbæk consequently announced to the Coordination Committee that his 
company wanted to bring the matter before the court of law.684 
Clearly, the relations between the stakeholders were tense at this point. 
On the face of it, it appears to be a huge gamble to take legal actions against the 
ministry in charge of your means of existence as a company. A lawsuit was a 
dramatic step to take, given the fact that the telephone companies had hitherto 
been able to avoid a state take-over by largely meeting the expectations from 
the state.685 However, as described in chapter three, despite intentions, shifting 
Danish governments had not taken steps towards a stake take-over of the 
companies. By contrast, the course of events in the telephone commission of 
the 1960s had put the matter on hold for a while, and this was probably further 
enhanced by the many replacements in the ministerial office of the Ministry of 
Public Works following the long period from 1955 to 1966, where Kai 
Lindberg had served as minister.686 
Furthermore, there are indications that KTAS was well-informed about 
the lack of support for the order within the Ministry of Public Works. Already 
in the spring of 1967, before the order was formulated, the ministry’s 
department addressed the Legal Advisor to the Danish Government explaining 
that is was possible that legal actions could be taken against the state contesting 
the validity of an order to establish the concerned disposal circuits without 
getting full compensation for the expenses.687 Moreover, the fact that it took the 
ministry three years to answer KTAS on whether it stood firm on the order or 
not, indicates that doubt or disagreement existed within the ministry – a 
circumstance that KTAS was most likely well aware of. It is also important to 
note that the chairman of KTAS’ board was the social democrat politician Kaj 
Bundvad, who had been Minister for Social Affairs until 1968 – that is, he had 
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been part of the government, who had decided to issue the order to the 
telephone companies.688  
 
The Supreme Court ruling and the aftermath 
The case was tested in the High Court of Eastern Denmark in December 1973 
where KTAS did not have its claim against the Ministry of Public Works 
sustained. The ruling was appealed by KTAS and considered in the Supreme 
Court in November 1974. The three Supreme Court judges supporting the 
ministry emphasized that the disposal circuits were to be understood as a 
“preparedness-related reserve” and that the decision to change from prepared 
to disposal circuits had been made on a technical basis with regard to the risk 
of a breakdown of the civilian telephone traffic. Such circuits, the three judges 
argued, were to be understood as part of KTAS’s “ordinary business activities.” 
On the other hand, the four Supreme Court judges supporting KTAS did not 
find that the principle of a “minimum of supplies” in the law on civil emergency 
planning gave the ministry the warrant to order KTAS to make certain circuits 
available exclusively for emergency purposes.689  
In the wake of the Supreme Court case, the involved parties to a large 
extent held on to their initial positions. The discussion on how to solve the 
issue of the preparedness circuits continued – with the use of the same 
arguments – until 1977, when an agreement was finally made. At first, the 
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense asked the Ministry of Public 
Works to issue an order to the telephone companies – this time with a 
formulation that was within the framework of the law on civil emergency 
planning.690 As this did not happen, the Ministry of Interior made a new 
suggestion for an order.691 In reply, the Minister of Public Works, Niels 
Matthiasen, stressed that the “Supreme Court has determined that the [defence 
and civil defence] needs to be covered should not be paid by the telephone 
subscribers, and it is my view that one should come to terms with this”.692 
Moreover, his successor from February 1977 Kjeld Olesen, also a social 
democrat, noted in July 1977 that he “did not see a reasonable reason for or 
possibility of working out a new order to the telephone companies”.693 However 
Olesen also accentuated that if an order was to be issued, it should be issued 
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by him.694 In October 1977, Olesen invited the other involved ministers to a 
meeting with the purpose of settling the case once and for all. At this meeting, 
the three ministries managed to come to an agreement about how to lay down 
the tariffs for the disposal circuits. The ministers agreed that instead of 
managing permanent long-distance circuits and the disposal ‘tails’ separately, a 
unitary tariff should be charged for all circuits ordered by defence and civil 
defence authorities. This tariff was first set to 50 per cent of the regular circuit 
tariff, rising to 60 per cent by the spring of 1978.695 With this agreement, an 
arrangement had fallen into place as for how to deal with all kinds of circuits 
needed for defence and civil defence purposes for the rest of the Cold War 
period.  
To sum up, the circuit controversy serves as a case in point of how civil 
emergency planning in the area of communications became a site of struggle. 
Despite the fact that the dispute perhaps mainly appears to be a consequence 
of poor cooperative relations – and probably even a power struggle – between 
the involved ministries, including the Secretariat of Civil Emergency Planning, 
the case does shed light on an aspect of security governance which is of wider 
importance. This regards the issue of the participation of private or semi-
private actors in preparedness tasks. The ’total defence’ of the Cold War was 
an enterprise involving all parts of the society, including the private sector. 
Within the area of telecommunications, the state as well as the telephone 
companies agreed on the importance of making preparations so that the 
communication facilities would also be functional in case of crisis, not least for 
the most vital and critical functions of the society such as the military, the Civil 
Defence, the police, and other public authorities. The previous chapters of this 
dissertation have shown how the companies participated in many different 
aspects hereof and how many of the potential security problems were identified 
by the sector itself. Thus, the general impression is that the companies were an 
active and at times even agenda-setting partner in preparedness planning 
activities. 
In this way, my examinations reveal how the governance of preparedness 
matters in the area of telecommunications took place in a mutual relationship 
between the state and the sector and rested on two pillars. On the one hand, 
the state had legal instruments with which it could instruct the telephone 
companies to take part in the activities: The concessions under which the 
companies operated and the 1959 law on civil emergency planning. However, 
as demonstrated in this chapter, both means left behind room for 
interpretation. On the other hand, the cooperation on communications 
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preparedness also rested on a mutual ‘goodwill’ or, put differently, a 
community of interests that both the state and the companies could apply and 
make use of. The telephone companies were interested in participating in the 
preparedness activities for more reasons: First, their status as regional 
monopolies relied on privileges granted by the state. Second, many of the 
measures to be taken – including the disposal circuits – also rated as 
improvements of the communications infrastructure in general. Third, the 
state-owned shares and the close links that the companies had with local 
societies also appear to have generated a general societal concern. However, 
the question of what was of the greatest benefit to the society was open for 
interpretation and put to the test in the case of the circuit controversy. From 
this perspective, the legal proceedings taken by KTAS against the Ministry of 
Public Works can be understood as a litmus test for the reach of the sector 
responsibility principle in preparedness planning. 
 
6.2 Epilogue: Liberalisation and security governance of 
communications 
In the late 1970s, the dispute around the preparedness circuits had finally been 
settled. A few years hereafter, the area of telecommunications began to see 
changes, both at home and abroad. In Denmark – as part of a broader, 
international tendency – a number of steps were taken in the 1980s in order to 
reorganise the telecom sector. This was part of a broader, international 
tendency. In the years that followed, the area of telecommunications was met 
with new international and national agendas of privatisation and liberalisation, 
leading to major organisational changes in most Western European telecom 
sectors. In this section, I briefly discuss how these changes in the late Cold War 
years challenged existing practices of security governance of 
telecommunications. 
Despite political ambitions to restructure the organisation of the Danish 
telephone sector, no changes had occurred through the 1970s. Instead, upon 
the 1971 dissolution of the telephone commission that had worked through the 
1960s, as outlined in chapter three, the concessions granted to the telephone 
companies were extended for another five-year period four times from 1971 
onwards. No major changes were made until the mid-1980s – with the 
exception of the 1982 reorganisation of the Telephone Control Board into the 
National Board on Telecommunications [Statens Teleråd], which however 
failed to gain an important role in unifying the sector.696 In September 1982, 
the social democratic government stepped back and was replaced by a 
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conservative-liberal government led by Poul Schlüter, who was in power until 
1993.697 In line with new political agendas abroad, Schlüter’s government called 
for a larger exercise of ‘modernisation and debureaucratisation’ of the public 
sector in Denmark and spoke heavily in favour of privatising parts of the public 
sector.698  
In the mid-1980s, two major changes of the Danish telecommunications 
sector were carried through. On the one hand, all telecommunications services 
were transferred to the companies, except for the international services and a 
few nationwide tasks, which were placed in new a state-owned company, the 
National Telecom Service [Statens Teletjeneste]. On the other hand, all 
regulatory tasks were moved from the national board and the ministry and 
placed in an agency within the P&T.699 This arrangement was however short-
lived, since international trends of liberalisation – and more specifically 
developments within the European Economic Community (EEC) – also set in 
motion further developments in Denmark. In 1990, the Parliament decided to 
gather all the regional companies in one large holding company, Tele Danmark 
A/S, and in the following years, the Danish state sold its shares in the 
company.700 
It lies beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine the processes of 
liberalisation and privatisation that swept over telecommunications markets 
both inside and outside Western Europe during the 1980s.701 However, it is 
necessary to mention an important landmark in this process within the EEC, 
namely the green paper on European telecom sectors presented by the 
European Commission in 1987, which called for the liberalisation of 
telecommunications terminals and a number of services.702 This process 
                                               
697 Schlüter’s conservative party formed government with the liberal party and two 
smaller parties from 1982 to 1988, with the liberal and social-liberal parties to 1990, and 
with the liberal party to 1993. Statsministeriet, “Regeringer siden 1848”. 
698 However, as demonstrated in a recent book on the Schlüter governments, the strong 
rhetorical stand on privatisation did not materialise in major concrete political changes. 
See Olesen, De Danske Ministerier 1972-1993, Del 2, p. 438f.  
699 Blüdnikow, Enhedsvæsenet, p. 135; Johansen, Fra monopol til konkurrence, p. 277. 
This reorganisation came into being after a proposal from a committee established in 
1984, referred to as the Bernstein committee, named after its chairman, Nils Bernstein, 
the head of the administration department in the Ministry of Finance.  
700 Henten, “Dansk telefonhistorie”, p. 17, 23f.; Blüdnikow, Enhedsvæsenet, p. 163f. 
701 In the United States, where communications were already in private hands, a 
deregulation period began from 1974 onwards, leading to the 1984 break-up of AT&T. 
In Europe, Britain was one of the earliest countries to undertake privatisation, leading to 
the 1984 final privatisation of British Telecommunications (BT). For more, see Eliassen 
and Sjøvaag eds., European Telecommunications Liberalisation; Lewis, 
“Telecommunication: Critical Infrastructure Protection”. 
702 Thue, Nye forbindelser, p. 93. The “Green Paper on the Development of the 
Common Market for Telecom Equipment and Services” was occasioned by the 1986 
adoption of the Single European Act leading to the establishment of a single market 
within the European Community by 1993. 
 
 
205 
eventually led to a system in which the European Commission played a central 
role in the regulation tasks related to telecommunications that had previously 
been carried out by national instances.703 Previous research has outlined how 
the process of liberalisation of European telecom markets was driven by 
neoliberal economic agendas, by the promotion of the single market project, 
and by the technological developments towards digitalisation, which had 
introduced new players into the telecom markets.704 By contrast, security and 
preparedness do not appear to have received much attention in this transition 
process, neither in the Danish nor European case. A noteworthy result hereof 
appears to be that the governance of telecommunications moved further away 
from the sphere of national security governance. This process is however still 
unexplored in research and calls for further examination in the future.  
Clearly, this development fundamentally changed the conditions for the 
security governance of the area of telecommunications that had been 
established through the Cold War period. In the Danish case, the development 
towards privatisation affected both of the pillars described above, the legal 
framework as well as the community of interests. In 1988, at the suggestion of 
KTAS, the authorities involved in preparedness planning in the area of 
communications established an ad hoc working group in order to review how 
the organisational changes influenced the existing framework, including the 
future expectations to the security services provided by the telephone 
companies. The working group provided a number of recommendations to the 
preparedness authorities regarding renegotiations of the existing regulations 
and agreements between the state and the communications sector. Moreover, 
it pointed towards a number of disadvantages of the development towards 
privatisation in terms of preparedness planning, mainly that the 
communications services requested by preparedness authorities were expected 
to rise in price and that the spread of the delivering services on more hands 
was undesirable in terms of security.705 By requests of i.a. the Civil Defence 
Board, the law on civil emergency planning was renegotiated and a new law 
with a broadened reach in terms of private businesses became effective as of 
1993.706 By this time, however, the post-Cold War era had begun.  
Since the 1990s, more private and multinational corporations have 
entered into the scene, in Danish communications as well as elsewhere.707 
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Today, as a result, the involvement of private actors in ‘public-private 
partnerships’ is a cornerstone in national and international security governance 
of the information and communications technology (ICT) sector – and one 
that from time to time causes fundamental cleavages between different 
interests.708 
When perceived through the lens of security, the developments towards 
privatisation and liberalisation that took place within the telecom sectors in 
most Western European countries in the late Cold War years may appear as a 
paradox. As I have shown in this dissertation, the preceding four decades had 
seen the devoting of many efforts into securing the telecommunications 
infrastructures, as these were perceived as vital for state security. Research into 
telecommunications history has stressed how the traditional strong state control 
of telecom sectors has been motivated by the character of telecommunications 
as an infrastructure critical for the society.709 One can ask, then, if this was no 
longer the case in the 1980s. The economic historian Robert Millward has 
suggested that telecommunications were no longer regarded as key sources of 
security concern at this point, in the late Cold War period.710 However, my 
findings in this dissertation suggest that this is a claim that requires further 
exploration. What had changed by the end of the Cold War period was 
perhaps not so much the perception of telecommunications as a security 
concern as the overall framework for security governance of the telecom 
sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
708 Christensen and Petersen, “Public–private partnerships on cyber security”, p. 1436. 
See also Carr, “Public-private partnerships in national cyber-security strategies”; Cavelty 
and Suter, “Public-private partnerships are no silver bullet”. 
709 Thue, Nye forbindelser, p. 10. 
710 Millward, “Business and the State”, p. 547.  
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[7]  
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this dissertation has been to investigate how the Cold War brought 
about a new security framework in the area of telecommunications. I have done 
this by focusing on different efforts to provide secure telecommunications in 
two, interconnected contexts, NATO and Denmark.  
Historically, the governance of telecommunications security prior to the 
Cold War has mainly revolved around physical protection of the facilities or 
control of information flows and been targeted against enemy interception, 
sabotage, or propaganda. In this dissertation, I show how both political and 
technological developments in the Cold War period necessitated a new kind 
of security governance of the area of telecommunications. My findings can be 
summarized in two main arguments, which I shall enlarge on and discuss in 
this final chapter. The first is that the process of ‘networking’ NATO beginning 
in the early Cold War years was the result of new demands for communications 
stemming from the international, collective defence cooperation among the 
allies. Consequently, national tele administrations were drawn into a 
transnational system-building aiming to develop communications 
infrastructures that supported the objectives of the alliance, but also served 
other technopolitical purposes and came to affect developments in civilian 
communications in the member states too. The second argument is that the 
prospect of a total, nuclear war brought along new perceptions of vulnerability 
into telecommunications system-building and engaged a wide range of actors in 
telecommunications security governance – a governance process that extended 
beyond security challenges directly related to the Cold War. 
 
I. Networking NATO – a technopolitical perspective 
 
Through the Cold War period, telecommunications appeared on the central 
agenda in NATO at different occasions. One of the analytical perspectives that 
drove my examinations was that of technopolitics, as I set out to understand 
the technopolitical agendas that lay behind the initiatives taken by the NATO 
allies to connect and protect telecommunications within the alliance. This 
analytical approach is based on the recognition that technological systems are 
the results of a process in which different actors with different ambitions have 
contributed and choices have been made. By studying the role of 
telecommunications in NATO from the point of view of technopolitics, I have 
shown in chapter two and four how the allies’ engagement with this area was 
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brought forward by different factors and how NATO’s communication 
infrastructures developed in interaction with the strategic development of the 
alliance. In conclusion, I shall highlight three points related to this process. 
First, the networking of NATO served the purpose of forming NATO 
as a political and material entity. As mentioned in the introduction, Daniel 
Headrick has framed telecommunications as a ‘tool of empire’ in his 
examination of the role of telecommunications in international politics in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Extending this observation to the 
Cold War period – although without further comparison – I suggest that within 
NATO, telecommunication was a ‘tool of alliance’. Telecommunication 
infrastructures were a crucial component in the defence build-up that began in 
Western Europe in the late 1940s and accelerated greatly with the outbreak of 
the Korean War and the establishment of NATO’s supreme allied command 
of Europe. In the context of military integration and collective defence build-
up, telecommunications security in these years meant connectivity, and the 
need for major investments in communications infrastructure was widely 
accepted, although the concrete materialisation hereof also caused disputes. 
Later, when the NATO allies adopted the nuclear strategy in the mid-1950s 
and the strategy of flexible response in the late 1960s, both shifts entailed the 
adoption of new and highly advanced communications systems, and 
communications system-building played a vital role in the practical 
implementation of these strategies.  
When bringing in the member state level, as I have done with the case of 
Denmark in this dissertation, it becomes evident how the construction of 
communication infrastructures helped materialise NATO on a national level. 
My examinations of Danish telecommunications in the 1950s in chapter three 
revealed how, due to the NATO membership, new infrastructural and 
organisational agendas were introduced into national communications system-
building. In this way, the alliance also took form in material terms, as telecom 
sectors in the member states now had to take into consideration both the 
transnational links needed for NATO purposes and provided with common 
NATO funding and new needs for domestic and transnational 
communications for national defence purposes. This brings to mind a point 
put forward in recent research on European technology and infrastructure 
history, namely that the construction of border-crossing technological and 
infrastructural systems has played an important role for ‘making Europe’ by 
visualising or materialising Europe as an entity. Drawing on this, I suggest that 
a similar argument can be made in relation to communications infrastructures 
in NATO, namely that NATO was formed as a space through the 
communications system-building that I have studied in this dissertation. 
However, keeping in mind that infrastructures possess the ability to both link 
and de-link by crossing borders as well as creating new ones, it is important to 
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note that by furthering the networking of the NATO allies in Western Europe, 
NATO’s cooperation on telecommunications also contributed to shaping the 
divided Europe. 
Second, inspired by the research field of history of technology, the 
dissertation has studied NATO as a ‘system-builder’ in Western European 
telecommunications. What was needed within NATO was not just gateways 
that could provide interoperation between different systems, but instead a 
deeper integration of the national communications systems and the 
management hereof in wartime. It was, essentially, a national decision how such 
installations needed for military communications were to be constructed and 
managed, although this decision-making also involved a number of demands 
related to NATO’s involvement in the construction of common infrastructure. 
Yet, NATO provided a forum for this transnational system-building to take 
place and paved the way for common funding hereof. In chapter two, I outlined 
how research into European telecommunications history in the early Cold War 
years has called attention to how the political push for European integration in 
the 1950s proved difficult to materialise in the area of telecommunications due 
to national tendencies of protectionism. These difficulties played a less 
significant role in NATO’s transnational telecommunications system-building, 
which was deeply embedded in military and security agendas and took priority 
over civilian agendas in communications. However, national telecom actors 
such as the PTTs played a key role in NATO’s system-building given their 
dominant positions, technical expertise, and experiences with transnational 
system-building. The system-builder perspective adds a new perspective to 
existing research on NATO in outlining how the defence build-up in Western 
Europe was not just a matter of strengthening military factors, but also one that 
involved many elements of the civil societies. I have shown with the Danish 
case how this had the consequence that the Danish tele sector became deeply 
involved in defence and security aspects of communications. While this task, 
by contrast, remained in military hands in Norway, it is still a topic for further 
exploration how this military networking process played out in other NATO 
countries and how it interacted with civilian agendas in the area of 
telecommunications. 
In continuation hereof, my third point is that the networking of NATO 
also intertwined with other political and technological agendas. Most 
importantly, the communications system-building had to be balanced with 
general societal economic circumstances. As evident from chapter two, 
financial aspects were vital for communications planning from the outset in 
both WUDO and NATO. Since telecommunications were a very costly 
component in the defence build-up, the construction of cables and radio link 
installations connecting the European allies build upon the use of existing, 
national communications infrastructure operated by civilian communication 
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authorities – in Denmark the P&T and the three regional telephone 
companies. This civilian communications infrastructure continued to be the 
backbone of internal communications within NATO, even as more advanced 
systems only for military communications were taken in use, for which reason 
NATO’s communications infrastructure in Western Europe can be 
understood as a ‘layered’ one. On a national level, the networking process also 
had to be balanced with general alliance political concerns. My examinations 
of the Danish context have revealed that more discussions between civilian and 
military stakeholders revolved around to what extent Danish solutions had to 
align with NATO standards – for instance the case with the disposal circuits 
that I examined in chapter six. The general tendency in such cases seems to be 
that it was considerations for Danish circumstances more than the NATO 
membership that guided the decisions taken in Denmark. While this can be 
understood as a particular Danish matter, it must also be taken into 
consideration that national PTTs in general had a strong position in Western 
European countries at this point, for which reason NATO’s networking 
process relied closely on their expertise. 
On a different note, but related to my third point, it is important to keep 
in mind that NATO’s telecommunications system-building took place in the 
context of the Cold War competition between the two blocks. This became 
particularly evident in NATO with the introduction of satellite 
communications, which for the United States also served an external purpose 
by showing off the technological capabilities of the alliance to the rest of the 
world. Similar to the US attempts to promote specific technological and 
scientific agendas within NATO, as other historians such as John Krige and 
Simone Turchetti have documented, my study of the area of 
telecommunications has also revealed how the United States used soft power 
in the shape of providing technological knowledge and funding to the NATO 
allies. The balancing within NATO between different available technological 
systems is of particular importance in the area of communications, where 
historians such as Hugh Slotten and Jill Hills have outlined how the United 
States in the Cold War years challenged the pre-Second World War European 
dominance by furthering the spread of new technologies, e.g. satellite 
communications as an alternative to submarine and landline cables. However, 
my findings suggest that this strategy only succeeded to a certain extent, since it 
from the outset had been a deliberate strategy for more European allies, 
including Denmark, to base the alliance’s communications on existing national 
capabilities. 
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II. Total war, nuclear threats, and the governance of 
telecommunications security 
 
A second main aim of this dissertation has been to examine how 
telecommunications were governed in terms of security through the Cold War 
period in NATO and in Denmark. For this purpose, my engagement with the 
concept of security governance was motivated by the recognition that politics is 
not limited to political decision-making but comes into being in governance 
processes in which many stakeholders interact. In this dissertation, therefore, I 
have examined the security governance of telecommunications within NATO 
and in more detail in Denmark with a particular focus on tracing by whom and 
with what purpose this took place. I shall conclude this by highlighting three 
points. 
First, in studying how the alliance’s communications systems were 
problematised from the early 1950s onwards, I argue that the governance of 
telecommunications within NATO can overall be understood as dealing with 
two main purposes. On the one hand, NATO’s agencies and member states 
sought to ensure that capacity in the existing networks would be sufficient for 
the defence of Europe in case of war. Special agencies were established for this 
purpose, namely the European Long Lines Agency and National Long Lines 
Agencies (NALLAs) in the member states, and within these agencies, a 
comprehensive task of registering circuits and practicing the management 
hereof in wartime was initiated. Thus, a central aspect of the governance of 
telecommunications was that of managing the networks with a view to wartime. 
This involved planning for redundancies and the balancing of military needs 
with other needs for communications deemed to be vital for societies in 
wartime. On the other hand, in response to the nuclear threat and the allies’ 
increased focus on the mobilisation period of a future war, new perceptions of 
communications vulnerabilities emerged within the civil emergency planning 
committee in NATO. This can be understood as a response to a general 
political awareness towards upholding the home front, which was both a 
consequence of Second World War experiences and the threat scenarios 
related to a future war. On a national level, the collaboration in NATO on civil 
emergency planning introduced new security agendas into national 
telecommunications planning, e.g. the necessity to avoid urban areas as 
communication nodes. My examination of the planning for wartime 
telecommunications in Denmark in chapter five and six revealed that the 
NATO membership served as an important motive force for the initiation of 
many security measures in particular in the 1950s and early 1960s. As less 
attention was paid directly to the nuclear threat from the early 1960s onwards, 
new dimensions were added to the perceptions of communications 
vulnerability. Many of these were related to technological developments. For 
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instance, the automation of telecom services led to new concerns about how to 
avoid breakdown and how to manage border-crossing facilities in case of crisis 
or war.  
However, when bringing the national level into the analysis, it appears 
that the security governance of telecommunications also intertwined with other 
developments in the telecom sectors. My examination of the Danish context 
shows how common standards etc. stemming from NATO agencies were in 
some cases applied in a Danish context, in some cases not. Accordingly, the 
NATO collaboration can mainly be understood as a catalyst for national 
developments in the way that it provided a framework and a number of 
standards upon which the national planning could be based. The Danish case 
suggests that from the early 1960s onwards, many of the topics that dominated 
the security governance of telecommunications were more often a response to 
national, sector-specific considerations. It must be noted, however, that this 
perhaps also reflects the circumstance that the source material available from 
the NATO Archives does not allow me to map out in detail which topics that 
were discussed among the allies in for instance ELLA and CCPC in the later 
Cold War years. Still, it appears from Danish material that many of the requests 
or initiatives related to telecommunications security from NATO were vaguely 
defined and set the stage for an implementation with a view to national 
circumstances. For instance, the NATO allies in Europe were requested to 
establish a NALLA and to take part in the international management of circuits 
in ELLA, but it was in the end a national choice how much effort that should 
be put into for instance exercise planning etc.  
The second and third point that I wish to highlight concerns the Danish 
context more specifically. An important insight from my examination hereof is 
that the placing of responsibility of telecommunications security was 
increasingly transferred to civilian spheres. This was first and foremost in 
response to a political push for lowering defence expenditures and for placing 
security responsibilities among the actors also responsible for sectoral planning 
in peacetime. Moreover, it was also a consequence of the technological 
developments in communications leading to increased complexity, for which 
reason also security aspects hereof increasingly necessitated involvement of 
technical experts. The hybrid arrangement of the Danish telecom sector meant 
that many tasks related to telecommunications security in Denmark were 
carried out by the private, regional telephone companies, but as shown in 
chapter six, the involvement of private actors caused difficulties in cases where 
commercial agendas and national security agendas did not align. This is an 
important, but still unexamined aspect of the Cold War preparedness 
planning, both in Denmark and internationally, and my research suggests that 
further exploration of the involvement of private and semi-private actors in 
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preparedness is necessary for reaching a wider understanding of the Cold War 
state. 
Third, my examinations of the Danish context have also demonstrated 
how the perception of what constituted a problem of telecommunications 
security was broadened through the Cold War period. What began in the 
1950s as attempts to secure the telecommunications infrastructure against the 
nuclear threat evolved to be a complex security apparatus in which new security 
issues emerged out of the civil-military cooperation. In the preparations for war 
and critical situations, peacetime scenarios of technological breakdowns and 
the like also appeared as critical, and in this way, the imagination of breakdowns 
caused by different factors came to serve as a motive force in 
telecommunications planning. This is an important aspect of the governance 
of critical infrastructures, which has become a growing research field since 
critical infrastructure protection first appeared on political agendas in the 
1990s. With reference to the argument made by the social scientists Collier 
and Lakoff that the Cold War was a pivotal moment in constituting system-
vulnerability as an object of thought and total preparedness as a national 
security problem in its own right, my examinations have outlined in detail how 
vulnerabilities and preparedness planning came into being in a specific sector, 
namely telecommunications. I hereby add an important aspect to current 
understandings by showing how security governance did not only involve 
‘security thinkers’ placed in central political agencies, e.g. those dealing with 
civil defence planning, but was also a result of sector-specific dynamics and 
technopolitical developments.  
 
*** 
 
The dissertation demonstrates how the striving for ‘nuclear-proof 
communications’ is an important chapter in the history of telecommunications. 
Through the chapters, I have shown how a new security framework came to 
surround telecommunications in the Cold War period, adding new dimensions 
to telecommunications security in the shape of increased awareness around 
vulnerability, network capacity, and flexibility of communication facilities. In 
examining these aspects, the dissertation sheds new light to a theme, which has 
been dominant in communications since the nineteenth century – and also 
prior to that – namely the quest for reliability and security. In the Cold War 
era, this quest was redefined with reference to the concept of the total defence 
and, for the NATO allies, along the lines of the alliance membership.  
The narrative of this dissertation concentrates on NATO’s Western 
European spaces and the pitfall of doing so is that the importance of inner-
western developments is perhaps overestimated. I have only very briefly 
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touched upon the governance of telecommunications linking with neutral and 
enemy states, as I demonstrated in chapter six how these links posed a problem 
in NATO’s wartime planning. In peacetime, however, despite Cold War bloc 
politics, links with Warsaw Pact counties were extended through the Cold War 
period, for instance between Denmark and Poland and Denmark and the 
German Democratic Republic. Research into broadcasting and other 
communication means has shown how the Iron Curtain was bridged or 
perforated in different ways from a technological point of view.711 The 
perforation of the iron curtain has also been studied in research on political 
Cold War history.712 Thus, it is important to keep in mind that the Cold War 
security framework is not suitable for explaining everything and that bloc 
politics should not be exaggerated. Moreover, it is important to note that the 
security governance of telecommunications outlined in this dissertation should 
probably not be understood as a phenomenon limited to the NATO countries. 
To my knowledge, communication preparedness has not yet been examined 
in either other NATO countries or neutral ones, but previous research into 
civil defence issues during the Cold War has revealed how the reach hereof 
was immense in neutral countries like Sweden and Switzerland, and it is very 
probable that this also extended to communications.713 Examinations of 
communications preparedness planning constitutes a fruitful topic for further 
exploration by historians. 
My findings suggest that the international cooperation on 
communications within NATO is a fruitful field for further research. My 
examinations have paid particular attention to cases from the early Cold War 
period, as I have found it necessary to understand how and in which 
technopolitical context the system-building emerged. More material related to 
NATO’s communications cooperation is likely to become available for 
researchers in the future. As my examinations have demonstrated, the defence 
cooperation in NATO reached well beyond defence areas and had wide 
implications also for civilian communications. It remains a topic for further 
exploration how this was dealt with in other national contexts than the Danish 
one and how for instance large private businesses took part in this project. Such 
examinations may not only reveal new aspects of Cold War preparedness 
planning on communications – as I have shown, approaching the topic of 
communications from the point of view of wartime planning can also more 
generally shed light on the role of telecommunications in modern societies and 
on internal dynamics within telecom sectors. 
                                               
711 See for instance Badenoch et al. eds., Airy Curtains in the European Ether. 
712 See for instance Villaume and Westad eds., Perforating the Iron Curtain. 
713 See for instance Ziauddin, “Superpower Underground”; Linnarsson, “Rayon för 
rikets försörjning”; Cronqvist, “Survival in the Welfare Cocoon”. 
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This topic is not least relevant if we wish to reach a deeper understanding 
of the security problems related to information and communication 
technologies (ICT) today. After the end of the Cold War, ICT has gained 
importance as a new space of security governance. The cyber risk is often 
presented as one of the main security challenges of the twenty-first century. 
Facing asymmetrical threats like terrorist and hacker attacks, the cyber front 
has indeed become a ‘first line of defence’. However, in scholarly as well as in 
popular debates, there is a tendency towards treating the cyber threat as a new 
phenomenon. Certainly, the development of a global and easily accessible 
World Wide Web since the end of the Cold War and the increasing 
interconnectedness of different infrastructures has brought along new risks and 
security challenges – not least for those societies, among them Denmark, that 
are front runners of digitisation. Moreover, the liberalisation of the area of 
communications – along with many other societal critical infrastructures like 
transport and postal matters – means that security governance of these sectors 
today involves a large number of private and multinational corporations. 
However, with this dissertation, I suggest that we need to apply a perspective of 
continuity on critical communication infrastructure protection in the twentieth 
and twenty-first century if we wish to understand how processes of security 
governance come into being and play out for critical infrastructures. With the 
prospect of an all-encompassing total war, the Cold War period was decisive 
for placing communications infrastructures at the very centre of the security 
apparatus of the modern state. 
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Summary 
The PhD dissertation Nuclear-proof communications?  examines how the 
Cold War brought about a new security framework in the area of 
telecommunications. The dissertation explores different efforts to provide 
secure telecommunications in two, interconnected contexts, NATO and one 
of the member states, Denmark, from the late 1940s through to the 1980s. 
Drawing on the concept of technopolitics, the dissertation asks how different 
efforts to connect and protect telecommunications in NATO and Denmark 
were shaped by both technological and political factors. Moreover, the 
dissertation engages with the concept of security governance in order to 
examine how telecommunications were governed in terms of security, not only 
by politicians, but in a dynamic interplay between different stakeholders – 
among them NATO committees, military authorities, the P&T, and the Danish 
telephone companies.  
Historically, the governance of telecommunications security prior to the 
Cold War revolved around physical protection of facilities or control of 
information flows and was targeted against enemy interception, sabotage, or 
propaganda. Based on investigations of archive material from NATO and 
Denmark, this dissertation shows how both political and technological 
developments in the Cold War necessitated a new kind of security governance 
of the area of telecommunications. First, the dissertation examines the role 
ascribed to communication infrastructures in the international defence 
cooperation that emerged among the NATO allies and in the strategic 
development that the alliance went through in the Cold War period. In doing 
so, it shows how the cooperation on both military and civilian communications 
was a tool of alliance in the sense that it formed NATO as a political and 
material entity. Since NATO’s communications rested on national 
communication resources, national tele administrations in Western Europe 
became involved in transnational system-building. In Denmark, this led to a 
number of dilemmas on how to balance civilian and military needs and 
provided opportunities for prioritising civilian aspects in the defence build-up.  
Second, by exploring in detail the immense preparedness planning that 
took place in the area of telecommunications in Denmark, the dissertation 
documents how Cold War threat scenarios became a motive force for 
technological and organisational developments in communications. New 
perceptions of vulnerability, directly catalysed by the NATO membership, 
were added to communications planning in response to the nuclear threat, but 
over time the perception of vulnerabilities was broadened to include many 
peacetime scenarios too. In this way, the governance of telecommunications 
security extended beyond security challenges directly related to the Cold War. 
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Dansk resumé 
Ph.d.-afhandlingen Nuclear-proof communications?  undersøger, hvordan 
Den Kolde Krig bibragte telekommunikationsområdet en ny 
sikkerhedspolitisk dimension. Dette gøres ved at analysere forskellige forsøg 
på at sikre kommunikationsfaciliteterne i NATO og i et af NATO’s 
medlemslande, Danmark, fra slutningen af 1940erne og frem til 1980erne. Ved 
hjælp af begrebet ‘technopolitics’ spørger afhandlingen, hvordan en række 
tiltag til at forbinde og beskytte telekommunikationerne i NATO og Danmark 
var formet af både teknologiske og politiske faktorer. Afhandlingen benytter 
desuden begrebet ’security governance’ til at udforske, hvordan den 
sikkerhedspolitiske håndtering af telekommunikationsområdet ikke blot blev 
til af politikere, men i et dynamisk samspil mellem forskellige aktører – 
deriblandt NATO-komitéer, militære myndigheder, P&T og de danske 
telefonselskaber. 
I perioden frem til Den Kolde Krig drejede 
telekommunikationssikkerhed sig primært om fysisk sikring af faciliteter eller 
om kontrol over informationsstrømme og var rettet mod fjendtlig aflytning, 
sabotage eller propaganda. På baggrund af undersøgelser af arkivmateriale fra 
NATO og Danmark viser denne afhandling, hvordan både politiske og 
teknologiske udviklinger i Den Kolde Krig nødvendiggjorde nye 
sikkerhedsmæssige håndteringer af teleområdet. For det første undersøges den 
rolle, som kommunikationsinfrastrukturer blev tiltænkt i det internationale 
forsvarssamarbejde, der opstod blandt de NATO-allierede og i den strategiske 
udvikling, som alliancen gennemgik. Hermed argumenterer afhandlingen for, 
at samarbejdet om både militære og civile kommunikationer var et ’tool of 
alliance’ i den forstand, at det formede NATO som en politisk og materiel 
enhed. Idet NATO’s kommunikation var baseret på nationale ressourcer, blev 
nationale teleadministrationer i Vesteuropa dybt involveret i transnational 
’system-building’. I Danmark medførte dette en række dilemmaer 
omhandlende balanceringen af civile og militære kommunikationsbehov, men 
det åbnede også muligheder for at prioritere civile aspekter som en del af den 
omfattende forsvarsopbygning. 
For det andet viser afhandlingen via en grundig udforskning af 
beredskabsplanlægningen på teleområdet i Danmark, hvordan Den Kolde 
Krigs trusselsscenarier blev en drivkraft for både teknologiske og 
organisatoriske udviklinger på teleområdet. Som konsekvens af atomtruslen – 
og direkte foranlediget af NATO-medlemsskabet – blev nye opfattelser af 
sårbarhed tænkt ind i kommunikationsplanlægningen, men over tid blev 
opfattelsen af sårbarhed udvidet til også at inkludere mange fredstidsscenarier. 
På denne måde rakte den sikkerhedspolitiske styring af teleområdet ud over 
sikkerhedsmæssige udfordringer direkte relateret til Den Kolde Krig.   
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Source material 
 
NATO Archives (NA) 
In the document IDs, D refers to documents, M to memoranda, N to notes, 
and R to records. 
• AC/4: Infrastructure Committee 
• AC/29: Working Group on Definition of Common Infrastructure 
• AC/98: Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee 
• AC/109: Working Group on Wartime International Communication 
Requirements 
• AC/121: Civil Communications Planning Committee 
• C: The North Atlantic Council 
• D: North Atlantic Council Deputies 
• DPC: Defence Planning Committee 
• IMS: International Military Staff 
• MC: The Military Committee 
• LOCO: Liaison Office Communication  
• LO: Standing Group Liaison Office Paris  
• PDD: Public Diplomacy Division / NATO Information Service 
• SG: The Standing Group 
• SHAPE Histories 
Available from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/91523.htm  
o “SHAPE History Volume I”, 1953 
o “SHAPE History Volume II”, c. 1953.  
o “SHAPE History – The New Approach (1953-1956)”, c. 1956. 
o “SHAPE History – 1957”, 1957. 
o “SHAPE History – 1958”, 1958. 
 
 
NATO E-Library (NA-E) 
• Official texts: https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/official_texts.htm  
 
Rigarkivet / Danish National Archives (RA) 
• Forsvarsministeriet (FM) 
• Indenrigsministeriet (IM) 
• IT- og Telestyrelsen (ITTS) 
• Jydsk Telefon-Aktieselskab (JTAS) 
• Ministeriet for Offentlige Arbejder (MOA) 
• Trafikministeriet (TM) 
• Udenrigsministeriet (UM) 
• Økonomiministeriet (ØM) 
 
ENIGMA Archives (EA) 
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The History of ITU Portal (ITU-H)  
Available at: https://www.itu.int/en/history/Pages/Home.aspx 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 
Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments  
• FRUS 1948 Volume III 
• FRUS 1950 Volume I and III 
• FRUS 1951 Volume III 
 
Published Danish material 
• Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen 
• Rigsdagstidende 
• Folketingstidende 
• Weekendavisen 
• Berlingske Tidende 
 
National Archives, The United Kingdom 
• The Ministry of Defence: DEFE 5 – Chiefs of Staff Committee: 
Memoranda 
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Annex A:  
List of committees, authorities etc. 
 
English name Danish name Description 
Allied Long Lines 
Agency (ALLA) 
 In 1965, ELLA was renamed ALLA. The 
terms of reference for ALLA were to support 
NATO’s Standing Group, commands, 
national forces, and civil emergency agencies 
in having their requirements for long lines met 
in the most efficient manner. 
The Chief of Defence Forsvarschefen (FCH) The supreme commander of the Danish 
Defence. The position was established 1950 to 
ensure a joint command of all the defence 
services. 
Civil Communications 
Planning Committee 
(CCPC) 
 Established in 1957 in order to study the 
overall requirements for communications 
needed for civil purposes in time of war and 
make recommendations for how to close gaps 
in communications requirements in wartime. 
Civil Defence 
 
Civilforsvaret A general term for all parts of the Civil 
Defence in Denmark, including the Civil 
Defence Board and the planning of civil 
defence activities at the local level. The Civil 
Defence was established with a law of April 1 
1949 as a successor to the State Civil Air 
Defence [Statens Civile Luftværn], which had 
existed since 1938 and was responsible for 
planning for the protection of the civilian 
population in case of air strikes. The Civil 
Defence engaged both conscripted and 
volunteer personnel that could be drafted in 
case of mobilization. 
Civil Defence Board Civilforsvarsstyrelsen 
(CFS) 
The board in charge of the central planning of 
the Civil Defence. Established with the law on 
Civil Defence of April 1949 and placed under 
the Ministry of Interior. 
Committee for Defence 
Economy  
Det Forsvars-
økonomiske Udvalg 
A committee of civil servants established by 
the Danish government in October 1950 with 
the task of coordinating financial questions 
related to the military and civilian defensive 
measures taken in this period. 
Committee for Defence 
Rationalisation  
Forsvarets 
Rationaliseringsudvalg 
Established by the Ministry of Defence in 
1953 in order to evaluate the administration of 
the defence staff. In June 1957, the committee 
was asked to review the Defence Telegraph 
Administration. 
Coordination 
Committee under the 
Telephone Control 
Board 
Samarbejdsudvalget 
(SU) 
Samordningsudvalget 
(SO) 
A coordination committee established under 
the Telephone Control Board in 1948 in 
order to ensure the necessary internal 
cooperation between the telephone 
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administrations, in particular in technical and 
standardisation matters. 
Defence Command 
Denmark 
Forsvarskommandoen 
(FKO) 
As part of a 1969 reorganisation of the Danish 
Defence, the Defence Command was 
established in 1970. Thereby, the different 
commands within the defence (the Army 
Command, the Naval Command, and the Air 
Command) were organised in a joint 
command. 
Defence Telegraph  
Administration 
Forsvarets 
Telegrafforvaltning 
(FTF) 
A special defence committee existing from 
1952 to 1962. The Defence Telegraph 
Administration coordinated the technical and 
financial planning and administration of the 
permanent telecommunication services of the 
defence.  
European Long Lines 
Agency (ELLA) 
 Established under SHAPE in 1951 in order to 
coordinate matters concerning the use of 
national telecommunications facilities in 
support of the military effort for the defence of 
Western Europe. Renamed ALLA in 1965. 
Responsible to the Military Committee and 
Located in Brussels. 
European Military 
Communications 
Coordination 
Committee (EMCCC) 
 Established under SHAPE in 1951 in order to 
study the work needed to be done to 
implement the agreed signal communications 
plans. 
European Frequency 
Agency (ERFA) 
 Established under SHAPE in 1951 in order to 
coordinate matters concerning the use of radio 
frequencies in support of the military effort for 
the defence of Western Europe. 
 Fyns kommunale 
Telefonselskab (FkT) 
The telephone company on Funen, which 
existence reaches back to the establishment of 
Odense Telefon-Selskab in 1884. The 
company later came to cover the entire Funen 
area and was organised as a cooperative society 
in which the local municipalities were partners. 
Government Committee 
for Civil Emergency 
Planning 
Regeringsudvalget for 
Civilt Beredskab 
(RUCB) 
A government committee established in 1956 
to further and coordinate the planning of civil 
preparedness issues on the highest political 
level. 
Inter-Ministerial Signal 
Committee 
Den Interministerielle 
Signalkomité (IMSK) 
Established in 1953 as a consultative 
committee coordinating civilian and military 
interests in telecommunications. Members 
were appointed by the Ministry of Defence 
and the Ministry of Public Works, and the 
General Director of the P&T served as 
chairman. IMSK was closed down in 1993. 
 Jydsk Telefon A/S 
(JTAS) 
The telephone company serving most parts of 
Jutland. The company was established in 
1895, when 17 local telephone companies 
merged into one. From 1942, the Danish state 
owned the majority of the company. In 1992, 
the company was incorporated into Tele 
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Danmark along with the other regional 
telephone companies. 
 Kjøbenhavns Telefon 
A/S (KTAS) 
The telephone company serving Copenhagen, 
Zealand, Bornholm and Lolland-Falster in the 
period under study. The company reaches 
back to 1881. From 1939, the Danish state 
owned the majority of the company. In 1992, 
the company was incorporated into Tele 
Danmark along with the other regional 
telephone companies. 
National Board on 
Telecommunications 
Statens Teleråd The National Board on Telecommunications 
was from 1982 the successor to the Telephone 
Control Board. 
National Telecom 
Service 
Statens Teletjeneste A state-owned company established in 1986. 
The company took over the international 
telecommunication services and a few 
nationwide tasks from the P&T. As of 1991, 
the assets and liabilities of National Telecom 
Service were transferred to Tele Denmark. 
National Long Lines 
Agency Denmark 
(NALLA Denmark) 
 A coordinating agency established under the 
Ministry of Defence in 1961. Prior to this, the 
agency had existed temporarily during signal 
exercises. In 1975, the responsibility of 
NALLA was transferred to the Postal and 
Telegraph Services (P&T). From 1991, 
NALLA was placed under the  National 
Telecom Agency [Telestyrelsen], later the 
National IT and Telecom Agency [IT- og 
Telestyrelsen]. NALLA was closed down in 
2008, whereupon its field of responsibility and 
archives were transferred to the Danish 
Defence Intelligence Services [Forsvarets 
Efterretningstjeneste]. 
Postal and Telegraph 
Services 
Post- og 
Telegrafvæsenet (P&T) 
A state directorate in charge of postal and 
telecommunications matters established in 
1927 by merging the activities of the Post 
Services and Telegraph Services. The P&T 
was headed by a General Directorate and was 
placed as a department under the Ministry of 
Public Works. 
Secretariat for Civil 
Emergency Planning 
Sekretariatet for Civilt 
Beredskab (SCB) 
The secretariat attached to the Government 
Committee for Civil Emergency Planning 
established in 1956. In 1962, the secretariat 
was transferred from the Prime Minister’s 
Office to the Ministry of Interior. 
Senior Civil Emergency 
Planning Committee 
(SCEPC) 
 
 Established by the NATO Council with a 
resolution of November 1955. SCEPC was to 
advice the Council and make 
recommendations on all matters related to civil 
emergency planning and coordinate the 
activities of all emergency planning boards, 
committees, and working groups. 
Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe 
(SACEUR) 
 The position as SACEUR was established by 
the NATO allies in 1950. SACEUR had 
operational control over all the forces assigned 
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to the Allied Command Europe and was 
responsible for the organisation and training 
herof. In time of war, SACEUR would be 
responsible for the overall conduct of all 
operations under the Allied Command 
Europe. 
Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe 
(SHAPE) 
 The Headquarters of NATO’s Allied 
Command Europe from 1951 to 2003. First 
located at Rocquencourt, France, from 1967 at 
Casteau, Mons, Belgium. Commanded by 
SACEUR. 
Telephone Control 
Board 
Telefontilsynet (TTS) A supervisory organ established under the 
Ministry of Public Works in 1919. The 
control board supervised the telephone 
companies operating under concession and 
coordinated the cooperation between the 
ministry, the companies and the P&T. 
Western Union 
Defence Organisation 
(WUDO) 
 The military body of the Western Union 
created with the 1948 Brussels Treaty between 
the UK, France, and the Benelux countries. 
WUDO was active as of September 1948 with 
headquarters in Fontainebleau, France. 
WUDO was disbanded in December 1951 
and its headquarters, personnel and plans 
transferred to NATO.  
 
 
